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ABSTRACT

This literature review is intended for policymakers and researchers concerned with citizen participation in the educational decision-making process. The study examines (1) the functions of interest groups in social science analysis of the political process; (2) the dominant theories employed in social research on interest group processes; (3) the results of such research as it is relevant to citizen participation generally and the educational decision-making process specifically. Section I summarizes theories and research related to participation and presents hypotheses which consider a functional approach to the interest group process. This approach stresses the consequences of participation for the individual and for the stability of the social system. Section II presents a network analysis approach which interprets participation in terms of both formal (voluntary associations) and informal (primary groups, family, and ethnic groups) relationships. This section also explores implications of available findings for political participation at the community level. The emergence of ethnic identity as a dimension of political behavior is discussed in Section III. Federal programs designed to promote the organization of minority urban poor are reviewed in Section IV. In addition, studies which gave insight into the process involved in school decentralization policies are analyzed. The section concludes with an examination of the communities which appear to foster citizen participation in educational decision making. (KC)

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SOCIAL SCIENCE THEORY AND RESEARCH ON PARTICIPATION AND VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY.

by: LOIS SAXELBY STEINBERG

JULY, 1977

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FOREWORD

This report is one of nine resulting from the first year of a 33-month research project by the Institute for Responsive Education (I.R.E.) and the Education and Human Resources Development Division of Optimum Computer Systems, Inc. (OCS).

Entitled "Citizen Organizations: A Study of Citizen Participation in Educational Decisionmaking," the project is funded by the Group on School Capacity for Problem Solving of the National Institute of Education.

The principal purpose of the study is to increase understanding of:(1) ways in which organizations have impact on local decisionmaking, (2) ways in which they work to increase the responsiveness of public institutions (e.g., schools and school systems) to the constituents they serve, and (3) ways in which they enhance the power of minorities and of low-income residents. The study is particularly concerned about ways in which parents and other community members, especially urban minorities and the poor, participate in decisions that bear on the education of their children.

Sources of Data

Data for the reports from this study are drawn from a variety of sources. Seven cities were visited: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York and San Francisco. In each city, the superintendent of schools, the president and members of the school board, the education editors of the major daily newspapers, the head of the teachers' organization, the mayor's chief education aide, key school administrators in the central district office, other informed observers of school politics, and the staff director, officers, or members of 10 to 20 different kinds of citizen organizations were interviewed.

Visits were made to three State capitals (Denver, Sacramento, and Tallahassee) to interview State legislators, legislative staff members, State department of education officials, and observers of State educational politics.

Interviews were conducted with foundation officials, staff members of the National Education Association, the American Federation of Teachers, the National School Boards Association, the Council of Great City Schools, the National Congress of Parents and Teachers, the National Committee for Citizens in Education, the National Coalition of Title I Parents, the Coalition of Indian-Controlled School Boards, Office of Education administrators, the Education Commission of the States, the Children's Defense Fund, the Federal Education Project of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law, and a variety of other national and State citizen and education interest groups.

A comprehensive computer search of relevant literature was undertaken that included these data bases: Education Resources Information Center, Social Sciences Citation Index, Sociology Abstracts, and the Foundation Center Data Bank. In addition, conventional literature searches were made including the dissertation abstracts and periodical and book indexes. More than 500 books, articles, reports and dissertations were reviewed and summarized; annotations were prepared for most of these.

The conventional sources of data for Federal and State court cases were reviewed extensively, including the State and regional reporting system, the Federal Supplement (F. SUPP.), Federal Reporter Second (F. 2nd), United States Reporter (U.S.), Supreme Court Reporter (S. Ct.), United States Law Week (U.S.L.W.), and Poverty Law Reporter.

A request for information and opinions was mailed to approximately 15,000 readers of the I.R.E. quarterly publication Citizen Action in Education.

To further this project, the Education Commission of the States prepared and disseminated a request for information from each State to locate relevant State laws, regulations, guidelines and court cases.

Since August 1976 we have continuously scanned several sources of relevant current news and information: Education Daily, Education U.S.A., Compact and Legislative Report (of the Education Commission of the States), and a variety of organization newsletters.

Terminology

The use of multiple data sources adds further complexity to an already ill-defined area. Citizen participation is not a unitary concept. No single theoretical framework can encompass it. It means many different things and is used in many ways. For our purposes, we use the word citizen to refer to parents and other adult residents in a city or town. It normally excludes students, even though students are sometimes involved in some of the varied activities known as citizen participation. It also excludes professional educators and school staff, only to make the important distinction between noneducators and the professionals and other employees of the schools.

Participation, as we use it and as it is most commonly used, means taking part in activities in order to exercise power or influence--to have impact on decisionmaking. However, much difficulty and confusion arise with this usage in that much that is called participation involves little or no power or influence. In looking at any of the forms of citizen participation in this report and the other reports in the series, it is particularly important to consider degrees or levels of power or impact as well as the nature and purpose of the participation.

In order to encompass most of the major purposes of participation, we have set forward six according to impact: (1) impact on policy, (2) impact on service delivery, (3) impact on community development, (4) impact on the individual participant, (5) impact on student performance in school, and (6) impact on the effectiveness of the citizen organization.

We will use the term involvement (rather than participation), where there is no clear intent to exercise power or to have an effect on decisionmaking.

Throughout this report and the others in this series, we differentiate between citizen-initiated organizations and mandated organizations. The latter are those groups that are formed by action of a local school or school system, or by State or Federal legislative or executive or court action.

The first phase of our study of citizen organizations was designed to be impressionistic. Our assertions, definitions, and conclusions should be viewed as tentative. These will be tested further in our field studies in three urban sites.

In this report and its six companion reports, we attempt to describe the current status of citizen participation in the United States by depicting selected features:

1. PATTERNS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN EDUCATIONAL DECISIONMAKING:
   Volume 1: Overview of the Status of Citizen Participation.
   Volume 2: Diverse and Shifting Patterns of Citizen Participation.

   Volume 1, an interpretive essay by Don Davies, establishes the ideological framework and sketches a historical, social, and educational context for the study. Observations and hypotheses drawn from preliminary field studies are woven together in an examination of several basic questions: Who partcipates? In what ways and in what issues? With what impact? In what governmental context?

   Volume 2 considers a variety of channels--including advisory councils, neighborhood associations, and networks--that offer structural innovations to increase citizen access to schools. The authors analyze the strengths and limitations of various types of involvement with particular emphasis on evidence of effectiveness in countering professional domination. These initial observations will be tested and supplemented in more intensive and systematic phases of the research.

2. FEDERAL AND STATE IMPACT ON CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN THE SCHOOLS.

   One unanticipated finding during initial stages of the study was the intervention of government agencies to increase citizen involvement in schools. This collection of five chapters documents those actions of the Federal Government--legislative, executive and judicial--which open new avenues for citizen participation in education. Attention is also focused on the actions of State governments which give new legitimacy to public involvement in schools through legislation, regulations, and administrative practices. Both Federal and State court decisions and procedures for desegregating schools which stimulate participation receive extended treatment.

3. SOCIAL SCIENCE THEORY AND RESEARCH ON PARTICIPATION AND VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS: A Bibliographic Essay.

Lois Steinberg reviews conceptual frameworks, analytic constructs, and field-based research to throw light on issues pertinent to participation. Topics include the politics of education, the role of interest groups in social science analysis of the political process, the dominant theoretical perspectives of social science research on interest group processes, and the effects of this research on citizen participation in educational decisionmaking.

4. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN EDUCATIONAL DECISIONMAKING: An Annotated Bibliography.

Updating a previous bibliography prepared by the Institute for Responsive Education in 1974, this publication provides annotations for more than 500 books, essays, and articles on citizen participation.

5. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN THE SCHOOLS: A Special Report to Policymakers in the States.

This summary of policy implications draws on Report #2, Federal and State Impact on Citizen Participation in the Schools. The intended audience includes personnel in executive and legislative branches of State government.

6. A DIRECTORY OF STATE AND NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SERVING LOCAL CITIZEN GROUPS.

Designed as a tool for citizens involved in schools, this resource directory appears in Citizen Action in Education, the national newsletter of the Institute for Responsive Education.

Continuation Activities

Following this first-year national study of current organizations and their activities, intensive investigations will commence in Atlanta, Boston, and Los Angeles, beginning in fall 1977. In each city, a site coordinator and staff of part-time community researchers will use case-study methodology, participant observation, and survey techniques to study several citizen organizations for about 18 months. The organizations will be studied in the context of their sociopolitical environments.

Each organization's internal structure and the characteristics of its members will be examined. An attempt will be made to relate these characteristics to organizational effectiveness. A cross-site comparison will be made to produce both theoretical and practical perspectives on organizational behavior and to develop recommendations for local, State and Federal policymakers.

The final phase of the study continues the work in the three cities but focuses on the process of individual and group relationships and interchange called "networking." The study staff will intervene to encourage networking and will document the results of these efforts.

The study will terminate in the spring of 1979 with several major publications including:

1. A Citizen's Guide to Informed Citizen Participation, which will outline results of the study and address the question, "What is informed citizen participation and what makes it work?";

2. An Administrator's Handbook to provide school people with information about the most productive ways to encourage and assist citizen participation;

3. A Report on Policy Issues Related to Citizen Participation In Education Decisionmaking prepared for decisionmakers;

4. A Special Report to the NIE Staff;

5. A Technical Research Report.

The Principal Investigator for the 33-month study is Don Davies, President of the Institute for Responsive Education. Marilyn Gittell, Assistant Vice President and Associate Provost at Brooklyn College, has taken a leave of absence to work with Optimum Computer Systems, Inc. as Director of Research for the study.

The Institute for Responsive Education (I.R.E.) is a nonprofit, private organization, founded in 1973 by Don Davies to study and assist the process of citizen participation in educational decisionmaking. It is housed in the Department of System Development and Adaptation, School of Education, Boston University, where Davies is chairperson and a professor.

Optimum Computer Systems, Inc. (OCS) is a minority-owned company, founded in 1968 and located in New York City. Cyril D. Tyson (president of OCS' Education and Human Resources Development Division) and other staff members have had extensive experience in the planning, management, delivery and evaluation of educational services, particularly in inner-city and other poverty areas.

For more information about the NIE-funded study of citizen organizations, about the Institute for Responsive Education, or about the Education and Human Resources Development Division of Optimum Computer Systems, Inc., write or call:

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PREFACE

This review of theory and research on interest groups is intended for policymakers and researchers concerned with citizen participation in the educational decision-making process. It focuses on the following questions:

- Why have interest groups played a central role in social science analyses of the political process in the United States?
- What are the dominant theoretical perspectives that have been employed in the social research on interest group processes?
- What do the findings of this research tell us about citizen participation generally, and about citizen participation in the educational decision-making process specifically?

Section I summarizes the theory and research related to the above questions. Findings of the empirical studies are presented in terms of several hypotheses derived from the theoretical formulations which reflect a functional approach to the interest group process stressing the consequences of participation for the individual and the stability of the social system.

Another approach, which provides for the interpretation of participation through both formal associations and informal relationships, is presented in the discussion of network analysis in Section II. Although the term "network" has been employed in studies dealing with voting behavior and interpersonal influence, the codification of network concepts and research techniques is a relatively new enterprise. In addition to presenting definitions of the major concepts that have been developed by network analysts, this section explores the implications of the available findings for political participation at the local community level.

For the most part the theory and research on interest groups and decisionmaking reviewed in Section I tended to reflect assimilationist assumptions--or the "melting

pot" concept--and therefore usually failed to consider the impact of ethnic factors on political behavior. The emergence of ethnic identity as a salient dimension of American society and political behavior and the distinction between "old" and "new" style ethnic politics are discussed in Section III.

Civil disorders, characteristic of major urban centers in the 1960's, have been interpreted by most analysts as the result of population changes, the political reform movement, unsatisfied expectations, Federal intervention and the consequent decline of the political "machine." Federal efforts to promote the organization of minority urban poor are viewed as one response to the widespread dissatisfaction with the public services provided for this segment of the population. A review of evaluations of these Federal programs, presented in Section IV, suggests the extent to which these efforts stimulated participation of the poor and promoted social change.

The literature on school decentralization suggests that demands for community control of schools were initiated by leadership developed through the community action programs. Section IV concludes with an analysis of the studies which contributed insights into the political processes related to the adoption of decentralization policies and the organizational characteristics of the community which appear to foster citizen participation in educational decisions.

I. SOCIAL SCIENCE THEORY AND RESEARCH ON PARTICIPATION AND VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS

For social scientists who had assumed that all interests were represented--or could easily be represented--in the American political system, demands for participation in the 1960's came as a surprise. The most influential political scientists and sociologists had created an image of this country as consisting of a variety of diverse subgroups held together together by a political system that provided for bargaining, negotiation and compromise among all contending interests.

Descriptions of the political behavior of Americans often referred to their activism--particularly their membership in voluntary associations. We were a society of "joiners"--all anyone had to do to get his interests represented was to join an appropriate group, or start a new one. There was a problem with this image, however. It applied primarily to middle- and upper-middle-class Americans.

Many scholars had expressed concern about what was usually referred to as the "apathy" of the bottom segment of the population. Others assumed that the lack of participation was a sign of satisfaction with the system, ignorance or just indifference.

When community conflict involved hitherto nonaffiliated and nonorganized segments of the population, often in opposition to established community power structures, there was a tendency to interpret such opposition in terms of personal pathology rather than as evidence of an objective clash of interests. Underlying this view was the assumption that only organized interests were legitimate.

The emergence in the 1960's of numerous protest groups that began as social movements, rather than as formal voluntary associations, challenged that latter assumption. Government sponsorship of new channels for the participation of the poor has provided a rich source of both new data and new questions on political behavior. To those concerned with the participation of the poor perhaps the central questions have been: did the poor particpate more?

and, what were the results?

The purpose of this essay is to review the works of contemporary social science theorists, primarily sociologists and political scientists who have been concerned with the effects of formal and informal association membership at the local level. The former are usually referred to as "voluntary associations" and include interest groups, fraternal societies, church groups, political parties, trade unions, and civic associations. Included in the informal category are primary groups, networks, family or kinship groups, friendship cliques, and ethnic groups.

The significance, for political behavior, of citizen participation in both voluntary and informal associations, has preoccupied a number of contemporary theorists (i.e., those writing between 1950 and the present), but each has tended to focus on one type of association. In addition, they tend to differ in their views on the consequences of such participation. Whereas some dwell on the effects on society (particularly the stability of the "political system"), others emphasize their importance to the individual (the promotion of political competence and a sense of efficacy). A few theorists include both societal and individual consequences.

A. RECENT AND CLASSICAL THEORIES

There is general agreement among most theorists that for individuals the primary functions of voluntary associations are protective and integrative. Voluntary associations are viewed as linkage mechanisms between the citizen and his governmental representatives, providing access to authorities and two-way communication channels. On the one hand, they operate as independent power bases to resist the abuses of centralized power, and on the other hand, they serve to bind the citizen to the national society. Although informal associations can serve these functions, their ability to do so is considered much weaker than that of formal associations.

Another important distinction among contemporary theorists involves the level of analysis. Some deal with the role of voluntary association participation at the local decisionmaking level, whereas others are more concerned with national affairs. There has been relatively little empirical research that relates local participation to the national level although this relationship was stressed by those earlier democratic theorists whom Pateman classifies as theorists of participatory democracy.[1/]

Between 1950 and the early 1960's, there were three basic issues underlying social science thinking on citizen participation:

(1) the preservation of democracy in the modern state--or the conditions required to maintain a stable democracy,

(2) the extent of participation in American society--or the discrepancy between democratic doctrine and actual democratic practice,

(3) the distribution of power and influences in decisionmaking--or the "Who governs?" question.

To a large extent, social science concern with these issues was stimulated by the effort to explain the rise of totalitarian governments in European democracies and the findings of empirical research on political behavior in the United States. Both factors led to the conclusion that the average citizen was not the rational activist portrayed in earlier statements of democratic theory. For example, Almond and Verba note that:

> Recent studies of political behavior call the rationality-activist model into question, for it is becoming clear that citizens in democracies rarely live up to this model. They are not well informed, not deeply involved, nor particularly active; and the process by which they come to their voting decision is anything but a process of rational calculation.[2]

In many respects the social scientists' efforts to explain this state of affairs reflect the same issues that dominated scholarly dialogue in the 1930's and 1940's. To some analysts, the failure of democracy to develop a broad-based responsible citizenry is due to established hierarchial institutional arrangements which assign a subordinate and passive role to most citizens.[3] Others attribute the failure to the inherent limitations of human nature.[4] These opposing views give rise to three distinct prescriptions to achieve stable democracy:

(1) create new participatory opportunities through the development of insitutitional arrangements which provide a meaningful participatory role for the average citizen in local institutions,

(2) change the individual through the expansion of socialization processes found conducive to fostering democratic responsibility and efficacy

(mainly those practiced in middle-class and upper-middle-class families),

(3) revise democratic theory. Alternatives falling into this category usually include notions about the desirability of limited, rather than full, participation.

It is the third alternative that has prevailed in contemporary theory. Most theorists can be described as theorists of representative rather than participatory democracy. These "democratic-elitists" rationalize the domination of decisionmaking by elites on the basis of the shortcomings of a majority of voters.5/ Actual practices initiated by the Federal Government and some urban school systems, in response to widespread discontent with urban public institutions in the 1960's, however, reflect an effort to realize the first alternative--the creation of new opportunities for participation. Although a number of observers have written off these efforts as a failure, a review of the major findings presented in a later section of this report suggests that in some instances these opportunities did realize the intended effect.

To understand these alternatives and the underlying issues, it would be helpful to review some of the earlier democratic theorists.

In brief, the issues related to citizen participation for both contemporary and earlier theorists reflect a concern with social change, primarily the presumed effects of processes associated with modernization: industrialization, differentiation, bureacratization, migration, and urbanization. These themes dominate the assumptions underlying mass society theories, derived mainly from Durkheim and Weber. They include: a shift from primary to secondary relationships; a decline in individual attachment to the community (atomization); a breakdown in traditional values and norms (anomie); the centralization of decisionmaking in large-scale government bureaucracies and corporations; and the development of mass media. For the individual, these effects are seen as promoting psychological pathologies; for the community, social disorganization.

While some of the earlier sociologists dealt with both the positive and negative effects of modernization, the rise of totalitarianism in Europe during the 1930's and 1940's inclined many influential writers to focus on the negative consequences of modernization for political behavior.

Two contrasting definitions of the appropriate role for the citizen in modern democracy were derived from the "theory of the mass society." According to one school of thought, usually referred to as the "classical doctrine of democracy," the role of the citizen is to formulate policy and elect representatives to carry it out. The processes are reversed in the second school, where the role of the citizen is restricted to the election of leaders who formulate and execute policy. These two arguments, exemplified in the writings of Karl Mannheim and Joseph Schumpeter, can be seen to persist in the current controversy over citizen vs. professional or elite domination of public policy.6/

Both Mannheim and Schumpeter were concerned about the conditions of modern society which brought into the political arena previously inactive segments of the population which, because of low levels of education and lack of political experience of their members, were easily manipulated by demagogues. In short, both writers perceived the masses as "irrational." But whereas Mannheim thought the average citizen was capable of acquiring the characteristics to make rational political judgments, Schumpeter believed this was impossible because the average citizen has no responsibility for political affairs. Consequently he viewed irrationality in such issues as inevitable.

In traditional society, according to Mannheim, irrational behavior was controlled by elites. New elites in modern society had not developed the leadership qualities necessary to perform this social control function. This contributed to the further breakdown of values and norms. Furthermore, the functional rationalization of industry created an environment that inhibited the development of substantive rationality in the individual.7/

Mannheim was committed to the rational goals of the classical democratic doctrine--chiefly the notions of the sovereignty of the people and a politically responsible electorate. Consistent with that doctrine, he viewed democracy as an end:

> Democracy means the gradual education of the people and the cultivation of judgment and refinement.8/

In Mannheim's opinion, the failure of Western industrial democracies to achieve these ends was due to increasing interdependence. Liberal institutional arrangements with government controls in the legal and political spheres but laissez-faire in economic and social spheres would no longer work. Economic upheavals led to the development of conditions that created irrationality in the masses and made them prey to easy manipulation.9/ The solution,

for Mannheim, was to create democratic planning with popular controls over the political, economic, and social spheres as the means for securing freedom in modern society. What Mannheim expounds is essentially an evolutionary theory of social change which recognizes the need to redefine democracy and freedom.

A completely different perspective on democracy and human nature was formulated by Schumpeter, who defined democracy as a method rather than an end:

> The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competive struggle for the people's vote.[10]

To qualify as democratic, Schumpeter wrote, a government must provide for "free competition for a free vote." The only means by which citizens can control their leaders is to refuse "to re-elect them or the parliamentary majorities that support them."[11]

The conditions of modern society and human nature, in Schumpeter's view, preclude the development of rationality and volition underlying the classical democratic doctrine. He saw most individuals, since they had no direct responsibility for decisonmaking, as incapable of using intelligently the information available to them on public affairs:

> . . . All of this goes to show that without the initiative that comes from immediate responsibility, ignorance will persist in the face of masses of information however complete and correct. It persists even in the face of the meritorious efforts that are being made to go beyond presenting information and to teach the use of it by means of lectures, classes, discussion groups. Results are not zero. But they are small. People cannot be carried up the ladder . . . Thus the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field . . . His thinking becomes associative and ineffective.[12]

When it comes to political issues, Schumpeter's typical citizen yields to "extra-rational or irrational prejudice" and "occasionally" gives in to "dark urges which the conditions of private life help him to repress."[13]

Mannheim thought that irrationality in political behavior could be corrected through socialization processes and institutional arrangements at the local level that provided an opportunity for individuals to acquire responsibility and practice meaningful participation in decisions

affecting their day-to-day existence. In this regard Mannheim's views converge with those of Rousseau, J.S. Mill, Tocqueville and others.

For example, as Pateman brings out, participation for Rousseau meant participation in decisionmaking. The ideal participatory system, recognized as such by Rousseau (i.e., "ideal"), in which men both made and executed the law, requires: (1) economic equality and independence, and (2) the interdependence between citizens. The law emerges from the participatory process and it is the law, not men, that governs individual action. Freedom lies in the fact that all participate in the making of the law. Because men are equal, all men share the same advantages and disadvantages.14/

Following Pateman's interpretation, the central function of participation in Rousseau's theory is an educative one. His "ideal" participatory system is designed to develop responsible individual social and political action through the effect of the participatory process.15/ According to Rousseau, the individual's actual as well as his perceived sense of freedom is increased through participation in decisionmaking because it gives him a very real degree of control over the course of his life and the structure of his environment.

A major concern to Rousseau was the "interrelationship between the authority structure of institutions and the psychological orientations of individuals."16/ The threat to individual freedom is posed not by institutions per se but by those institutions that are nonparticipatory.

Mill shared this stress on the interrelationship between the individual's psychological characteristics and types of institutions. Consequently he focused on the role of civic participation in the development of an "active public-spirited type of character." In translating these concepts to the conditions of the modern state, he stressed that responsible performance of the citizenship role in national affairs required participation in local institutions.

Moreover, Mill quite consciously drew out the implications of Tocqueville's writings about the importance of self-government at the local community level--particularly the role of voluntary associations. All three of the theorists assent that it is at the local level that the individual learns the art of self-government and develops attachment to the State.

Tocqueville's chapter on "Political Associations in the United States" had a profound influence on many contemporary

students of American political behavior who have perpetrated the image of this country as a society of activists and "joiners." It was Tocqueville's impression that:

> The citizen of the U.S. is taught from infancy to rely upon his own exertions in order to resist the evils and the difficulties of life; he looks upon social authority with an eye of mistrust and anxiety, and he claims its assistance only when he is unable to do without it. This habit may be noted even in the schools, where the children in their games are wont to submit to rules which they themselves have established, and to punish misdemeanors which they have themselves defined. The same spirit pervades every act of social life. If a stoppage occurs in a thoroughfare and the circulation of vehicles is hindered, the neighbors immediately form themselves into a deliberative body . . . [17]

Mill was particularly impressed, as are most political sociologists, with Tocqueville's discussion of the function of voluntary associations in protecting individuals against the abuses of centralized power. Tocqueville wrote that democratic nations were more in danger of the "despotism of faction or the arbitrary rule of a prince" than aristocratic societies. In the latter, the body of nobles and the wealthy are "natural associations" which check the abuse of power. Tocqueville saw voluntary associations as a substitute for natural associations in the U.S.[18]

Where Mill and Tocqueville had focused on the protective and "civilizing" (i.e., contribution to "public-spirited character") function of membership in voluntary associations, it was Durkheim who first stressed that such membership would serve to integrate the individual into society:

> A nation can be maintained only if, between the state and the individual, there is intercalated a whole series of secondary groups near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their sphere of action and drag them, in this way, into the general torrent of social life. [19]

The secondary groups which Durkheim predicted would make this contribution were professional associations.

However, a less optimistic perspective on voluntary associations was initiated in the writings of Michels, whose "iron law of oligarchy" is commonly invoked in discussions of voluntary associations. This "law" refers to the tendency of organizations to become oligarchical

and bureaucratic. Michels believed that "organization is an absolutely essential condition for the political struggle of the masses"[20] but "with the advance of organization democracy tends to decline." Leadership begins to require technical expertise and the "power of determination comes to be considered one of the specific attributes of leadership, and is gradually withdrawn from the masses to be concentrated in the hands of the leaders alone. Thus the leaders . . . soon emancipate themselves from the mass and become independent of its control."[21]

Bendix and Lipset interpret Michels' formulation of the problems as follows:

> . . . modern democracies do not constitute a government by the people. Instead, this form of government consists of conflicts of power among oligarchic organizations, with the result that the average citizen exercises his rights of citizenship only in the sense that he chooses among alternatives presented to him by these competing oligarchies.[22]

The preceding perspectives were reflected in many social science theories--particularly "middle range theories" advanced in the 1950's and 1960's. The prevailing theme--or what Pateman describes as "orthodoxy"--was based on the positive functions of voluntary associations. In political science the orthodox view was political "pluralism"; in political sociology it was the "theory of mass society."

In their review of pluralism, Prewitt and Stone point out that the term:

> is (or can be) used to describe a number of different theories that are based on the common concept that power is widely dispersed in the American political economy.[23]

The view of the American political process shared by most pluralists is one in which decisionmaking systems are not monolithic but "polyarchic."[24] No one group dominates the decisionmaking process. Instead, power is shared by the diverse subgroups in America. While resources may be unequally distributed, these inequalities are not cumulative. Power is based on a variety of resources and no one group controls them all.

All interests, following pluralist assumptions, have equal access to the decisionmaking process. Truman notes that the polity is divided between two types of interest groups: organized interest groups and "poten-

tial" interest groups.[25] An "interest group" is "any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes."[26] "Potential groups" reflect "widely held attitudes that are not expressed in interaction."[27]

Elected representatives are presumed to be responsive to the interests of organized and "potential groups," thus representation does not necessarily require that interests be aggregated through formal associations. If such interests are not represented in the decision-making process the neglected interests will become organized. However, as Wilson and others have pointed out, a major flaw in Truman's work is the failure to specify how potential interest groups become organized.[28]

The political system is said to be regulated by these group processes. When tensions or imbalances develop, disaffected groups will mobilize and a new balance or redistribution of power and resources will be achieved.[29]

Prior to the publication of Truman's The Governmental Process, some political scientists and laymen had a negative view of interest groups, then typically referred to as "pressure groups." At the national level, certain groups, mostly made up of leaders of large corporations, were seen as having powerful influence on government policy.

The concept offered by Truman, to alleviate such fears, was "overlapping memberships." Individuals belong to more than one group--therefore, their views cannot be completely shaped by any one group nor can a particular group count on consensus among its members on every issue. Such overlapping memberships create constraints on the positions taken by the interest groups. Truman cited evidence from voting studies to indicate that where such positions create a conflict for the individual there is a tendency to withdraw from the political arena.[30]

Contemporary sociological writings based on pluralist assumptions are often described as "mass society theories." One distinction between mass society theorists and pluralists is the former's emphasis on the requirement that the mediating structures must be independent of the State.[31]

Thus, Kornhauser concluded that:

> . . . a liberal democracy requires widespread participation in the selection of leaders, and a large amount

> of self-governing activity on the part of non-elites . . . The basic question arises, what kind of social structure will meet these conditions of liberal democracy? The theory of mass society expounded in the present study implies that social pluralism is a social arrangement which performs this function.[32]

In addition to the above formulation on the role of voluntary associations, much recent work in the social sciences has been influenced by concepts derived from functional theories, particularly those embodying the notion of a "social system."

According to the functional perspective, which is itself based on an organic or biological model, societies are social systems comprised of subsystems which perform specialized activities that contribute to the stability (maintenance) of the social order.[33] These subsystems are viewed as interdependent so that changes in one part of the system will affect other parts of the system. One goal of a functional analysis of political life is to identify the consequences of participation for the society rather than for the individual.[34]

Functional concepts are implicit in Truman's discussion of group processes as self-regulating or balancing mechanisms. Evidence from the voting studies initiated a new trend in empirical research on political behavior. This signaled departure from the almost exclusive concentration on the role of formal organizations.[35] The most important aspect of this trend for our interests is the inclusion of the role of informal groups as determinants of political attitudes and behavior and, the extension of political analysis to consider nongovernmental, as well as formal, governmental institutions (e.g., legislatures, the courts, etc.).

The term "political system" became increasingly common in the tests and monographs in the field of comparive politics. For example, Almond and Powell write that:

> This new term reflects a new way of looking at political phenomena . . . The political system includes not only governmental insitutions . . . but all structures in their political aspects. Among these are traditional structures such as kinship ties and caste groups; and anomic phenomena such as assassinations, riots, and demonstrations; as well as formal organizations like parties, interest groups and media of communication.[36]

Writers who adhere to these notions are referred to as political systems analysts. While many of the key concepts employed by systems analysts are derived from func-

tional analysis, political systems analysts contend that their emphasis is different. Political systems analysts focus on the persistence rather than the maintenance of political systems. They argue that their formulations permit the analysis of political development and change. The basic concepts utilized by political systems analysts are:37/

- the political system--a set of interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society,
- inputs--the demands and supports or resources transmitted to the political system,
- conversions--the processes through which demands are converted into authoritative decisions (rules) and the implementation of these decisions,
- outputs--the decisions which flow from the political system to its environment,
- feedback--the consequences of the outputs which lead to the development of new demands or the modification of previous demands.

The political system is conceived as interacting with an environment comprised of numerous subsystems which generate the inputs. This environment is subject to change--particularly with modernization and industrialization--which creates pressures on the political system in the form of demands. The ability of the political system to persist depends on its capacity to respond effectively to these demands or pressures.

Two types of inputs interest the political scientist: (1) demands--the allocation of goods and services, regulation of behavior, and participation in the political system; (2) supports--taxes and provision of services (e.g., labor or military service), obedience to the laws and regulations produced by the system, participatory behavior (e.g., voting), and respect for authority.

Since an adequate presentation of political systems theory is beyond the scope of this paper, we will limit the rest of this discussion to the function of interest groups in political systems. For the systems analyst, the activities of interest groups are seen as inputs. Such groups perform an interest articulation function, that is, they transmit demands of various groups to the political system.

Correspondingly, four types of interest groups have been identified:

(1) "Anomic" interest groups--those groups which may or may not be organized (and if organized the organization is usually--but not always--weak) whose interests are transmitted spontaneously (examples are riots, demonstrations, violence).

(2) Nonassociational interest groups based on kinship, ethnicity or class which articulate interests intermittently through informally organized leaders.

(3) Institutional groups--formal organizations "composed of professionally employed personnel" with designated political functions other than interest articulation (armies, bureaucracies, churches, etc.).

(4) Associational interest groups which provide for the "explicit representation of the interests of a particular group," with full-time paid professional staffs.38/

(1) and (2) are basically informal groups, whereas (3) and (4) are formally organized. The interests of anomic and nonassociational groups are transmitted intermittently, while those of the institutional and associational groups are transmitted continually. Further, in institutional and associational groups specific roles are designated to articulate interests and procedures: the formally organized groups have developed institutionalized procedures for identifying and processing group demands.

According to Almond and Powell, the articulation of interests by institutional and associational groups is more likely to be successful than that of the other two types because the former have full-time specialists devoted to this function, and institutionalized procedures for bargaining and negotiating with decisionmakers. Moreover, in modern societies nonassociational groups tend to become organized or associational groups.

B. OVERVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND RESEARCH ON DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION

Although there are variations in the formulations and assumptions of the theories discussed in the preceding section--theories of participatory democracy, pluralism,

mass society and political systems analysis--they possess a common element: an emphasis on the interrelationship among formal governmental institutions, nongovernmental institutions, and the social-psychological characteristics of individuals. The major distinction between the formulations and assumptions of the first three approaches and the last is their emphasis on participation through formally organized structures. While the relationship of informal groups and political behavior is frequently taken into account in the first three, it is given far more weight in the fourth. Therefore, our analysis of research on participation will be divided on this basis.[39]

A number of testable hypotheses can be derived from the various formulations reviewed in the preceding section, but our analysis will be limited to those that relate to the effects of participation on the individual and the consequences of this participation for the decision-making system to which the actions are related.

Hypotheses

For this purpose we will be reviewing those studies that include data on the following hypotheses:

(1) The development of individual, social-psychological characteristics conducive to effective participation in a democratic society (interest and active involvement in local civic affairs) requires local institutional decisionmaking providing for meaningful participation in decisionmaking.

In other words, the individual must be provided with the opportunity to participate in active self-governing groups (independent groups) and local governmental institutional arrangements with legitimate group influence in the decisionmaking process. Since the focus is on these objective conditions of participation, the democratic theorist would seek data on the variations in:

(a) The extent of actual opportunities for participation at the local level and the organizational structure of the local environment. This would include data not only on the types of organizations existing but also on differences in participatory resources.

(b) The authority structure of voluntary associations; does the organization enable meaningful participation for the rank and file, or is it an oligarchic

structure conducive to the same type of atomization and anomie presumed to be characteristic of mass society?

(c) Access, i.e., the extent to which the group is able to pursue its interests through the local decisionmaking structure.

Pluralists typically do not include data on these variables in their studies of local decisionmaking. They assume opportunities for participation (including noncumulative inequalities) and adequate institutional arrangements, i.e., equal access to the decisionmaking structure, as given. Such assumptions stem from a "functionalist" perspective which views societies as consisting of self-regulating mechanisms which create a tendency toward "equilibrium." As formulated by Truman, this pluralist perspective yields a second set of hypotheses:

(2) Voluntary associations function to redistribute power and influence. Power and material resources are diffused throughout the society. Although such resources are not equally distributed, inequalities are not cumulative; no one group can control decisionmaking in all issue areas.

(3) Voluntary associations function as mechanisms for orderly and democratic social change; when changes create tensions or disturbances in one part of the system, mechanisms will be developed to reduce these tensions leading to a new balance (or "equilibrium").

These "mechanisms" refer to the fact that "interests" generate "counter-interests." For example, if the interests of an organized group are threatened by the demands of an opposing group, its members will mobilize to press their claims on government authorities. Where the threatened interests are not represented by organized groups, the affected individuals will become organized and assert their claims on governmental authorities. It is further assumed that such mobilization will lead to a redistribution of power and resources (or social change).

A third set of hypotheses may be derived from the "mass society theory." It sees membership and participation in voluntary associations as serving to:

(4) develop the individual's sense of autonomy and efficacy; it fosters the belief that the

individual can participate and thereby have some degree of control over the decisions that affect his/her life (the efficacy function),

(5) develop political skills and responsible political and social action (the education function), and

(6) develop a sense of attachment to the community and the national society (the integration function).

Consequently, participation in local-level voluntary associations performs several individual and societal functions. It leads to the growth of a "democratic personality" and through the "integration function" contributes to social stability.

The connections between these three perspectives and their corresponding hypotheses can be seen if we consider what kind of data would serve as a test for this last set of hypotheses. We would need to know:

(a) the extent of the individual's participation in voluntary associations and instrumental associations involved in decisionmaking at the local level,

(b) the impact of such participation in terms of both the acquisition of knowledge and participatory skills and the sense of autonomy, efficacy, and sense of attachment to the local community,

(c) the extent to which the group has access to the decisionmaking system and that system's response--or effectiveness, and

(d) the relationship between participation in local associations and attachment to the community and national society.

Three categories of studies are usually regarded as providing data to test the above hypotheses--research on voluntary association membership, community conflict, and community power. While research on voting behavior provides data relevant to some of the above hypotheses, these studies will be considered in the section of this report dealing with informal associations. Research on community development is also relevant, but it will be given more extensive treatment in the section dealing with community action programs.

Voluntary Association Membership and Participation

Voluntary associations are defined as formal organizations. That is, they are regarded as "cooperative systems" of two or more persons for at least one definite end."[40] "Formal" means that organizations represent "rationally ordered . . . arrangements of personnel for facilitating the accomplishment of some agreed upon purpose through the allocation of functions and responsibilities."[41] Such organizations develop explicit policies and rules and functionally differentiated subunits. The formal organization specifies the line of authority and control and the official channels of communication among the groups and individuals in the organization.

Role assignment in formal organizations is based on the individual's possession of specific skills (achieved characteristics) and, ideally, role performance is based on role prescriptions rather than individual characteristics. If organizations functioned according to this rational model, it would be relatively easy to predict the behavior of organization members simply by knowing their statuses. Organizational analyses conducted by adherents to this model focus on organizational goals.

An alternative, functional approach, however, views organizations not as goal-directed entitities but as social systems consisting of multifunctional units which devote only part of their time to goal activities and part of their time to maintenance activities.

The failure of organizatons to realize public goals is not, according to Etzioni, because of poor planning, unanticipated consequences, or hostile environment. "They are not meant to be realized."[42] If an organization invested sufficient means to achieve the goals and was then successful, its function would be diminished and the organization would have to set new goals.

This is the primary rationale offered in Wilson's treatise on Political Organizations.[43] Such organizations, which include the entire spectrum of voluntary associations--interest groups, political parties, fraternal societies, trade unions, civic groups, and ethnic associations--are, (according to Wilson), preoccupied more with organizational mairtenance than goal achievement.

Widely accepted among contemporary organization theorists, this view emphasizes that the behavior of the organization and its members must be interpreted in terms of maintenance needs rather than stated goals or objectives.

The Extent of Organization Membership in the United States

Operational definitions of participation in most empirical studies are rarely consistent with the conceptual definition specified in the theories of participatory democracy. That is, they do not include or obtain data on the respondents' actual involvement in decisions affecting the policies of the organization. In the most frequently cited surveys, respondents are simply asked how many and what types of organizations they belong to.

The results of these surveys are inconsistent, mainly because of the different types of organizations included, but most studies report that a majority of Americans belong to no voluntary association. The usual figures range from 57 percent [44] to 36 percent [45] of the total population having no voluntary association affiliations. Only a tiny fraction of the population belong to more than two organizations; Hyman and Wright report 7 percent in 1955 and 10 percent in 1962.[46] The 1971 article reports a "small but noteworthy increase" in such memberships between 1955 and 1962 and suggests that the events of the 1960's may have contributed to a greater increase.[47] However, they have no data on this issue. Of the total U.S. sample in their five-nation study, Almond and Verba report that 55 percent of organization members belong to more than one organization.[48]

Differential Participation

Socioeconomic Status (SES). The one relationship for which the results of most studies are in agreement, regardless of how membership is operationalized, pertains to socioeconomic differences. Membership in voluntary associations is distinctly characteristic of middle- and upper-middle-class Americans as measured by occupation, income or education.[49]

Race. Here the findings are less consistent. In both time periods (1953 and 1955) included in their 1958 report, Wright and Hyman found lower membership levels among blacks as compared to whites, but by 1962 there was an increase among the former and decline among the latter, narrowing the difference between the two categories. The results of the 1955 study were challenged by Babchuk and Thompson. This was based on a study of adult blacks conducted in Nebraska in 1960.[50] The results showed that three-fourths of the respondents had organizational affiliations and the investigation attributed the difference to the fact that their questionnaires had asked about membership in religious groups whereas Wright and Hyman's had not.

In addition, there is a positive relationship between organizational membership and sex; more men than women belong to instrumental organizations. This is in part a reflection of male dominance in the professions and in industry. Since the studies were all conducted prior to the women's liberation movement, they cannot reflect changes in attitudes and policies attributable to that movement. There is also a relationship between membership and age; organizational membership is more characteristic of older than of younger age groups.

Community studies that have included data on organizational membership and the extent of organized groups within a community indicate that communities vary in terms of both variables.[51] The implications of these differences will be discussed in later sections of this report.

C. THE FUNCTIONS OF PARTICIPATION

Political Efficacy and Civic Competence

A major study, based on cross-sectional interviews in five nations, providing data to support some of the assumptions of "classical" democratic theorists, was conducted in 1959-60 by Almond and Verba. This section will highlight the correlations reported between organizational membership and sense of efficacy and attachment to the local community and the Nation for the United States sample.[52]

It should be kept in mind that no data were gathered on the actual opportunities for participation at the local level, the authority structure of the voluntary associations, or access to decisionmaking--factors specified earlier as important to a test of the participatory democratic theorists' hypotheses. Nor were objective data obtained on the types of organizations to which the respondents belonged. The findings only measured respondents' perceptions.

The authors found that "about one in four respondents (United States) belongs to an association that he perceives to be involved in politics"[53] and suggest that the difference between this and other studies may be due to the respondents' definitions of politics. (For example, some respondents would not regard school-related organizations such as the PTA as involved in "politics.")

This same study reported that in all countries included in their five-nation sample, organizational members scored higher on a competency scale (confidence in ability to influence the government) than nonmembers, with those perceiving their organizations as political scoring highest. However, in all countries except Britain, there are great differences in sense of competence between those who belong to organizations (regardless of perception of political involvement of the organization) and those who belong to no organization.[54] This finding supports the conclusion that:

> . . . latent functions are performed by voluntary associations, whether those associations are explicitly political or not. Those who are members of some organization, even if they report that it has no political role, have more political competence than those who have no such membership.[55]

Activism

The theory of participatory democracy implies that membership in voluntary organizations will be related to a higher degree of civic activism. The concept of "activism" employed in the Almond and Verba study is similar to the psychological effects stressed by participatory democratic theorists. In the Almond and Verba study, 46 percent of Americans reported that they had been "active" in organizations--defined as at sometime having held an official position in an organization--with more females than males (52 percent vs. 41 percent) responding positively to this item. Furthermore, the competency score rises even with controls for the variable of "holding an official position."

Since even passive organizational members (those who have not held office) have higher competency scores than nonmembers, the authors state that:

> These findings strongly support the proposition associated with the theory of mass society that the existence of voluntary associations increases the democratic potential of a society. Democracy depends upon citizen participation, and it is clear that organizational membership is directly related to such participation.[56]

Sense of competence is increased also with membership in more than one organization.

Participation in local political decisions, according to theorists of participatory democracy and mass society

theorists, serves to attach the individual to the community and the Nation. Almond and Verba tested a related hypothesis: "the perception that one can participate is related to greater satisfaction with the performance of the system and to a higher level of attachment to that system," on the assumption that "the combination of high participation and high system performance will increase the chances of stable democracy only if both the high participation and the high system performance are perceived as such by the citizenry." The results, based on the respondents' assessment of the activities of the local government, indicate a positive relationship between a subjective sense of competence and a positive evaluation of the local government.57/ Participatory democratic theorists all assumed that participation at the local level would affect the individual's sense of attachment to the national society. Here also, Almond and Verba found a positive relationship between the two variables: "the sense of the ability to participate," they note. "and appears to increase the legitamacy of the system and to lead to political stability."58/

The Community Integration Function

When they talk about community integration, mass society theorists usually use such words as "cohesion" and "stability," meaning absence of "conflict".

A good deal of the evidence that mass society theorists interpret as supporting their assumptions about the stabilizing function of voluntary associations at the local level stems from studies of community conflict. These studies tend to concentrate on four issues: opposition to school bond referendums, textbook controversies, school desegregation battles, and fluoridation controversies. The results of these conflicts present a dilemma to those who adhere to the pluralist assumptions: when participation increases, conflict emerges and official policies are usually defeated.

Mass society theorists often relate this volatile and episodic participation at the local level to the data revealed by voting studies.59/ The voting studies revealed that a majority of citizens have low interest in, knowledge of, and involvement in political affairs, and that the most "apathetic" citizens tend to be those with the least preparation for responsible citizenship--they tend to have low levels of education and organizational participation.

The first in-depth analysis of voting behavior showed that individuals in the apathetic category tended to be subject to "cross-pressures"--their immediate family and friends held different views on the campaign and this created conflict within the individuals.[60] The typical pattern for resolving this conflict was to lose interest in the election:

> Those with no cross-pressures showed most interest in the election; even one cross-pressure meant a substantial increase in the proportion of voters who felt less interested in the election, and as the number of cross-pressures increases the degree of interest shows a steady decline.[61]

These and similar findings from other studies have led some analysts to question the advisability of increasing participation:

> . . . while the case for higher levels of participation may seem almost self-evident to believers in democracy, as we have come to know more about the characteristics of non-voters and the conditions under which nations secure high turnouts, some people have questioned whether high participation actually is a good thing. One school of thought welcomes a low voting rate as evidence of the electorate's basic satisfaction with the way things are going.[62]

High levels of participation are interpreted, in this view, as indications of a decline in consensus or of increased levels of tension in the society. Such conditions may be a threat to democratic stability since they introduce:

> . . . as voters individuals whose social attitudes are unhealthy from the point of view of the requirements of the democratic system.[63]

Although the cross-pressure theory was developed on the basis of participatory behavior in relation to national elections, it is also used to interpret local community conflicts, most notably in the work of Coleman.[64] In Coleman's elaboration of the cross-pressures concept, the potential for conflict (or cleavage) at the community level is related to two factors: the "density" of community associations and organizations, and the extent of overlapping or interlocking memberships. Communities with both high organizational density and overlapping membership create:

> . . . cross-pressures in their members; others, less

> tightly knit, do not. Among the first communities, part of the conflict is located within each person, part within each small group of friends, part within larger organizations and only the remainder at the level of the community itself. In the community which does not create in its member the potential for cross-pressures, individuals are consistent; groups of friends are of one mind; and organizations are unified--all the conflict is shifted to the level of the community itself."[65]

Coleman mentioned that there were no empirical data on this phenomenon but that his analysis was "consistent with numerous descriptive accounts of the course of controversy in different communities." Among the problems requiring further research, he identified that concerning the relationship between "lack of attachment to community affairs and responsiveness to demagogy."[66]

One critic of the mass society theory argues that it represents an:

> . . . idealized conception of the pluralistic social and political system held necessary for the maintenance of democratic institutions. This conception is idealized in that it fails to give adequate weight to barriers which conflicts of interest offer to political harmony and compromise under any political structure.[67]

What Gusfield was driving at was the tendency for community conflict theorists to neglect democratic norms in their emphasis on social structure. Thus they equated opposition with extremism, defined as a denial of pluralistic norms, i.e., refusal to compromise and negotiate within the political institutions. Mass society theorists explain extremism (opposition) as the result of "the breakdown in functioning of primary and secondary associations in mass society . . . The socially alienated individual is not only politically alienated; he is also more likely to become the extremist activist than is the member of a structured interest group."[68]

There are, Gusfield holds, "at least four situations in which pluralism either invites or fails to forestall behavior outside the range of democratic norms for the mediating of conflicts:"[69]

(1) those where social change excludes some groups from the political process so that they "must either function outside of the political 'game' or force their way into it",

(2) where political defeat is not an acceptable alternative to violence and other breaks with pluralist procedure (e.g., the American Civil War),

(3) where public opinion is hostile to the interests of specific groups (i.e., labor strikes), and

(4) where competing interests create a "stalemate" . . . which enables problems to develop into major crises."

Pluralism, in short, can lead to conflict, particularly when the "ins" are not responsive to the "outs."

The Power Distribution Function

The concept of political pluralism dominates the research, as well as the theory, on community power and decision-making published during the 1960's. However, the assumptions underlying this school of thought have come increasingly under attack in the writings of scholars whose works are based on the research of events in the 1960's, which suggested that pluralistic conceptions did not provide an accurate description--let alone a theory--of the American political system.70/

Since the controversial issues related to pluralist assumptions and research methods have been rehashed in so many publications and both elitist and pluralist scholars now agree that both reputational and decisional methods are needed, it seems redundant to go over these matters here. Besides, many political scientists and sociologists are now pursuing issues other than power. What follows is merely to give readers unfamiliar with the literature a general sense of what the debate was about and its relevance to interest group theory.

The community power studies grew out of the pluralists' effort to challenge the assumptions advanced by "elitists" or stratification theorists who claimed that decisions were controlled by a "power structure"--an established elite dominated by economic notables.71/ Any adequate test of elitists' assumptions, the pluralists asserted, required examination of the decisionmaking process itself in relation to a number of issues, rather than the reputational techniques used by elite theorists to identify a controlling group. The fact that people perceived a group as "powerful" or influential did not necessarily mean that they actually were. A study of the decisionmaking related to three issues in the city of New Haven, Connecticut found that different elites

dominated decisions in each issue area.[72] An example of that approach applied to larger cities can be seen in another classic study on the governing of New York City.[73]

An example of how pluralist assumptions and the research results were interpreted is found in Arnold Rose's critique of the power elite school:

> Through the voluntary association, the ordinary citizen can acquire as much power in the community or the nation as his free time, ability, and inclination permit him to . . . Political power, or influence, in U.S. is not concentrated in the government but is distributed over as many citizens, working through their associations, as want to take the responsibility for power.[74]

However, Bachrach and Baratz have argued that "ordinary" citizens might not find it so easy to acquire power. They suggest that power could be "exercised by confining the scope of decisionmaking to relatively 'safe' issues." The student of power, they contended, should analyze not only the decisions placed on the public agenda but also "nondecisions."[75] Other critics have stressed the failure of pluralists to analyze the development and emergence of new groups[76] and the price "paid by those who are out."[77]

When it comes specifically to the question of the influence of voluntary associations on public policy, Wilson states that:

> . . . The plain fact is, that no well-supported and comprehensive rendering of accounts about the impact of organizations on public policy is as yet possible. The significance of organizations will depend, in ways that are not fully understood, on the nature of both the issue and the institutional process by which it is resolved.[78]

Lowi has suggested that different issues are resolved differently and thus cannot all be analyzed in terms of the single pluralist perspective.[79] Two other important factors that need to be considered in the evaluation of political organizations and policy (suggested by Wilson) are: the distinction between the adoption of a new policy and the amendment of an existing one, and costs and benefits. New policies are adopted in response to opinion change and a redefinition of the legitimate role of government in various issues. The distribution of costs and benefits (wide vs. narrow) will affect the extent of support or resistance to a policy.

While there appears to be a relationship between the legitimacy of a public agency and an organization's effectiveness in pressing its claims upon that agency, more comparative research is needed on these variables. Findings reported in the literature suggest that future studies need to incorporate such factors as city size, the organizational structure of the city, leadership centralization, and party strength.[80]

Wilson observed, for example, that although "special-interest associations are more powerful where formal political authority is weak or diffuse . . . (this) does not necessarily mean that they will be more effective in such places."[81] Where power is diffuse, all organizations have more access. But in such situations, leaders can be immobilized by a plurality of competing interests[82], or they can select policy choices based on their individual orientations.[83]

Results of a comparitive study of elite and nonelite dominated political and economic associations led Sallach to conclude that neither kind of association provides the nonelite with access to power.[84] Similarly, Connoly noted that:

> The prevailing system inhibits some segments of society from efficacious involvement in the balancing process while bestowing cumulative advantages upon other segments.[85]

Pluralist studies were criticized also because of their "basically atheoretical, ad hoc selection of community issues for analysis with the result that comparative study of community decisionmaking is difficult, if not impossible."[86] Two orientations which do reflect a theoretical framework are "instrumental" (a Marxian orientation) and "expressive" (the functional orientation). Laumann's recent analysis of decisionmaking in a small community in Germany represents one of the more ambitious efforts to develop a theoretical basis for the selection of issues based on the functional approach.[87]

Meanwhile, the attention of political scientists has shifted from the preoccupation with power to an examination of other concepts basic to democratic theory; specifically, the notions of representation and responsiveness and the processes through which interests are represented. Much of the work in this area reflects the thinking of Pitkin.[88]

Representation, according to Pitkin, means the capacity for representatives to act in the interest of the represented. A representative system requires not only free

elections, but also institutional arrangements for both the "expression of wishes" and response to those wishes:

> It seems to me that we show a government to be representative . . . by demonstrating that its subjects have control over what it does. Every government's actions are attributed to its subjects formally, legally. But in a representative government this attribution has a substantive content: the people really do act through their government, and are not merely passive recipients of its actions . . . a representative government must be responsive to the people.89/

In addition to "machinery for the expression of wishes," such a representative system requires regular free elections where a "number of minority or opposition viewpoints are officially active in its government"90/, and functioning institutions responsive to public interest and opinion.91/

Pitkin does not specify what types of functioning institutions are required to create responsiveness, but implies the need for some means to link respresentatives with constituents. Our review of the literature has indicated that many theorists perceive voluntary associations as a major vehicle for fulfilling this purpose. The assumption is that representatives will arrive at decisions based on the views expressed to them by members of volunary associations, and that where such groups reflect opposing views the representative body will perform a mediating function. Decisions arise out of negotiation, bargaining, and compromise.

Unfortunately, studies of community power structures have usually neglected "elected officials of the municipal baronies that comprise the metropolis," e.g., municipal mayors and councilpersons as well as trustees of suburban towns and townships.92/

A recent study of the role orientations of city councilpersons in the San Francisco Bay Area (not, however, specifically designed to test Pitkin's formulation), indicated that the investigation of the linkage process requires data on each official's interest-group role-orientation vis-à-vis the "group universe." Using three variables--attitude toward interest groups, perception of "influential" groups, and "sophistication" with regard to the group universe, the author identifies three types of councilpersons: "pluralists," "tolerants," and "antagonists."93/

Pluralists tend to be receptive to group interests and admit that bargaining takes place on councils, whereas antagonists tend to disapprove of group influences, and

claim themselves to be less responsive to interest group pressure. More pluralists are found in cities with a "large number of groups, many groups with intensively involved members, or groups active in both the political communications and local political campaign, than in cities where groups are less active."94/

Another neglect in the conventional study of decision-making is the implementation process which "has been much discussed but rarely studied," according to Pressman and Wildavsky, who caution that "the separation of policy design from implementation is fatal."95/ The study of implementation includes:

> . . . the setting of goals (policy) . . . by paying attention to the structural position of those who set targets . . . and those who must implement them--career bureaucrats and local participants characterized by high needs and low cohesion . . .96/

The tendency for political scientists to separate the policymaking and implementation processes is interesting in view of another strand of research which reflects Weber's concern with the growth of governmental bureaucracies:

> . . . local governments are becoming more bureaucratized and more professional. As they become more professional, the administrative bureaucracies are also becoming more independent in the core city as well as in the larger suburban and county governments.97/

Members of the bureaucracy then have the potential to dominate the implementation process. Moreover, the earlier theorists saw the bureaucracy as a semi-independent political force. Consequently, if a supporting group is unstable when the administration takes over:

> . . . organized opposing groups are better able to achieve effective access . . .[and are] thus in a position to make their claims felt in the administration . . . The administrator will find means of maintaining the strength of supporting groups or he will have to accept some of the demands of the opposition elements.98/

The behavior of both elected and appointed public officials must also be included in the analyses if we are to develop an understanding of public policy--including both policy formulation and implementation processes.

The Social Change Function

The preceding challenges to the community integration and power distribution functions of voluntary organizations also call into question their social change function.

In previous periods, some political observers feared that the pressure of conservative elites would inhibit government initiatives. The impediment to change today, according to Wilson, arises from the great:

> . . . expansion in both the role of government and the size of the liberal elite . . . it has been rapid expansion of government policy that has produced a kind of immobilism to the extent that each new program has acquired, or even created for itself, a client association that makes it difficult to change, and impossible to abandon, the original measure. The competition of interest groups does not, in the long run, make it difficult for the government to start doing things, it only makes it difficult for the government to stop. 99/

Wilson believes that while interest group politics may often benefit small constituencies, "unorganized groups will often be neglected and the resultant policies may reflect benefits sought by easily organized sectors rather than by broader, harder-to-organize constituencies and perhaps only those sought by associational activists at that."100/ Mass mobilization may be a more effective strategy for social change although this process has disadvantages as well as advantages.

Empirical studies which provide data on the social change function of voluntary associations are discussed in later sections.

Summary

Survey research on efficacy indicates that there is a positive relationship between membership in voluntary associations and participation in national and local affairs, and suggests that organizational members are more supportive of local and national governments, lending tentative support to the hypothesis related to the effects of membership on individuals. However, this research was cross-sectional and did not examine the relationship between organization membership and the respondents' actual behavior in local community issues.101/ Further-

more, the voting studies focused only on participation in national elections and it has been suggested that explanations of national electoral behavior may not be appropriate for local political behavior.

The voting studies attributed community stability or cohesion, i.e., lack of conflict, to the tendency for nonvoting to reflect withdrawal from politics of those least equipped to participate--the less educated, least involved individuals. Studies of local controversies, on the other hand, indicate that this segment of the community can and does become active when given an opportunity.[102] While it is plausible to explain such "negative" participation in terms of personal alienation or structural characteristics (organizational density and interlocking), it is equally possible to interpret this behavior as an indication of rational opposition to the local power structure.

The equation of opposition and extremism is based on the assumptions that pluralism in American society operates to give equal access to all groups and that decisions are the result of bargaining and compromise. Comparative studies of efforts to promote or resist social change suggest that regardless of whether such efforts are pursued through voluntary associations or some other means of expressing shared interests, some groups are cumulatively disadvantaged: all interests do not have access to the decisionmaking process, and thus conflict may result not from the psychological effects of an attenuation of primary and secondary relationships but from an objective clash of interests.

Mass society theorists interpret the mobilization of the less involved and those who are least apt to belong to voluntary associations as a threat to democratic institutions. Another perspective concludes that there are other means for citizens to influence the decision-making process than through formal voluntary associations. Critics suggest that the designation of these forms of participation as antidemocratic may be a reflection of the analysts' values and may serve as an implicit defense of the status quo.

There are indications that the role of interest groups varies with the organization structure of the community and the orientations of representatives.

D. OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH ON PARTICIPATION IN SCHOOL POLITICS

Background

Most of the early research on the politics of education has centered on the same "Who govern?" or "Who 'runs' the schools?" question that concerned the political science investigations discussed above. 103/ Few provide the type of data required to test the hypotheses set forth in the preceding section. Some include data on participation in voluntary associations. In other words, such participation is inferred. Although this research (like the research on municipal governance) has been dominated by case studies in one city using different theoretical frameworks and methodologies, the results are generally consistent. With few exceptions, mostly involving studies conducted in rural districts, scholars have found that influence is wielded, not by an informal elite group operating behind the scenes, but by "persons who are involved in educational affairs because they hold (now or in the past) official positions in educational institutions or public affairs."104/ There is less consensus on which group is more powerful--superintendents, other administrators (e.g., the central headquarters staff), or teachers.105/ One reason for this inconsistency is that the studies are not comparable: they employ different research methods and most are time and place bound.

Professional domination of urban educational policy is traced to the municipal reform movement beginning around the late 19th century and its "cult of efficiency."106/ Prior to that period, urban school districts were decentralized on a ward basis. This situation fostered political patronage and corruption.

Reformers justified the development of a separate governing structure for education on the grounds that it would remove educational policy from partisan politics and specifically from control by the political machine. A centralized administrative structure, it was maintained, would increase efficiency, and promotion based on merit would upgrade professional standards.

As interpreted by some analysts, however, these reforms have not had the intended effects. They suggest that the evidence indicates that instead of eliminating politics from school policy, the centralized administrative structure simply changed the players. Higher standards have not always weeded out incompetents. Nor did the reforms, these scholars maintain, lead to greater efficiencies in the delivery of services. The advantages of the reforms

went disproportionately, as one analyst put it, to "middle-class Americans, generally Protestants. . . at a time when public services in most large cities were coming under the power of working-class political machines."[107]

That political scientists began to discover these consequences only in the late 1950's and early 1960's reflects the fact that up till then the school systems were not generally regarded as political entities.[108] But far more attention has been given, in the literature, to the implications of these consequences for citizen participation in school policy in urban than in suburban areas. This may be due to the fact that the reforms were more extensive in the former where depoliticization and centralization eliminated the participation of citizens at the local level. In most suburbs, citizens continued to have access to decisionmaking--at least in relation to school taxes and bond issues--through local school board elections. It was also generally presumed that suburban parents were satisfied with their public schools, whereas the lower achievement levels and high dropout rates in urban systems were generally regarded as institutional failures and indicators of non-response to client needs.

The first part of this section will briefly take up some of the major studies of suburban school politics which have included data on community participation and which reflect some of the theoretical issues reviewed in the first section of this report. These studies were generally conducted earlier than the urban research which will be discussed later.

Participation in Suburban School Politics.

Three groups of studies provided data on citizen participation in suburban local school systems. The first two consisted of political science research on decisionmaking based on either the extent of such participation or the distribution of power. The third consisted of studies conducted by sociologists who had used school-community controversies to examine hypotheses derived from Coleman's community-conflict model. They were less interested in, and probably had less knowledge of, school governance.

The typical indicator of participation in studies which include quantitative data is an aggregate measure: voting statistics. Qualitative studies usually assess the views represented in the decision, or outcome, of a controversy but rarely attempt to indicate the extent of participation. Regardless of the methods employed, the empirical studies are overwhelmingly focused on economic and ideological disputes (textbook controversies or so called

"left-wing" activities) reflecting the tenor of the 1950's. Such issues should be distinguished from "educational issues"--decisions involving the type of education provided in the classroom or the quality of education services. Before the 1960's, studies dealing with the latter (quality) usually equated quality with inputs (per-pupil expenditures or the quality of school facilities). Thus the presumed superiority of suburban districts was based on their higher spending levels as compared to urban and rural districts.

With few exceptions, then, the studies which include data on participation deal with a limited aspect of this phenomemon: electoral behavior. Therefore, they tell us little about participation as defined by theorists concerned with participatory democracy--direct participation in decisionmaking and its impact on the individual. The studies are primarily descriptive and atheoretical with post hoc interpretations of voting behavior based on the findings of research on participation in partisan political issues. Few of the early studies include variables to permit analyses of the relationship between participation and the structural aspects of the decisionmaking system, the organizational structure of the community, or the structure of the municipal government.

In 1962, Roscoe Martin published Government and the Suburban Schools based on a cross-sectional survey of a sample of citizens in New York State school districts.[109/] In his book, he attempted to describe the extent of citizen participation in educational policymaking. A mailed questionnaire sent to "a sample of citizens, League of Women Voters, presidents, mayors and chamber of commerce officials," included items on the respondents' perceptions of various aspects of participation (educational issues of concern to the citizenry, channels for the articulation of citizen interest, etc.), their knowledge (the name of the school board president), and their actual participation (attendance at school board meetings, PTA membership, etc.). The finding of low interest and low citizen participation was explained in terms of factors not included in the study: the depoliticization of suburban school systems and the professionalization of educators. Only a small number of citizens, about 3 percent, were reported to be actively involved in educational decisions; they were mostly high-status professionals and businesspersons. The measure of participation used in this study is limited (the item on attendance, for instance, asked if the respondent had ever attended a school board meeting); the sample was limited to only one State and no explanatory independent variables were included.

Martin's findings were similar to those reported by Carter, who had published a study based on representative samples

of residents in four communities. Recognizing the limitations of his earlier study (which took the success or failure of school elections as the criterion of school-community relations), Carter undertook an explanatory study based on a random national sample of school districts.110/ A questionnaire incorporating an index of "understanding" (the key explanatory variable), was mailed to each district superintendent and other high-status informants, as well as an active supporter of the local schools and an active opponent. In addition, interviews were conducted with informants, and data on the community were collected from secondary sources. The indicator of participation was the percentage of eligible voters who turned out to vote in different types of school elections (e.g., budgets, bond issues, election of school trustees). The study design was more sophisticated than Martin's in that it used both survey and field methods to identify the processes involved in school community relations and different electoral decisions. The major drawbacks were that the study was limited to one point in time and relied primarily on "elite" informants (community leaders). Thus the indicators of participation, other than voting statistics, were based on subjective perceptions. The study concluded that there is "no evidence of any participation in school affairs and no interest in such participation." On the other hand, Carter reported a relationship between high participation and conflict (which he referred to as "low acquiescence"), and his findings indicated a positive relationship between participation in school affairs and organizational membership.

Hypotheses explaining changes in school board leadership and governance were developed by Iannaccone and Lutz, based on a longitudinal case study including data on population change and school board/superintendent turnover.111/ Findings of numerous case studies were used to develop and support their propositions. They argued that the local school district did contain a mechanism to redirect its education goals: the local school board election. Change in school board leadership was a response to population and value change. They assumed that leadership change would be followed by changes in educational programs, but provided no followup data. One conclusion was that the network of community organizations provided the functional alternative to the two-party system in nonpartisan school politics. Since the studies were time bound (all conducted before 1965), they cannot reflect the potential impact of recent events such as teacher unionism and urban decentralization.

Community Conflict Studies

Explanations of school-community conflict studies made by sociologists in the late 1950's and early 1960's tended to interpret what appeared to be the sudden mobilization of previously uninvolved citizens in terms of the "alienation hypothesis." There were at least two reasons to challenge this thesis: (1) investigations neglected to consider the structure of the formal governmental arrangements for participation, and (2) attributing opposition to psychological characteristics precluded investigation of the objective basis of conflict. A pattern characteristic of these conflicts was the formation of ad hoc groups in opposition to school board leaders' or to school administrators' decisions. Following the notions advanced by mass society theorists, this pattern was designated as a form of "extremism."112/ This label was based on the fact that issues were pursued outside of the formal institutional arrangements for the mediation of conflict--school board hearings or consultation with school administrators.

Coleman had suggested two explanations for the mobilization of opposition in school controversies: (1) a conscious effort on the part of "powerful subgroups" to promote their own interests or (2) an indication of a nonresponsive admininstration.113/ In the latter case, the official channels would be closed to the expression of dissent, and thus opposition would have no where to go except outside the institutional channels. Many of the school-community studies were inclined to consider only the first alternative.114/

It will be recalled that some of the researchers who investigated voting behavior saw apathy in national elections as contributing to community stability. They suggested that activation of such citizens in a heterogeneous community could lead to polarization.115/ On the assumption that Berelson's findings might not apply to local elections, two sociologists speculated that local referenda (since they often enable voters to participate in issues of more direct concern to the individual) might provide greater opportunities for expressing "alienation" or "hostility" in relation to the local "power structure."116/ To test this possibility they investigated the relationship between "political alienation" and opposition to school bond referenda. An index of political alienation was based on three items; the respondents' perceptions of their role in the community power structure (active vs. passive), sense of power, and trust in local officials.

Results lent "tentative substantiation of both the hypothesis that political alienation is inversely related to

socioeconomic status and the hypothesis that political alienation leads to an attitude on a given issue which represents a protest against the existing power structure in the community."117/

A more rigorous scrutiny of the alienation hypothesis (this time in relation to fluoridation conflicts) suggested the need to relate participation to two variables: the governmental structure (executive centralization) and participativeness (the extent to which the governmental structure enabled or restricted citizen participation). Strong government centralization was found in "council-manager suburbs, especially if the councilmen were united and backed by active poltical parties, and the weakest in nonpartisan commission towns."118/

Officials elected without strong party backing are relatively insecure and "tend to extend their range of responsiveness to public demands over a wider field than would those whose positions are relatively secure."119/ Participation can be aroused where there is disagreement among officials in a community with strong political parties, or in nonpartisan and weak-party communities where officials tend to be insecure. These variables were included in the school integration study discussed below.

Another study which also related voter behavior to structural characteristics was conducted by Minar. He analyzed school voting records in 48 Illinois suburbs over a five-year period. A comparison of districts with high and low electoral conflict led to the conclusion that high conflict was associated with lower community socioeconomic status (SES).120/ Two indicators of conflict were included: school board election dissent and referendum dissent. He interpreted the lower level of conflict in higher SES districts to the prevalence of nominating caucuses in such districts which "provide protection against 'socially disruptive' conflict, take the 'heat' off decisionmakers and assure continuity of perspective and policy on the board."121/

However, the caucus appeared to serve this function only in relation to school board elections, since use of a "caucus has no appreciable effect on levels of dissent on referenda . . . even when social rank is controlled."122/ Although Minar did not collect data on organizational membership, or actual community controversies, he drew on others' discussions and speculated that opposition to referenda is related to the activation of the "more unattached or alienated from social life."123/ Those who control the "establishment" in low-conflict systems "are adept at allaying conflict before it reaches the threshold at which the less attached become activated."124/

Lyke's comparative analysis of educational decisonmaking in four suburbs (selected on the basis of population size and social class differences) was specifically designed to test Dahl's assumption that no group dominates the decision process.[125] It was correct, Lyke concluded, that no one group controlled educational decisionmaking but, with the exception of finances and construction, citizens had little impact on the process. His assertion that the educational decisionmaking process was not "democratic" was supported by the evidence in the four communities that: (1) citizen participation was low, (2) there was little or no competition in the electoral process, and (3) accountability was limited. The last factor stemmed from two causes: elections did not ensure citizen control over school board members, and administrative procedures did not ensure either board members' or administrators' control over teachers.[126] Organized activity in relation to school issues tends to be greater in larger communities which are more apt to have socially and culturally heterogeneous populations.

Urban School Studies

Prior to the mid-1960's "there was no incentive for scientific research to question basic educationist tenets and appraise existing power structures."[127] For the most part, the research reflected the interests of school administrators.

This trend was reversed in the mid-1960's when foundations and legislatures started to fund studies on the governance and functioning of urban school systems. A few that provided insights relevant to participation and pluralism will be discussed here.

In the introduction to a 1960 edition of their earlier study on the governance of New York City, Sayre and Kaufman reiterated that no one group "runs" the city and implied that all groups had equal access to decisionmaking within each issue area.[128]

Not content with this assumption, Gittell undertook to explore the "openness" of the New York City school system.[129] Assuming that public education was an issue likely to arouse the greatest public participation, she hypothesized that if there was little activity in this area, it would cast doubt on the openness of other areas less likely to arouse public interest.

Noting the extent of participation in five issue areas (budget, contract negotiations, curriculum planning, selection of the superintendent, and school integration), Gittell concluded that central board supervisory staff

was "a primary participant" in all five. Although the board had passed a policy to integrate the school system, it was unable to implement this policy effectively. The board was legally responsible for policy and the appointment of a superintendent to implement it but its ability to do so was limited. The superintendents were unable to hire their own top staff and the board did not have the expertise to challenge the superintendent--or a staff capable of providing the necessary information. Lack of public participation was attributed to the refusal of either the mayor (except for teacher contract negotiations) or other elected officials to interfere in school issues. Only two groups were visibly active: United Parents Association and Public Education Association, both of which usually played supportive rather than critical roles. It was suggested that public participation increases with conflict--school integration was "not resolved internally in the system, and participation was thrown into the open."130/

David Rogers' analysis of the failure of school integration in the same school system is one of the few to present detailed data on policy implementation (or non-implementation.)131/ Subsequent to the 1954 integration decision, several desegregation plans had been proposed but little implementation had occurred. This was an exploratory study, based primarily on organizational and community-conflict theory, designed to develop hypotheses for future research.

The board's failure to take a definite stand on the integration proposals led to a proliferation of groups. Public participation was polarized between two factions: middle- and working-class white antibusing groups and civil rights organizations, some of whose leaders became increasingly militant as the controversy persisted. Mobilization of support for the former was aided by the established organizations already existing in middle-class white neighborhoods. The relative weakness of the civil rights groups was due to disagreement among leaders, internal organizational problems, the difficulty of mobilizing ghetto parents, and lack of support from "many established and powerful institutions."132/ In this cross-pressured situation, the board was immobilized.

The propositions Rogers developed to summarize the situation relate to the city's "pluralism, its consequent political fragmentation, and its massive school bureaucracy. The main consequence of these conditions, of course, is inaction, which is what this book is all about."133/ The proliferation and fragmentation of interest groups stems from the size of the population, its heterogeneity, and its "geographic spread," which makes the formulation of

coalitions difficult. The city, Rogers concluded, is composed of a series:

> . . . of veto groups that play against one another, and the result is a stalemated politics . . . This permits encrusted, tradition-bound institutions like the New York City Board of Education to continue unchallenged, regardless of their many inadequacies. 134/

A comparative analysis of innovativeness in six large city school systems concluded that educational change was related to public participation.135/ There was, however, little change in any of the cities investigated. By the middle of the century all of the school boards included in the study had become centralized and insulated from the public, but two responded to external demands for change. In Detroit, the development of "mechanisms for participation" reflected the "commitment of the mayor to educational needs and the willingness of school officials to cooperate with city officials for mutual advantage in minimizing school crises."136/ The "political culture" and the size of the middle-class black population enabled black groups to play an active role in civic affairs, particularly education.137/

In Philadelphia, on the other hand, change was attributed to a "strong board" and a coalition of business, education organization, and civil rights interest groups.138/ The "reform movement was willing to accept political responsiblity for school policies. The school board, which was able to develop its own independent power base," was not dependent on city or State governments or its own administrative staff.139/

Additional data on the relationship were presented in Crain's investigation of variations in response to school integration demands in eight northern and six southern cities.140/ Following the insights derived from the analysis of floridation controversies, the researchers collected data on school board recruitment patterns (elected or appointed), board members' attitudes (toward civil rights and the civil rights movement), board cohesiveness, the political style of the city (role of the business and other interests or the "civic elite"), and political party strength.141/

Elected school board members, who tend to resist integration, had more conservative attitudes than appointed trustees; "conflict-ridden boards have more difficulty taking action."142/ In the more pluralistic northern cities, the civic elite had "relatively less influence on school integration. However, in the southern cities . . . it is relatively easy for the economic leaders to exert a great deal of influence on this decision."143/ The evidence suggested

that elites exerted influence on school boards in "modernizing cities . . . where businesspersons and civic leaders recognized the importance of education for continued economic growth."144/

Where the civic elite exerts its influence, the school board tends to take a positive stand on the issue. Controversy appears related to weak political parties where "any issue--no matter how temporary--may serve to realign the electorate."145/

In the eight northern cities included in the sample, the activities of civil rights groups appeared to have "little effect on what the board does"; however, there was a general pattern indicating that a board was "more likely to act if it is confronted by a neighborhood group than if it is dealing with civil rights organizations."146/ Board members, the authors explain, tend to perceive the former as representing parents and therefore more "legitimate."147/

A comparison of the amount of civil rights activity in the two regions was based on the militancy of the groups, characteristics of the leaders, internal competition, and the socioeconomic status of the black population. The more militant leaders in the North were young, better educated, and were long-term residents. The city provided opportunity for upward mobility and the resulting movement enabled competition for leadership or alternative bases for power.

Newark and St. Louis had established black political with a strong influence on the local NAACP:

> Since their power base lies in patronage and control over political rewards, they can tolerate a disagreement with the civil rights movement.148/

The NAACP in these cities had a conservative stand on school issues and there was pressure to organize competing groups:

> . . . in the other cities the battle between moderates and militants occurred within the NAACP, or else the NAACP cooperated with the other groups . . . 149/

The highest level of conflict occurred in the two machine cities and in two cities with weak machines and high status black populations. Conflict in the latter was explained thus:

> . . . the general presence of high status persons in the community tends to produce weak political parties and a less cohesive school board.150/

Black communities in the South were described as having "diffuse leadership rather than a power structure," and this leadership "is most often also the leadership of the civil rights movement."151/ However, some cities in the sample displayed monolithic leadership. There was a "perfect relationship between the leadership structure and the way in which the Negro community participates in local politics."152/ Blacks were excluded from political leadership in the diffuse cities, "informally co-opted into the political arena in the monolithic cities," and "they held formal or semiformal political positions in the two 'dichotomous' cities" (cities with two black factions). Where blacks occupy formal political positions there is "inevitiable conflict in the black community . . . without politics and the divisiveness which necessarily accompanies it, there is not much reason for conflict."153/

The authors were unable to test the hypothesis that "high status cities, having a specialized leadership and more competition for leadership positions, would be more militant."154/

The above studies suggest that the influence of interest groups in integration issues varies with different social contexts. Only the Gittell and Hollander six-city study indicated that civil rights groups were able to influence the course of events, and then only in a limited way.155/

A sample of American public school districts containing indicators of interest group activity and conflict resolution enabled the examination of the relationship between these two variables for the first time on a national scale.156/

While the type of issue and salient groups vary, "The effect, if one can call it that, seems to be independent of the goals of the organization."157/ Interest groups, categorized as "left-wing" (e.g., civil rights groups) or "right-wing" (e.g., veterans' groups), are responsible for issue arousal but "the more action on the part of the interest groups, the more trouble there is for the school board . . ."158/

In general, a higher turnout "spells doom" for a proposal; there are instances, however, where group efforts realize the intended effects.

The level of interest group activity, here defined as "organizational intensity" (the extent to which interest groups come to the attention of school boards), correlates positively with "social complexity," indicated by measures of metropolitanism, district population, and

percent urban. All correlate with of levels of diversity.[159]

Results of a test of the assertion that "interest groups thrive in political systems with weak political parties" were negative.[160] Instead, the authors found that:

> . . . when parties do enter the educational process interest group activity is enhanced. Rather than operating in competition, interest groups and parties exist side by side.[161]

This study, which analyzed responses from 82 districts (respondents included school board members, superintendents, and a sample of the public in each district) by three types of areas--urban, suburban, and small town also looked at some other variables discussed in previous sections. This essay, however, will only review the major findings relevant to the earlier discussion of the appropriate role for representatives in a democracy.

Two polar types of representatives were considered: the "instructed-delegate" who responds to public wishes regardless of his or her own opinion, and the "trustee" who relies on his or her own "judgment."

There was a "wide gap" between constituents' and board members' preferred role orientation for school-board member. Some 68 percent of the board members chose the "trustee" but the general public preferred the "instructed-delegate model" at both the aggregate and district levels.[162] There was no difference between elected and appointed boards or between partisan and nonpartisan board members on this factor.

While there is a "moderate to very healthy" agreement between board members and the public when it comes to identifying school district problems, this was not true of teaching and education. The authors suggest that:

> . . . substantive representation is, if one takes these figures literally, nonexistent.[163]

But they go on to say that "if pressed," most board members would probably agree that there are "minor problems in those domains."

Summary of Suburban and Urban School Studies

These and other studies suggest that both urban and suburban school systems are relatively closed to the policy influence of parents. When public participation

increases, it has usually reflected external pressure for change (e.g., school desegregation or school prayers) or economic issues.

In the studies reviewed here, these environmental pressures have included population and economic change and Supreme Court rulings. The response of the school system appears to depend on the extent of leadership centralization and community diversity or fragmentation. While some authors have argued that school systems would be more responsive if tied to partisan elections, the research results are inconsistent. The inconsistency may be due to differences in method (e.g., Zeigler and Jennings' national study was based on survey methods whereas the Crain study employed field methods). More research is needed before jumping to conclusions on this factor.[164]

The finding, that appointed rather than elected boards are more responsive to interest groups, should also be explored further.[165]

While some earlier surveys concluded that most citizens were not interested in curriculum questions, the Zeigler and Jennings results indicate that some citizens are interested in such issues. Noninvolvement in issues related to the school program could be a logical response to a situation where educators have defined much lay participation as illegitimate.

Although some decentralization advocates assumed that suburban parents had more channels for participation in school policy than urban parents, the results of research suggest that, in general, their influence was equally limited. There is ample evidence to suggest that future research on educational politics should examin the school and municipal governments as well as the organizational structure of the community.[166]

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28. James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1973). Also see: David J. O'Brien, Neighborhood Organizations and Interest Group Processes (Princeton University Press, 1975); and Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard University Press, 1971).

29. Nevertheless, the tendency for decisionmaking to be dominated by the representatives of established interests inclines some writers to regard pluralistic notions as related to social-elite theories.

30. The voting studies, however, were based on a sample of citizens, not of organization leaders.

31. See: David Sills, "Voluntary Associations: Sociological Aspects," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan Co., 1968), Vol. 16, pp.362-379.

32. William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (New York: Free Press, 1959), p. 230.

33. Examples of "subsystems" are the economy, the polity, the family, etc. According to the schema developed by Talcott Parsons, four categories of activities are required for the maintenance of a social system: adaptation, integration, goal attainment, and pattern maintenance or tension management. See: Max Black, The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1961); and Charles P. and Zona K Loomis, Modern Social Theories (New York: Van Nostrand Co., 1965).

34. For a discussion of the distinction between functional theories and functional analysis, see: George C. Homans, "Contemporary Theory in Sociology," in Handbook of Modern Sociology, ed. R. E. Faris (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1964); and Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957).

35. See: Berelson, Voting (1954) and Paul F. Lazarsfeld et al., The People's Choice (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1944).

36. Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), p. 18.

37. See: David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 57.

38. Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics (1966), p. 77.

39. This review is not intended to be exhaustive. It will be limited to some of the studies which are generally regarded as having made contributions to the theoretical issues with which we are concerned. It should also be noted that although the task is important, we shall make little effort to compare the various works considered or to analyze, except incidentally, their methodological weaknesses. These tasks are enormously complicated because of the differences in research design, levels of analysis, conceptual and operational definitions of key terms.

40. Chester Barnard, "Organizations as Systems of Cooperation," in A Sociological Reader in Complex Organizations, ed. Amitai Etzioni (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1961).

41. Philip Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of Organizations," in Etzioni, ibid.

42. Amitai Etzioni, "Two Approaches to Organizational Analysis: A Critique and a Suggestion," Administrative Science Quarterly, 1960, pp. 257-278.

43. Wilson, Political Organizations (1973).

44. Herbert H. Hyman and Charles R. Wright, "Trends in Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults: Replication Based on Secondary Analysis of National Sample Surveys," American Sociological Review, April 1971.

45. Arnold M. Rose, The Power Structure (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 219-220.

46. Hyman and Wright (1971).

47. Ibid, p. 205.

48. Almond and Verba, Civic Culture (1965).

49. Stephen J. Cutler, "Voluntary Association Membership and the Theory of Mass Society," in Bonds of Pluralism: The Form and Substance of Urban Social Networks, ed. E. O. Laumann (New York: J. Wiley, 1973).

50. Nicholas Babchuk and Ralph V. Thompson, "The Voluntary Associations of Negroes," American Sociological Review, October 1962.

51. Rose, The Power Structure (1967) and Betty H. Zisk, Local Interest Politics: A One-Way Street (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1975).

52. Almond and Verba (1965). Other countries included in their study were: Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico.

53. Ibid., pp. 250-51.

54. Ibid., p. 254.

55. Ibid., p. 255.

56. Ibid., p. 265.

57. These findings from Almond and Verba (1965) should be interpreted with caution since no data were presented on the extent of actual participation in local affairs. See: Richard L. Cole, Citizen Participation and the Urban Policy Process (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co., 1974), pp. 105-107, for possibility that individual's perceptions of public policy rewards, rather than the amount or scope of participation, leads to satisfaction, attachment, and integration in the political community.

58. Almond and Verba (1965), p. 204.

59. Berelson (1954) and Lazarsfeld, The People's Choice (1944).

60. Lazarsfeld (1944).

61. Ibid., p. 62. See also: Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (1960), p. 227.

62. Lipset, Political Man (1960), p. 227.

63. Ibid., p. 229.

64. James S. Coleman, Community Conflict (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1959).

65. Ibid., p. 22.

66. The most frequently cited hypotheses from Coleman's paper on community conflict deals with the effects of these factors--e.g., manipulation of the masses by extremists. However, Coleman's essay included a number of variables besides group affiliations that need to be incorporated in the investigation of community conflict.

67. Joseph R. Gusfield, "Mass Society and Extremist Politics," American Sociological Review, January 1962, p. 20.

68. Ibid., p. 23.

69. Ibid., p. 25.

70. Pateman (1970); Edward O. Lauman and Franz U. Pappi, Networks of Collective Action (New York: Academic Press, 1976).

71. Floyd Hunter, The Power Structure (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953); C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

72. Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (Yale University Press, 1961).

73. Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kauffman, Governing New York City (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1965).

74. Rose (1967), p. 247.

75. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytical Framework," American Political Science Review, September 1963.

76. William A. Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1975).

77. Theodore J. Lowi, The Politics of Disorder (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

78. Wilson (1973), p. 327.

79. Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory," World Politics, July 1964.

80. Robert L. Crain et al., The Politics of Community Conflict (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969); Marilyn Gittel and Edward T. Hollander, Six Urban School Districts (New York: Praeger, 1968); Wilson (1973); and Zisk, Local Interest Group Politics (1975).

81. Wilson (1973), p. 337.

82. David Rogers, 110 Livingston Street (New York: Random House, 1968).

83. Wilson (1973), p.338.

84. David L. Sallach, "Voluntary Associations and Power: A Reassessment," paper presented at an annual meeting of American Sociological Association, New York, 1973.

85. William E. Connoly, ed., Bias of Pluralism (Chicago: Atherton, 1969), pp. 18-19.

86. Lauman and Pappi, Networks of Collective Action (1976), p. 164.

87. Ibid., pp. 165-167.

88. Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

89. Ibid., pp. 232-233.

90. Ibid., p. 255.

91. Ibid., p. 234.

92. G. Ross Stephens, "The Power Grid of the Metropolis," in Future Directions in Community Power Research: A Colloquium, ed. F.D. Wirt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

93. Zisk (1975), p. 19.

94. Ibid., p. 132.

95. Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Implementation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

96. Ibid., p. xvii.

97. Stephens, "The Power Grid of the Metropolis" (1971), p. 131.

98. Truman, The Governmental Process (1951), pp. 442-443.

99. Wilson (1973), p. 341.

100. Ibid., p. 345.

101. A reanalysis of the Almond and Verba data comparing national and local acts of political participation by place of residence (rural/urban) found that: "the larger the place of residence, the less likely is the citizen to be involved as an active participant in local political life." See: Norman H. Nie, G. Bingham Powell and Kenneth Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, part I," American Political Science Review, June 1969.

102. Crain et al., Politics of Community Conflict (1969); Wayne E. Thompson and John E. Horton, "Political Alienation as a Foreign Political Action," Social Forces, 38:1960, pp. 190-95.

103. Laurence Iannaccone and Peter J. Cistone, The Politics of Education (Eugene, Oregon: ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management, 1974).

104. Michael W. Kirst, The Politics of Education at the Local, State, and Federal Levels (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1970). However, Paul E. Peterson (1974) challenges this generalization, arguing that the extent of citizen influence depends on the nature of the issue. Resistance to "the organized efforts of the black community," interpreted by some analysts as an indicator of professional insulation, is interpreted by Peterson as an indicator of responsiveness to white groups. See: Paul E. Peterson, "The Politics of American Education," in Review of Research in Education 2, ed. F.N. Kerlinger and J.B. Carrol (Itasca, Ill.: F.E. Peacock, 1974), p. 385.

105. William L. Boyd, "The Public, the Professionals and Educational Policy-Making: Who Governs?" Teachers College Record, May 1976.

106. Raymond E. Callahan, "The American Board of Education 1789-1960," in Understanding School Boards, ed. Peter J. Cistone (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co., 1975).

107. Robert F. Lyke, "Political Issues in School District Decentralization," in Politics of Education, ed. Michael W. Kirst (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1970), p. 115.

108. L. Harmon Zeigler and M. Kent Jennings, Governing American Schools (North Scituate, Mass: Duxbury Press, 1974), p. 1.

109. Roscoe C. Martin, Government and the Suburban Schools (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1962).

110. The two studies are: Richard Carter, Voters and Their Schools (Stanford, Calif.: Institute for Communications Research, 1960); and Richard Carter et al., The Structure and Process of School Community Relations (Stanford University Project Cost, 1966).

111. Laurence Iannaccone and Frank Lutz, Politics, Power, and Policy: The Governing of Local School Districts (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1970).

112. Crain et al. (1969), especially pp. 41-43.

113. Community Conflict (1959).

114. See: Keith Goldhammer and Roland J. Pellegrin, Jackson County Revisited (University of Oregon: Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration, 1968). These authors attributed opposition to the local schools' educational program to economic and political rather than educational motivations. This view is supported by the claim that in the two periods studied (1962 and 1964) the public lacked "strong objective evidence to support the assertions about educational quality . . ." The issues presented by the opposing factions affected philosophical differences related to the educational program but the study's authors did not provide objective evidence to support or refute either side.

115. Berelson, Voting (1954).

116. Wayne E. Thompson and John E. Horton, "Political Alienation as a Foreign Political Action," Social Forces, March 1970.

117. Ibid., p. 332.

118. Crain et al., The Politics of Community Conflict (1969), p. 199.

119. Ibid., p. 200.

120. David Minar, "The Community Basis of Conflict in School System Politics," American Sociological Review, December 1966.

121. Ibid., p. 830.

122. Ibid., p. 831.

123. Ibid., p. 834.

124. Ibid., p. 835.

125. Robert F. Lyke, "Suburban School Politics," Ph.d. diss., Yale University, 1968.

126. Ibid., p. 220.

127. Michael Kirst and Edith Mosher, "The Politics of Education," Review of Educational Research, December 1969, p. 625.

128. Sayre and Kauffman, Governing New York City (1960), p. xi.

129. Marilyn Gittel, Participants and Participation: A Study of School Policy in New York City (New York: Center for Urban Education, 1966).

130. Ibid., p. 15.

131. 110 Livingston Street (1968).

132. Ibid., p. 494.

133. Ibid., p. 523.

134. Ibid.

135. Gittell and Hollander, Six Urban School Districts (1968).

136. Ibid., p. 152.

137. Ibid., p. 151.

138. Ibid., p. 45.

139. Ibid., p. 49.

140. Robert L. Crain, The Politics of School Desegregation (New York: Doubleday-Anchor Books, 1969).

141. Ibid., pp. 376-385.

142. Ibid., p. 379.

143 Ibid., p. 337.

144. Ibid., p. 339.

145. Ibid., p. 384.

146. Ibid., p. 144.

147. Ibid., p. 139.

148. Ibid., p. 353.

149. Ibid., p. 353.

150. Ibid., p. 337.

151. Ibid., p. 363.

152. Ibid., p. 365.

153. Ibid., p. 366.

154. Ibid., p. 367.

155. Subsequent events in Philadelphia reversed the trend in that city. See the section, "School Decentralization," below.

156. Zeigler and Jennings, Governing American Schools (1974).

157. Ibid., p. 114.

158. Ibid., p. 112.

159. Ibid., p. 100. "Metropolitanism divides the school districts between those not located in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas and those located within one; district population is the total adult population within the school boundaries; and percent urban is the percentage of pupils residing in urban places, as estimated by district officials," ibid., p. 80.

160. Ibid., pp. 102-103.

161. Ibid., pp. 104-105.

162. Ibid., p. 121.

163. Ibid., p. 129.

164. Boyd, "The Public, the Professionals and Educational Policy-Making: Who Governs?" (1976).

165. Zeigler and Jennings (1974), p. 85.

166. Students of educational politics have frequently claimed that there is a difference between education and other policy issues, due primarily to the autonomy of school systems. However, Gittell and Hollander (1968) concluded that political culture is the overriding factor; Peterson, "Politics of American Education" (1974), also challenges the political autonomy of school issues argument as unsubstantiated by research.

II. NETWORK ANALYSIS

A. DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

The term "network" has appeared with increasing frequency in social science literature since World War II (e.g., Sarason) but it was only eight years ago that Mitchell began to codify the dimensions of interpersonal networks developed in the research of anthropologists and sociologists. Sarason's volume reviews the studies published in several social science disciplines between World War II and the present.[1] A number of methodological techniques are discussed in both of these publications. Although both interpersonal and interorganizational networks are discussed in the literature, most of the concepts that have been developed pertain to the former, but some analysts have suggested that their concepts are applicable to organizations and communities.[2]

Network techniques seem to provide particularly appropriate methods for the analysis of political behavior in terms of the basic assumptions underlying political systems theory. A comparison between conventional methods of sociological analysis and network analysis will indicate why this is so.

The conventional approach has been for the researcher to classify subjects in terms of a specific position in the subsystem under investigation. Political scientists have concentrated on formal strucutures although informal leadership interrelationships are discussed. Decision-making studies, for example, typically classify participants in terms of their dominant status in the subsystem (e.g., elected official, business executive, school superintendent, parent, etc.). Such methods do not enable us to consider the influence of other formal and informal positions or the subject's interpersonal relationships or political behavior. Nor do they enable consideration of the impact of indirect contacts on the actor's behavior.

An interpersonal network, meaning "a set of linkages among a defined set of persons, with the additional property that the characteristics of these linkages as a whole

may be used to interpret social behavior of the persons involved,"[3] permits the inclusion of the actor's formal and informal role relationships. Such an interpersonal network is composed of two types of linkages: direct linkages of any one unit with others and indirect linkages of any one unit with any others. Although most network analysts refer to Mitchell's definition, Schon has suggested a broader definition:

> . . . a set of elements related to eachother through multiple interconnections. The metaphor of the net suggests a special kind of interconnectedness, one dependent on nodes in which several connecting strands meet. There is the suggestion both of each element being connected to every other, and of elements connecting through one another rather than to each other through a center. [4]

This modification, enabling the analysis of collectivities as well as interpersonal networks, is similar to that suggested by Craven and Wellman, who believe the concepts may be useful in the analysis of networks consisting of tribal groups, organizations, and ethnic groups.[5]

The unique characteristic of network analysis is that it "permits the examination of interrelationships of the behavior of people in different contexts," whereas "institutional analysis minimizes the connection between institutions."[6] In contrast to institutional or organizational analysis, where the units in interaction have a clear boundary, there is no clear boundary for the units in a network. Network concepts, according to Sarason, "allow the description of the actual complexity of societal phenomena."[7]

Network Structure

In the analysis of an interpersonal network, the focal point is the Ego whose "total network" includes all the people with whom a person has direct and indirect relationships. The "primary zone" refers to the direct relationships. All of the persons with whom Ego communicates through an indirect relationship (or link) are included in the "secondary zone."[8]

Ego's total network is comprised of a number of "partial networks" or "action sets" through which he or she pursues specific needs or objectives. For example, a political candidate will activate all the units in his or her network whom he or she can mobilize to support the campaign. Such a partial network or action set is typically of limited duration. In this particular example the effectiveness of Ego's campaign relies not only on the number of direct contacts but also the extent to which Ego can contact

people to support him or her, i.e., the "reachability" of the network.9/

Networks are characterized also by their "density" or the extent to which all the people in Ego's primary zone know each other. In a "tightly-knit" network most of the people who know Ego also know each other. In a "loosely-knit" network few people know each other, and the major common characteristic is their relationship to Ego. Studies dealing with the communication of information suggest that where a network is tightly knit, messages are spread more rapidly within the network. However, they are less likely to be transmitted beyond the network than in loosely-knit networks.

"Range" refers to both the number of people in direct contact with Ego and to the social heterogeneity of these individuals. "A person in contact with 30 people of widely different social backgrounds would have a wider range than a person in contact with 30 people of the same general social background."10/

Interactional Criteria and Network Structure

Mitchell discussed four interactional criteria that have been found to have an impact on the functioning of networks: content, directedness, durability, and intensity.

"Content" refers to the "meanings which the persons in the network attribute to their relationships."11/ A network develops to achieve specific or diffuse purposes based on the interests of either or both parties. Examples of network content are: economic assistance, kinship obligations, religious activities, friendship, professional, and political interests.

Networks with only one content are classified as "single stranded." Those with two or more contents are "multistranded" or "multiplex." Sometimes the multistranded network is described as "strong"; research suggests that in such instances people are more "securely bound to each other."

Multistranded networks are characteristic of traditional and small-scale societies where the same people in a community are likely to participate in all or most of its activities. In large-scale societies with opportunities for mobility and functional specialization, networks are more likely to be single-stranded. Partial networks are more characteristic of such societies and the people participating in Ego's various partial networks are not likely to know each other.12/

The "direction" of the network refers to whether or not the relationship is reciprocal or whether influence flows up or down.

As the example of the political candidate suggests, networks can be activated to achieve a specific purpose (election to office); once the purpose is achieved the relationship becomes dormant. In other relationships, e.g., kinship, obligations and rights persist over time. Thus network analysts talk about the "durability" of the network.

Finally, the "intensity" of a network refers to the "degree to which individuals are prepared to honor obligations or feel free to exercise the rights implied in their link to another person." Kinship networks, for example, are often described as involving strong ties which bind persons to each other and occupational networks relatively "weak" ties, usually measured by qualitative criteria (e.g., intimacy). However, where networks are based on common interests and shared values, they may lead to the development of strong ties similar to those characteristic of kinship.

B. NETWORKS, PARTICIPATION, AND INFLUENCE

There are at least three strands of research which provide evidence to challenge mass society assumptions about the nature of social relationships in American communites; studies of voting behavior and communication patterns, and social area analysis. The first two interpret findings in terms of network concepts and the findings of the third are relevant to these concepts.

This section will briefly review the findings. Implications for political participation will follow.[13]

Voting Research

This discussion will rely primarily on the findings reported by Lazarsfeld, et al. from their study of the 1948 national political campaign in Elmira, New York. In this study, the investigators employed the sociometric techniques they had used in their earlier study of similar behavior.[14] These techniques permitted the analysis of the effects of interpersonal relationships on candidate preferences.

Like the earlier study, the results of Voting suggested that the average voter does not reach political decisions--at least in reference to national elections--on the basis

of interest in, knowledge of, or discussion of the issue. Comparing these findings with the expectations of democratic theorists, the authors concluded that the voter "falls short" of the standards required for participation in a democratic study.

The most important influence on party preference is the family--a majority of Elmira residents tended to identify as close friends and co-workers individuals who shared preferences similar to their own:

> By and large, the voter is tied into a network of personal associations that is both homogeneous and congenial . . . For the community as a whole the proportion with associates from the other part is about 25 percent.[15]

> People tend to interact most with others who are like themselves, thus there is little variety of experience, diversity of information, competition of ideas or maximum number of choices--the conditions they assume to be expected in a democracy.[16]

For individuals whose contacts with others are restricted to such homogeneous influences, the major source of new ideas would be public debate, particularly through the mass media. And, as Berelson et al. point out, "Democratic theorists have always insisted on the need for public debate among political leaders."[17] Three factors operate to diminish the ability of the media to change people's opinions: the nature of the campaign, the amount of exposure to the media, and selective perception.

If there is little difference between two candidates or parties on issues or no open debate of the issues, there is little opportunity for the media to educate the electorate. In their analysis, the authors of Voting hold this to be true of the 1948 election, in which "Truman courted but Dewey avoided what might be called genuine debate of truly controversial issues."[18] Controversy at the community level was also partially reduced by the partisanship of the major newspaper owners, as reflected in the predominance of pro-Dewey editorials and columns.

Further, a minority of the respondents in this study "claimed to be paying a 'great deal of attention to news about the election.'" In June the figure was 35 percent, by October it had risen to only 38 percent.[19] Furthermore, there was a consistent overlap in exposure to media channels:

> . . . people who read more campaign material in the

> newspaper also read more in magazines and listened more over the radio.[20]

Finally, the differences between the objective reality and subjective perceptions or, as Walter Lippman put it, "the world outside and the pictures in our heads," [21] must be taken into account. Not only is "political reality" ambiguous, but most people tend to perceive selectively and interpret subjectively:

> . . . voter tends to oversee or invent what is favorable to himself and to distort much of what is unfavorable.[22]

These processes enable the voter to avoid conflict, to magnify the differences between candidates (thus making personal judgments "seem" more rational) and to "eliminate cross-pressures" before they can become visible.[23]

The overall effect is that media exposure "crystallizes and reinforces more than it converts."[24]

Interpersonal influence

It was the finding of the insignificance of mass media effects in both the 1940 and 1948 voting studies that led to the exploration of influence processes reported in Personal Influence.[25] In the introduction to this volume, the authors reveal the major reasons for the further study. Publishers, as well as social scientists, assumed that opinions were formed by community elites:

> . . . and then percolated down from one social stratum to the next until all followed the lead of the conspicuous persons at the apex of the community structure.[26]

The 1940 study:

> . . . seemed to indicate the parallel existence of what was then called horizontal opinion leadership. Each social stratum generated its own opinion leaders--the individuals who were likely to influence other persons in their immediate environment.[27]

In Personal Influence the decisions studied primarily involved consumer choices (household marketing, fashion, beauty products, and movies) and also included public affairs. The results corroborated the findings in the voting studies.

Again, popular assumptions about elites and the opinion

formation process were contradicted. Instead of a "one-step flow" process whereby messages are transmitted from elites down to the mass, the data indicated that messages are mediated by a "two-step flow" process through opinion leaders in primary groups.

This finding was obtained by taking account of:

> . . . those factors which intervene between the mass media and their audience and thus modify mass media effects. 28/

The network concept was introduced in the discussion of interpersonal relationships:

> Interpersonal relationships imply networks of interpersonal social communication . . .The two-step flow hypothesis suggests . . . that these interpersonal networks are linked to the mass media networks in such a way that some people who are relatively more exposed pass on what they hear, or read, to others with whom they are in contact who are less exposed. Primary groups, in other words, may serve as channels of mass media transmission.29/

Lazarsfeld and Katz were also interested in "the ways in which influences originating outside a group may successfully make their way inside to influence ideas or behavior."30/

Success, they suggest, may depend on three factors: the extent to which the idea can be identified with valued group norms, endorsement by an opinion leader, and gate-keeping processes.

Public affairs opinion leadership was based on having been asked recently for advice on some current social or political issue.

"First of all," the authors report, "This type of leadership is relatively rare."31/ A majority of people who indicated a change in opinion on a public affairs issue were influenced by men. Women in this category (public affairs leadership) tend to be of high status and occupy a social position which places them in contact with people who are "politically interested and active" and have more time for social contacts.

One fact which accounts for the dominance of high-status women among public affairs leaders is the "sparse numbers who are interested in public affairs among lower-status groups."32/ There is thus a higher rate of cross-status influencing in this opinion area than in any of the others included in this study.33/

Urban Area Analysis

A series of studies on residential patterns, conducted in the early 1950's, provided data on the persistence of primary relationships in the urban environment.[34]

A considerable amount of data on residential patterns in American cities were generated by social area analysts concerned with urbanization. Some of these analysts were interested in the relationship between urbanization and participation and applied the methods of social area analysis to test Wirth's notion of the breakdown in primary relationships and shift to secondary relationships in urban.

A central concept underlying the works of social area analysts is "scale." Urbanization, resulting from the transfer of workers from agriculture to manufacture and trade, is viewed as increasing the "scale" of the society. Scale is vaguely defined as an increase in "interdependence" and "scope of interaction."[35] By this they mean the decline of dependence and interaction "with the immediate social environment" and the development of a "national conscience," and heterogeneity.

The three indexes constructed to measure these trends, based on census tract data, are: social rank (or economic status) derived from measures of occupation and education; second, urbanization (or family status) derived from measures of fertility, women in the labor force, and number of single family dwelling units; and segregation, derived from measures of the racial and nationality (ethnic) groups. In several studies these indexes were related to social participation, usually measured in terms of the extent of contacts with kin, friends, and membership in local and extralocal organizations.

On the basis of these studies, Greer concluded that:

> Few urban subareas approach the anonymity and fragmentation of the stereotype . . . fewer still approach the kind of subcommunity envisaged in the democratic ideology.[36]

The most important contacts maintained in these urban areas are among kin and friends. Most residents belong to only one organization usually related to church or work. Although participation in civic affairs increases with social class, only 40 percent of those in the highest rank in one study could name as many as four local leaders and a majority could not name even one metropolitan leader.

There are, Greer observes, great variations in the importance of the local area to the individual. The earlier definition of the community:

> . . . posited a spatially defined social aggregate . . . such groups exist only when there is a functional interdependence (as the local community in the suburbs is most necessary to its merchants, least so to the childless couple who rent their dwelling). Interdependence means commitment to the ongoing social system--which produces intensive participation and the development of common values and norms.[37]

The development of common values and norms has been shown by numerous studies to be related to continuous interaction, and for many people this occurs mainly in their work groups.[38] What weakens the development of a sense of common community in the urbanized area is that work groups are separated from the area of residence and interests. The division of labor leads to fragmentation (single-stranded networks).

Neither the family or voluntary organizations can be relied on to develop a common conscience, Greer argues. In the former, relationships are "privatized" and research indicates that voluntary organizations are "relatively unimportant at the 'grass roots.'"[39] Formal organizations, in Greer's view, are not conducive to the development of democratic social processes due to their oligarchic tendencies and the "erratic" participation of their members.[40]

Nevertheless, most communities do contain voluntary associations (religious groups, social clubs, school community organizations) which foster interaction at the local level. Although these groups are not political in content, they comprise what Greer and Orleans call a "parapolitical structure."[41] Under conditions of threat or a crisis, residents can use these structures to mobilize support of, or opposition to, specific issues. Such actions could be interpreted in terms of the network concepts discussed in the preceding section. That is, at the local level, the individual's social relationships comprise a network of contacts developed in a variety of roles. Those contacts significant to a particular policy area can be activated (action set) by local residents or outside manipulators to achieve specific goals.

The significance of the social area research is that it indicated that (1) primary relationships had not been replaced by secondary relationships, (2) membership in formal organizations was characteristic of a minority

of residents, and mainly among those with higher socio-economic status, (3) most of the organizations at the local neighborhood level were essentially affective in content rather than political or instrumental, and (4) few residents are members of associations beyond the local neighborhood.

C. A NETWORK INTERPRETATION OF PRECEDING STUDIES

The combined data on voluntary association membership and the three types of studies reviewed in the preceding section suggest that for a majority of urban Americans, the range of interpersonal networks is narrow. "Range" refers to diversity since the studies provide no information on the size of the networks. Institutional roles are restricted primarily to the family and the work place. Neighborhood homogeneity or homogeneous friendship patterns (at the neighborhood level and the work place) tend to restrict the individual's opportunities to receive new ideas. The individual's receptivity to new ideas through the mass media is also limited by his/her interpersonal network. It would appear that his/her opportunity to develop direct or indirect links to persons with divergent views and different status levels is relatively limited at the neighborhood level. The ability to do this in the work place may depend on the extent to which the occupational setting enables him/her to interact with people who have opposing views.

One classic study of social relationships in an occupational setting found that membership in nonpolitical printers' clubs fostered involvement in national and union politics as well as the development of union leadership.[42] Exposure to divergent views, or their discussion, tended to be related to the size of the printing shop and the level of consensus on political issues.

Membership in social clubs had the most impact (in terms of activating political involvement) on men who scored lowest on "ideological sensitivity", a measure of general political interest or awareness and commitment to a specific ideology.[43] The authors relate these findings to those reported by Lazarsfeld, et al., where, among the working class group, only those who belonged to a trade union were likely to be politically active.[44] This suggested that:

> . . . increased contact, between individuals who are politically active and those who are not, increases the possibility that the latter will be politically stirred.[45]

In general, however, the patterns of interaction within

the occupational setting were similar to those found within the community; there is a tendency for people to select friends with similar values and interests.[46]

Network analysts have suggested that interpersonal networks in traditional societies are multistranded but tend to be singlestranded in the urban society. The urban area studies suggest that this is the case. Two factors account for this: the separation of work from residence and the confinement of nonfamilial interactions to friendship and neighboring.

The persistence of strong familial ties and the strength of family influence on political attitudes suggests that a majority of people may be resistant to new ideas unless they can be identified with previously held values. The most likely people to influence local residents are local opinion leaders who belong to the individual's interpersonal network. Where the local community is dominated by residents of similar status, and where subcommunity values or community organization structure provide few opportunities for membership in voluntary associations, there is less likelihood that the network will include people with divergent views or links to individuals and groups beyond the local neighborhood.

Opportunities for membership in voluntary associations at the local level are restricted primarily to affective groups (e.g., church or social clubs) which have limited potential to train people to participate in public affairs. However, as Greer's study indicates, in a situation of crisis or a threat, the interpersonal networks developed through these apolitical institutions can be activated to pursue political goals.[47]

The institution with the greatest potential for providing training in political participation and the development of a politically oriented partial network is the individual's occupation, through membership in trade unions or professional associations. This source is limited by the fact that most members are not actively involved in union affairs. Furthermore, the interests pursued in such groups are likely to be narrow, and the probability that members of his/her occupation network are also members of his/her community network (multipstranded) is low. In such a case, the occupational political network is irrelevant to the community political network.

Granovetter suggests that the diffusion of new ideas and the ability of a community to organize are related to the opportunities for individuals to develop "weak ties."[48] The strength (or weakness) of a tie has not been adequately clarified or operationalized by network analysts. While some anthropologists have suggested that relationships

involving multiple contents are "stronger" than those with "one content or with diffuse content," Granovetter notes that this may not necessarily be the case.[49] Until these concepts are developed more systematically, Granovetter suggests assessing the "strength" of a tie in terms of four factors: "the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie."[50] Where individuals belong to subgroups (either familial or friendship cliques) whose members have no or only a few weak ties, they are less likely to come in contact with new ideas or to be able to activate others outside the group for political purposes. Granovetter attributes the inability of Gans' working class "urban villagers" in Boston to resist urban renewal to the strength of their interpersonal networks and absence of weak ties at the local level. None belonged to organizations; most worked outside the community. The successful resistance of urban renewal by another working class community in Boston is explained in terms of their weak ties developed through a "rich organizational life" and the fact that "most male residents worked within the area."[51]

In contrast to Wirth and other writers who view weak ties "as generative of alienation," Granovetter sees them as:

> . . . indispensable to individuals' opportunities and to their integration into communities; strong ties breeding local cohesion lead to overall fragmentation.[52]

Granovetter is interested in the application of network concepts to analyze the processes whereby "small-scale interaction becomes translated into large-scale patterns, and that these in turn, feed back into small groups," which may provide a model for the "linking of levels."[53]

The possibility of using network concepts to analyze the linkage between micro- and macro-level networks has been pursued also by Craven and Willman, who are more interested in the links between communities than the links between individuals.[54] They suggest also that the units tied together in a network can include organizations and ethnic groups.

Interactions in modern society, according to Craven and Wellman's perspective, are not as bound to local community interactions as the earlier community studies indicated:

> . . . it has become clear that, with the exception of the most strongly-bounded neighborhood enclaves, a significant proportion of important interpersonal ties, indluding those of kinship, work, friendship, influence,

etc., extend beyond the local community.55/

This latter generalization is applied specifically to urban migrants who have been shown to have:

> . . . available to them various structures and mechanisms for attaching themselves to the ongoing social process of the metropolis. Their use of networks in migration helps link them to the ongoing communities of the city . . . and thus tie them into urban structures . . . 56/

Despite their interest in the possibility of "aspatial" communities, in their discussion of networks and migration Craven and Wellman focus on the tendency of these processes to create geographically-based ethnic enclaves.57/ The linkage between the ethnic group and the larger society is at the citywide level.

Further insight into the applicability of network concepts to urban political behavior comes from research on ethnicity and political participation.

D. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL CHANGE FOR THE STRUCTURE OF PLANNED INFORMAL NETWORKS

The Group on School Capacity for Problem Solving, a division of the National Institute of Education, recently began to explore the feasibility of stimulating innovation at the local level through informal networks. The process is referred to as "networking" and is defined as a "deliberate strategy for increasing the initiative and ability of schools and related organizations to confront and solve educational problems." Networks are conceived as "composed of spontaneously occurring personal 'connections' among individuals."58/

The NIE group's interest in informal networks stems from the disappointing results of the Federal efforts to promote local innovations during the 1960's. The evidence indicates that local implementation of decisions made in Washington is highly influenced by informal social processes leading those in support of change to question the efficacy of centrally directed change strategies.

The NIE group invited social scientists representing several disciplines to present papers dealing with various aspects of networks at a conference held in March 1977. Several authors point out features of informal networks which make them difficult for government agencies to "control, create, or support."59/

Innovators in education, Kadushin suggests, tend to take the form of "movement circles" which tend to "create 'against' some established principles or images."[60] In the initial phase of development, the circle is open to membership ("anyone who is 'on our side' may join") but in later stages, recruitment criteria become more rigid and the circle becomes a kind of "establishment" and "ripe for new rebellion against its authority."[61]

Examples of this tendency are presented by Schon, who calls them "movement networks." Such networks are created by "persons who share a particular ideology, a sense of injustice to be remedied or of a societal problem to be solved. Central to these networks is a particular concept of social reform."[62] Kadushin discusses a study of reforms in juvenile corrections in Massachusetts which found that:

> . . . in each instance, the network of reformers defined themselves and their program in opposition to the perceived evils of the established system of juvenile correction and later came themselves to dominate the operation of that system.[63]

More information--probably not now available to anyone--is needed about several aspects of informal networks before conclusions can be made about their role in school innovation. Particularly important is "the relationship between the informal network of innovators and the formal network of school systems."[64] The available research has enabled the identification of different types of networks, but the findings reflect the concerns of different disciplines and tend to be specialized. "As a consequence" Schon observed, "we have not had much occasion to consider the meaning of the existence and functions of these several sorts of networks <u>together</u> from the point of view of their relevance for intervention in the domain of social policy."[65]

Dalin raises questions about the goals of educational innovations. He asked, for example, which group is to benefit from the intended changes. He contends that the impact of educational change cannot:

> . . .ignore the political dynamics of educational reform. "Problemsolving" itself is . . . a political process. In most educational systems, however, it is taken for granted <u>who has the right to define the problem.</u> To a large extent this will determine the way the problem is solved, who is solving the problem and why.[66]

Since the NIE group is primarily interested in promoting change in urban school districts, it might be useful to

review some of the theoretical perspectives discussed in sections of this essay relating to urban change and to note their implications for the structure of planned informal networks.

These perspectives are concerned with changes in American society resulting in increased interdependence between local, State, and Federal governments. It will be argued here that change efforts that concentrate on locally based networks must take this interdependence into account. Previous government change strategies, it will be argued, had limited impact because they failed to consider informal local networks. But can local networks be effective without considering formal and informal networks at higher levels?

According to Warren's framework, the major change which has affected local communities in the contemporary period is the shift in decisionmaking from the local community to State and Federal authorities.[67] This has strengthened linkages along the vertical axes--or the ties linking local governments and agencies to State and Federal agencies--and weakened horizontal ties between agencies at the local level. Increased Federal intervention, resulting from the inadequacy of local resources and political processes to meet local needs, has fragmented the decisionmaking process.

The influence of local neighborhoods was further weakened by the urban reform movement which shifted power from elected officials to public bureaucracies whose expansion was facilitated by increased State and Federal funds. The decline of the political machine had important implications for the participation of the poor--particularly new migrants.

Several analysts have identified the political machine as the major mechanism for the integration of new groups.[68] Its decline parallelled the migration of the most recent new groups--primarily blacks and Hispanics--to many urban centers.

These changes have created new power bases. At the city level, policymaking is controlled by occupational groups or "new machines."[69] Under these conditions, where elected political officials and citizen groups were relatively powerless, middle-class groups (when their interests conflict with occupational groups) are structurally in the same position as the poor and working class--without an effective formal voice in the decisionmaking process.

Besides the shift in the locus of power, the decline of

the political machine and rise of public bureaucracies have changed the content of decisionmaking. In the period of rule by the political machines, where the political boss' status required community-based support, concerns were more likely to focus on neighborhood and consumer needs. In the contemporary period, concerns are said to focus on occupational or producer needs. While teachers' contract negotiations, for example, may give lip service to student needs, the emphasis is typically on teachers' salaries and working conditions.

The difficulty urban residents have in remedying neighborhood problems is further compounded by the overlap of functional units (e.g., separate police precincts, school districts, health areas) and the overlap of governmental units (e.g., City Council districts, State Assembly and State Senate districts, Congressional districts). While the decentralization of schools and other municipal services might make it easier for citizens to cope with this overlap, it is of limited help in a situation where many decisions that affect a neighborhood are made at higher levels of the policy system. More and more of the resources channeled to the city-level public bureaucracies come from State and Federal sources, suggesting that these are the most effective levels for the representation of minority interests. However, in education, professionals at the local level maintain control of the implementation process and are minimally, if at all, accountable to higher levels.70/ Mann argues that the ineffectiveness of State and Federally supported educational reforms was not dute to " . . . a lack of motivation or dedication on anyone's part. Rather, two things were lacking: legitimation for the power to require change and a sufficient technology of behavioral change."71/

The intent of the proposed NIE effort to create informal networks at the local level is to foster "problem-solving" by local participants. Looking at this goal from the perspective suggested by Warren and the issues reviewed above raises a serious question: If decisions and resources affecting the local community are largely determined by State and Federal officials, how can local problem-solvers be effective unless they are linked to these higher level units?72/

While the ability of locally based groups or networks to resist the implementation of State and Federal edicts might appear to support the viability of "local control," the fact remains that education in the United States is a State function and State policies must be consistent with Federal laws. To the extent that informal networks supported by the Federal government create horizontal

linkages among the various sectors involved in local problemsolving and lead to innovative decisions consistent with existing State and Federal laws, linkages at this level may prove effective. However, if they require policy changes, which would be more than likely unless only minimal solutions or "band-aids" are forthcoming, then provisions must be incorporated to integrate the local networks with networks that operate at higher levels of the policy system.

Some support for this suggestion is provided by Dalin, whose illustrations of successful networks indicate the importance of a multilevel structure. These networks did not have formal leaders, but they each included a core group based at a level outside the local school district. Dalin uses the multilevel concept to refer to two factors: (1) the location of the network member (e.g., the local school, district, State or Federal agency), and (2) the member's role (e.g., teacher, administrator, politician, etc.).

"Most innovators," Dalin pointed out, "seek political support through 'horizontal linkages,'" which is consistent with the view that "most educational decisionmaking is rather local in nature."[73] He also noted that most "spontaneous networks are networks among colleagues" which are usually "spin-offs" from "formal networks":

> . . . much more seldom are multiple level networks that involve people in different roles and positions throughout the system. I look upon the process of change as a systemic process. Interaction among individuals with different roles is essential. Multi-level networks are therefore important.[74]

In the successful networks examined by Dalin:

> Networks link members in an informal way across formal decisionmaking lines. Network members usually come from different parts of the system or across systems and do not often report to the same persons in authority. Effectively used networks then become a power in their own right that might have considerable influence on the process of change.[75]

The creation of multilevel networks that provide political as well as social and psychological support for community innovators, however:

> . . . raises a dilemma. Who has the right to 'intervene' in a local political process?[76]

One example, from Norway, involved a spontaneous network developed by an informal group of concerned educators from small schools and school districts throughout Norway who felt a particular mission to strengthen rural education. They were supported politically by the communities since the threat of centralization was a major concern to the smaller districts.[77] From evidence presented in this example, the network consisted of vertical links within the school districts and horizontal linkages among school districts.

In another case, support for an innovative local school came from an international network, suggesting that local resistance can sometimes be overcome by external forces. Besides researchers, the network included administrators, teachers and students from school districts, and politicians. Dalin views multilevel networks as primarily providing social and psychological support for local innovators who are usually isolated at the local level. However, since innovations are inevitably political, implementation would require political support as well. If Dalin is correct in the assertion that educational change involves political issues, an effort to develop informal networks to promote educational change should consider the decisionmaking structure and the changes in power relationships.

Further support for the need to foster multilevel or vertical networks comes from studies dealing with communication patterns, (e.g., dissemination of information, diffusion of new ideas). However, knowledge or information is only one of the resources required to promote change. A major assumption underlying network strategy is that a group of individuals faced with a common problem possess the knowledge or the ability to develop the requisite knowledge to solve that problem. The innovative networks described by Sarason and Dalin appear to have been dominated by professionals whose occupational roles involved them in the development of knowledge. The communication studies indicated that the infusion of new ideas to the local group, whether it consists of laypersons[78] or doctors[79] relies on individuals who were linked to extralocal groups.

A discussion of these and other factors related to the need for multilevel networks is beyond the scope of this essay. The issues are raised primarily to emphasize the need for research on: (1) the nature of the decisionmaking system in the contemporary period, (2) the types of influence networks generated by this system, (3) the implications for planning citizen networks that can participate effectively in the educational change process, and (4) the factors related to the development of multilevel networks. These ideas will be expanded in future documents in this series.

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9. Ibid., p. 15.

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11. Ibid., pp. 21-22.

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31. Ibid., p. 272.

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33. The findings should be viewed with caution since the level of interest in public affairs may change over time. The findings, however, have implications for participation in school affairs since a majority of participants in many communities are women.

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III. ETHNICITY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Background

The increase in social science interest in the relationship between ethnic group identity and political behavior might appear superficially to reflect a new phenomenon. A closer look at the literature, however, suggests that ethnic identity has been a persistent characteristic of political behavior. Two aspects of the current discussion will be presented here: (1) the failure of earlier sociological and political theories to recognize the persisting salience of ethnicity in American society and consequently its impact on political behavior and (2) the differences between the "old" and "new" style ethnic politics.

The failure of earlier theorists to recognize the persistence of ethnic identity reflects overwhelming reliance on the assumptions underlying the concept of assimilation. These came to light through the efforts to explain the events of the 1960's, specifically the emergence of black activism and its impact on other ethnic groups.[1/] These events challenged the assumptions underlying both political pluralism and assimilation theories.

The crucial belief underlying these assumptions was based on a view of America as an open society offering access to social and political mobility to its diverse cultural population. It was believed that the acquisition of middle-class status would foster the dispersal of immigrants to middle-class suburbs where increased interaction with members of the dominant culture (i.e., nonethnic) would lead to the erosion of ethnic identity. Where social science research findings indicated ethnic voting patterns, they were interpreted as an indication of either lack of assimilation or only partial assimilation (measured by socioeconomic variables). Ethnic identity was presumed to be most characteristic of first-generation immigrants. With occupational mobility, increased interaction with the larger society, and intermarriage, ethnic identification would decline in second and third generations. These notions originated in the theories propounded by Wirth and others in the early part of this century,

Which are sometimes referred to as "Anglo-conformity". [2]

The mobilization of blacks and other disaffected minorities in the 1960's provided ammunition for some social scientists to challenge the pluralist assumption of the openness of access to local decisionmaking structures.[3] Revolutionary movements, from the perspective of these writers, could be treated as indications that the system was closed to these participants rather than as indications of extremist behavior.

But prior to these events there was evidence to challenge the general openness of the American social system. This possibility was suggested by Gordon's distinction between cultural assimilation and structural assimilation. Cultural assimilation refers to the adoption by a member of an ethnic group of the "way of life" of a society which consists of norms of conduct, beliefs, values, skills, "along with the behavioral patterns and uniformities based on these categories."[4] The process is usually referred to as "acculturation."

Structural assimilation refers to "large-scale entrance into cliques, clubs, and institutions of the host society on primary group level."[5]

Gordon's thesis is that earlier assimilation theories had not taken this distinction into account. To analyze the degree of an ethnic group's assimilation into American society would require analysis of the extent to which its members participated in primary relationship with members of the host society in the various spheres of activity. The most significant contributions made by Gordon to the theory of assimilation are his assertion that the dominant sociological condition in the United States is that of structural pluralism and his concept of the "ethclass."

The United States, Gordon maintains, is comprised of numerous subcultures, membership in which is based on ethnic group membership and social class. Within each ethnic group there is a greater difference in values and attitudes than there is among members of different ethnic groups who share similar social and class positions.

The ethnic group serves three primary functions for the individual: (1) group self-identification, (2) provision of a network of groups and institutions which enable the individual to associate or develop primary relationships with members of his/her ethnic group through all stages of of the life cycle, and (3) refraction of the national culture through the prism of the ethnic group's cultural heritage.

Fitzpatrick has pointed out that the sense of ethnic identity develops after the immigrant arrives in the host society.[6] For most earlier immigrants the assimilation process is very painful--due to the cultural shock resulting from his/her move out of a social structure which is basically traditional into an industrial or modernized society. As Fitzpatrick puts it, the basic problem for the immigrant results from the transition to a culture where relationships are based on community into one where relationships are based on association. The central issue for both Fitzpatrick and Gordon is identity.

Herberg raised the issue of identity when he tried to explain the emergence or revival of religion among the third generation.[7] The second generation, in Herberg's thesis, had divested itself of the ethnic culture. The revival of religion by the third generation was based on the need to develop a specific identity as Americans. Feeling secure in the society, they were able to pursue this, but the only aspect of the cultural heritage which they could revive was religion. They had lost the mother tongue and values (culture or life style). This view is similar to the "melting pot" theory since it assumes that there had been structural and cultural assimilation. The persistence of ethnicity destroyed this premise.

According to Gordon, two factors contributed to the maintenance of the ethnic groups: the tendency of immigrants to concentrate geographically and their exclusion from mainstream institutions. Support of the ethnic group and its ability to impart to newcomers the requirements for success in America enabled the upward mobility of large segments of Irish, Italians, and Jews. For all three groups the major institution which helped to reinforce the subgroup was religion. In their discussion of ethnic groups in New York City, Glazer and Moynihan point out that each group managed to take over one of the civil services in their move up the economic ladder.[8] For the Irish it was the police; for the Italians the sanitation department (though this came later than for the others--post World War II); for the Jews, education. Glazer and Moynihan stress that the ethnic groups become interest groups, and give less weight than Gordon to identity--perhaps because their focus is political and economic.

One policy implication of the later perspective is that in time, Afro-Americans and other "newly arrived" ethnic groups will follow the same or similar paths in structural if not cultural assimilation. This assumes that Afro-Americans can be treated as just one other ethnic group. But to treat blacks as just another ethnic group is to

ignore centuries of slavery and, subsequently, a hundred or more years of social caste and class.[9]

It ignores the fact that historical circumstances (slavery and caste) have made Afro-Americans a nation within a nation. W.E.B. DuBois has been foremost among those who emphasized this dualism in 20th century political philosophy.[10] According to DuBois, "it is a particular sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness--an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings, two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder."[11]

DuBois advocated full political participation, and saw racial unity and action as vehicles for Afro-American citizens' advancement. DuBois argued that Afro-Americans were not only American citizens, but also members of a historic race (and not members of an ethnic group). Furthermore, he maintained that Afro-Americans as "a race, have a contribution to make to civilization and humanity . . . " that is:

> . . . the duty of the Americans of Negro descent, as a body, to maintain their race identity until this mission of the Negro people has become a practical possibility . . . We are Americans, not only by birth and by citizenship, but by our political ideals, our language, and our religion. We are the first fruits of this new nation, the harbinger of that black tomorrow which is yet destined to soften the whiteness of the Teutonic today . . . As a race we must strive by race organization, by race solidarity, by race unity to the realization of that broader humanity which freely recognizes in men, but sternly deprecates inequality in their opportunities of development.[12]

The Glazer-Moynihan thesis also assumes that Afro-Americans are recent arrivals that is, that they will have time to catch up with the gains made by other ethnic groups. However, the historical evidence suggests otherwise.

Despite the fact that a large number of blacks migrated during the post-Civil War period to Nebraska, Missouri (St. Louis), and to Maryland (Baltimore), the largest migration of blacks to urban-metropolitan-centers (e.g., Southside, Chicago; Harlem, N.Y.C.) occurred during and after World War I (approximately 2 million).[13] A much smaller number

of Afro-Americans (approximately 250,000) migrated to northern industrial centers during the immediate post-World War II years (The Kerner Report, 1968). According to this view, the new or recent migrants are unable to adjust to the stress and complexity of urban living which results in alienation from, and hostility towards, the economic and political system.[14]

Sears and McConahay argue that "mass society theorists expect migrants to be generally rootless and violence-prone."[15] Such an assumption serves to shift the responsibility for the equitable distribution of goods and services not only away from the social and political institutions but also away from the community as well.

Finally, even if it were possible to compare the experiences and prospects of "ethnics" and Afro-Americans, the fact remains that the urban environment has changed in ways that do not permit a repetition of the same process. For example, Fitzpatrick emphasizes that the adjustment or assimilation of the Puerto Ricans in New York City has been more difficult than for earlier groups because of their inability to concentrate or "cluster" in geographical areas or to use the Catholic church (since a majority of the Puerto Ricans are of this religion) as a basis for political organization as well as social support.[16] Urban renewal and housing regulations have contributed to a pattern of residential dispersal for the Puerto Ricans which impedes their ability to gain political representation proportionate to their distribution in the total city population. This also affects their position within the Catholic parish where they are usually a minority. Thus they are unable to mobilize on either a geographic or religious basis.[17]

Ethnicity and Political Participation

Looking at the persistence of ethnic voting patterns, political scientists tended to regard this as a reflection of the political strategies characteristic of "machine" politics. Wolfinger's "mobilization theory," based on an analysis of Italian voters in New Haven, is illustrative.[18] Ethnicity achieves political salience when a member of the ethnic group heads the ticket. This is particularly dependent on that group's achievement of middle-class status. Ethnic blocs, according to this view, are a product of leadership. Once a political party gains the loyalty of a particular ethnic group, continuity is ensured by the tendency of individuals to identify with familial political orientations.[19] Litt, however, reviewed several studies which suggested that ethnicity becomes more salient in nonpartisan elections.[20]

Parenti argues that the validity of Wolfinger's theory, which assigns independence to variables related to the political system, rests on the validity of a prior assumption: that assimilation has indeed taken place. "If in fact it can be demonstrated that assimilation is not taking place, then the assimilation theory as propounded by Dahl, along with Wolfinger's alternate explanations are somewhat beside the point." 21/

Parenti applies Gordon's distinctions between cultural and structural assimilation to an analysis of a number of other studies which included data on patterns of interaction in urban and suburban communities. His conclusions reinforce Gordon's hypotheses. Parenti's explanation for the persistence of individual ethnic identity is based on the hypothesis that "the cultural, social and personality systems may operate with complex independent imperatives to maintain ethnic consciousness."22/ The analysis suggests that this maintenance derives from three factors. They are:

(1) limited range of opportunities for ethnic group members to interact with outgroup members,

(2) outgroup rejection--the acculturated ethnic may be "no more acceptable to the nativist than the unacculturated," and

(3) the pluralistic parallel systems of ethnic, social and institutional life (several studies indicated that ethnic group members who leave the ghetto areas set up their own ethnic social structures in the new community).

"In sum, ethnic distinctiveness can still be treated as a factor in social and political pluralism."23/

The commonly held view was that an ethnic group member was faced with one of two alternatives: "isolated existence in autonomous cultural enclaves or total identificational immersion into the American society." In reality, Parenti asserts that an individual's experience may:

> . . . expose him to some of the social relations and cultural cues of the dominant society while yet placing him predominantly within the confines of a particular minority substructure . . . minority group identity is no more incompatible with life in America and with loyalty to the nation than is any regional, class, or other particular group attachment.24/

Parenti does not reject the possibility that the "political

system itself may be an instigator and fabricator of ethnic appeals,"25/ but he is inclined to view ethnic identity as an independent factor which can be used by a candidate "in need of a ready-made formal and informal network of relationship substructures within his constituency."26/

The writers cited above were trying to explain the meaning of ethnic identity for earlier groups, primarily first generation immigrants, who arrived around the turn of the century, and their children. Their political behavior is referred to as "old style" ethnic politics. Some of the recent interest in political behavior deals with the political behavior of "new migrants"27/ (southern blacks, and Latin Americans who migrated to northern and southwestern urban centers). This is referred to as "new style ethnic politics."28/

Accommodation is the dominant strategy for response to both old and new style ethnic politics, according to Litt. The essential difference between the two styles is in the type of benefits received. Under the old style ethnic politics, benefits were "divisible": material rewards went to a few ethnic leaders. For the mass membership of the ethnic group, however, benefits were limited to psychic rewards (recognition of the ethnic group and the potential promise of future benefits). The effectiveness of this method of accommodation rested on: the stability of the urban environment; the ability of new migrants to develop independent ethnic associations whose leaders were absorbed by the party machine; the strength of the political party; and the availability of alternative sources for economic and social rewards for members of older groups, and opening positions to newcomers (e.g., the Protestants who withdrew from urban party politics to social service and civic affairs).29/ Under this system, distribution of benefits, based as it was on the electoral process, was related to numerical strength.

There are, however, three major reasons why this accomodation model is inappropriate for the analysis of new ethnic politics:30/

(1) The New Deal and the collective benefits provided welfare and social services directly to large numbers of urban dwellers. This reduced the supply of benefits available to the poltical party and thereby led to its decline in most American cities.

(2) The critical actors changed from the mayor and the ward boss to national representatives and government bureaucracies.

(3) The civil rights movement resulted in changes in participation which:

(a) redefined the qualifications for participation. Participation under old style ethnic politics was limited to a few ethnic leaders who acquired organizational and negotiating skills and restricted the participation of challengers and the majority of the ethnic group. The techniques developed with the civil rights movement, in contrast, stimulated the participation of large numbers through informal channels, rather than formal organizations.

(b) Shifted the dialogue between the civil rights movement and government from the city and State to Federal levels. which was made possible by the emergence of "unprecedented governmental initiative" in the mid-1960's.[31]

(c) Used "creative disorder" . . . as a major strategy of direct action.[32]

Social science theorists were unable to anticipate the mass protest movements of the 1960's because in their view "electoral participation is the core criterion for mass involvement."[33] Popular participation was to be restricted (because of a fear of extremist movements) to:

> . . . established political institutions . . . It is the intensity and scope of mass participation between elections that characterizes the Negro revolution on the fronts of housing policy, educational structure and the administration of justice. [34]

Rogler's case study of the formation of a Puerto Rican action group in a New England city provided a unique opportunity to compare old and new style ethnic politics in a reformed city.[35] By the time the study began, political scientists tended to classify city governments as "reformed" or "partisan" (i.e. machine). The ethnic voting patterns characteristic of machine style politics were presumed to have been eliminated in reformed cities. Rogler's study documents the incidental observations in the literature that there may be a resurgence of old style politics among disadvantaged groups in the inner-city neighborhoods.[36] At the time Rogler's study began (mid-1960's) Puerto Ricans (anonymous) in Maplewood were under the informal control of a Puerto Rican political "boss" (Serrano) who developed his influence with the city's Democratic party "at the time when the Party's

mayoral candidate successfully turned away from the older strategies of ethnic politics to base his appeals on the need for urban redevelopment."[37] (A shift from "divisible" to "indivisible" benefits.) The first serious challenge to the boss' authority came about through the ability of a small group of Puerto Rican activists to form an independent Hispanic Confederation.

Among other distinctive characteristics, the Confederation leaders were individuals who "had turned away from Serrano when their mobility wishes were frustrated by his firm control over the network's hierarchy."[38] Puerto Rican activism, in Rogler's estimation, was "stimulated" by the Federal antipoverty program which made "available new apolitical (in the partisan sense) avenues for upward influence."[39] This form of "ethnic activism" differs from "ethnic bossism" in that it:

> . . . focuses the minority's collective problems, not discrete personal problems; it aims to bridge the gulf by extending agency services deep into the ethnic community, not piecemeal favors; it seeks to mobilize the ethnic community into broader coalitions of civic involvement, not to eliminate disparate fragments of power; it finds legitimacy in moral and legal concepts of minority rights and agency obligations, not in the personalism of self-sacrifice attached to the patron role and not in the attribution of monolithic influence to partisan politics as in the boss role. [40]

One point, crucial to our central interest in ethnicity and political behavior, is the new designation of ethnic politics, based on minority rights and agency obligations, as legitimate. "Bossism," based on the distribution of "divisible" rewards to individuals, the above implies, was illegitimate.

The Reawakening of Ethnic Consciousness

Shortly after the political scientists began trying to explain the persistence of ethnic politics, sociologists turned their attention to what Michael Novak described as The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics.[41] What surprised some writers was the impact that the black demands for civil rights, equality of opportunity, and equality of participation had on other ethnic groups--especially white ethnic groups.

According to Glazer and Moynihan, one of the "striking characteristics of the present situation " is the extent to which the ethnic group itself is now behaving as an interest group. They find four reasons to explain why

ethnicity has become a force for political mobilization:

(1) The rise of the welfare state. The ethnic group provides an effective means for making legitimate claims on State resources. Loosely aggregated groups such as "workers, peasants, and white collar employees" are too general to elicit a very satisfactory response. This strategy has its counterpart in government's "employment of ethnic categories as a basis for distributing rewards."42/

(2) The conflict between egalitarianism and the difficulty of achieving norms. Ethnic group members, when in a disadvantaged position:

". . . may 'pass' out of their own ethnic group into another, typically one that offers greater advantages . . . But they may also--and simultaneously--become more ethnic . . . This was most dramatically the experience of Negro Americans during the 1960's--they even changed their name to 'blacks' to establish that new assertion of distinctiveness--and other groups followed suit, or accompanied them on parallel tracts . . . This may be part of what Dahrendorf referred to as the 'refeudalization' of society, the return of ascribed as against achieved characteristics as determinants of social stratification."43/

(3) The growing heterogeneity of States.

(4) The international system of communication.

In identifying what is new about ethnicity today, Glazer and Moynihan stress that ethnic mobilization has been "legitimated" and, furthermore, that the salience of ethnicity seems to be a worldwide phenomenon.

Bell also sees ethnicity as an indication of world change related to "new and larger networks and ties within and between societies woven by communication and transportation." Ethnicity becomes a salient organizing principle according to Bell, when "class issues become attenuated and communal questions come to the fore."44/

From the perspective of writers speaking for white ethnic groups, the Federal reforms in response to civil rights demands for blacks were regarded as changing the rules of the game. The provision of Federal funds to ease the adjustment of blacks, and later, Spanish speaking groups, infuriated members of other ethnic groups whose own rise was based on the belief that in order to succeed in America, they would have to give up their ethnic heritage and con-

form to the cultural and behavioral patterns of the dominant group--which for most was what Novak refers to as "WASP culture." For the intellectuals such as Novak, the result had a profound psychological impact since the process of de-ethnicization involves the negation of the ethnic heritage and a perpetuation of feelings of inferiority. For the masses, the impact is primarily economic since the provisions for blacks and Hispanic groups came just at the time that they were beginning to secure their positions--even though they were not all that high up the ladder.

Novak speaks for the Southern Europeans, primarily Catholic. They have been made to feel that their culture cannot make a significant contribution to the United States, in comparison to that of the Protestants and Jews. Novak and others resent the domination of intellectual circles by academics from these other groups, who have fostered the notion that the problems of blacks stem from the bigotry of the working-class Catholics. In so doing, they have neglected their own bias which provides the rationale for giving preferential treatment to blacks.

On the local level in New York City, the reawakening, according to Glazer and Moynihan, is related to the decline of Catholic Democrats and the ascendance of Jews.[45] In the early 1960's the latter managed to destroy Catholic political power and form a coalition with liberal upper-class Protestants. The major issues, for Glazer and Moynihan, are not cultural or social but political and economic. The Jews and Protestants made the decision to promote blacks and Puerto Ricans but the cost would be paid by working-class Irish, Italians, and poor Jews. As interpreted by working-class ethnics, then, these preferential policies are unfair. Another source of working-class resistance is that the new benefits, allocated to a group, go against traditional values which stress individual achievement and initiative. In part, the resurgence of ethnic group politics was fostered by federal policy and possibly by the local implementation of school desegregation.

The Impact of Ethnicity on School Policy

The legitimation of ethnicity may turn out to have a significant impact on the function of public schools in the socialization of minority students--particularly immigrants. Historically, the school's responsibility in relation to socialization was restricted to training in the performance of citizenship and occupational roles in "mainstream" society.

Ethnic minorities were permitted to maintain their religious

identity and subcultural values, but the provision of public instruction in English only, and the denigration of non-Anglo-Saxon subcultures, operated to undermine the children's ability to maintain their ethnic identity. Success in American society was interpreted (by the dominant group and the minorities) as requiring identification with Anglo-Saxon role models. These conditions diminished the family's socialization function, making it difficult for immigrant parents to function as effective role models for their children.[46]

For children from English-speaking homes and subcultures whose values were consistent with the "mainstream" American culture, these forces did not present formidable obstacles. Some groups--most notably Catholics--avoided the problem of exposing their children to conflicting value systems by establishing their own educational institutions. For brief periods, some groups were able to inject bilingual instruction into the public school, but such programs became prohibited in most States following the wave of nationalism which emerged around World War I. [47]

However, most efforts to inject subcultural values into the public schools involved religious issues and were rejected on the principle of the separation of church and state.[48]

By the 1960's, of course, the major challenge confronting urban public schools was based on racial rather than religious issues. The revival of the community control movement grew out of the schools' failure to either implement desegregation policies or develop effective programs for black students.[49] A major feature of the community control rationale was the rejection of the pressure to conform to the white middle-class ethos--epitomized in the concept of compensatory education which was regarded as a device to make black children like their white middle-class peers.

Black demands for black studies programs, the hiring of more black teachers, and training programs to sensitize white teachers to black pupils' culutural backgrounds were endorsed by some educators who had come to believe that cultural factors were an important element in the learning process. There was some empirical evidence to support these views.[50] These studies suggested that cultural differences might account for differential achievement levels as well as variations in achievement in different subject areas.

Recent trends in American education have led to an increased acceptance of the notion that intellectual development involves both cognitive and affective components and that

the neglect of the latter can impede the former. This has been interpreted by some to require structural changes in the school which will enable the teacher to stress both aspects, or a change in the relationships between student and teacher. Furthermore, it became clear that in order to do this effectively for minority children, the teachers must understand their cultural backgrounds.

Following the initiative of black communities, other ethnic groups, primarily language minorities, have supported reforms to force the schools to recognize and respect cultural differences. In 1968 Congress passed the Bilingual Education Act. This provided funds (through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act) for experimental programs which would include instruction in two languages (English and the child's home language) as well as instruction in the history and culture of the parents' native country.[51]

The original supporters of this legislation intended the funds to be earmarked for Hispanic groups, but subsequent amendments made them available to a variety of groups, including American Indians. A court decision (the Lau case, a class-action suit filed on behalf of 1,800 Chinese students in the San Francisco school district) required the school district to institute educational programs that would "open" instruction in English for Chinese and other non-English-speaking pupils. This decision was crucial to the resolution of a similar lawsuit on behalf of Puerto Ricans in New York City (the Aspira Consent Decree).[52] Since passage of the Federal Bilingual Education Act, 30 States have passed legislation related to the provision of bilingual education programs. In eight States the legislation mandates bilingual programs for students with limited ability in speaking English; in the remaining States, the legislation is permissive.[53]

A major problem related to the implementation of bilingual education and other programs including ethnic content is the inadequate state of knowledge in this field and conflicting goals among educators.

Initially, many of those who supported bilingual education viewed the cultural component of these programs in terms of reinforcing the child's home culture. This view was consistent with the concept of "cultural pluralism," understood as the right to cherish and maintain cultural-ethnic differences. This emphasis on cultural pluralism assumes that the minority child has only one of two options: assimilation (Anglo-conformity) or maintenance of identification with the ethnic subculture. Ramirez and Castaneda

suggest a third alternative:

> [The] cultural democracy which we propose is based on (the) bicultural reality of the Mexican-American child's world and has as its primary educational goal, the ability to function effectively in and the responsibility to contribute to developments in both cultural worlds. Under this concept of cultural democracy in education, the term 'equal educational opportunity' can be interpreted to mean that the school is obligated to create programs of such a nature that the child acquires the skills that are necessary to his functioning in and contributing to both worlds . . . In terms of social and intellectual development, then, the educational goal of a bicultural educational program is a bicultural identity.[54]

The introduction of ethnicity into the school curriculum--since it has the potential of arousing inter- (within both the school and the community) as well as intra-group hostility--itself requires sensitive handling and significant citizen participation and involvement. The problems have only begun to be recognized. Some of the issues were pointed out in a position statement published by the National Council for the Social Studies:

> . . . there are a number of crucial questions concerning the relationship between the school and ethnicity which have not been satisfactorily clarified or resolved. In addition, most of these reform efforts have lacked clear goals, objectives, and sound guidelines which reflect current research and learning theory.
>
> There is widespread disagreement and confusion about the goals which school reform efforts should be designed to attain and about the proper relationship which should exist between the school and the ethnic identities and attachments of students. Educators and social scientists embrace divergent ideologies and recommend conflicting school and curricular policies. Questions about the goals of ethnic studies programs as well as other important issues related to ethnicity and the school must be better clarified and better answers provided if the schools are to design and implement effective programs related to ethnic pluralism.[55]

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IV. THE CHANGING URBAN ENVIRONMENT AND THE NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNMENT MOVEMENT

A. BACKGROUND

Vast changes in the political structure of most American cities followed the enactment of urban political reforms, but the extent of reformism varies within each city and some, like Chicago, have maintained strong political machines. Besides the decline of the political machines, the most dramatic urban change is reflected in the characteristics of the population, primarily due to increased migration of blacks and Latin-Americans to urban centers and the rising trend of residential segregation. The increase in residential segregation reflects Federal housing policies which facilitated the dispersal of whites to suburban areas and confinement of blacks and other racial minorities to the inner city:

> This ghetto situation is one of the most pronounced and most tenaciously maintained form of segregation the Negro American faces. 1/

Based on an analysis of 1960 census tract data, Tanber reported that a "higher percentage of Negroes than of whites live in cities." Furthermore, "forty percent of the Nation's Negro population" live in ten large cities in the North and West.

An examination of population change in the New York Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) reveals that this trend continues. Between 1950 and 1970 the total population of the NYSMSA increased 21.7 percent, from 10,741,000 to 13,077,000.2/ The growth was limited to the suburbs where the population almost doubled. This gain was based primarily on the outmigration of the white population. The percent of nonwhites of the suburban population rose by only 2.5 percentage points during this period. Between 1950 and 1970 the city lost over a million white residents. The dramatic change in the city's ethnic composition is best illustrated by a three-group breakdown which shows that the percent "other" (those not included in the nonwhite and Puerto Rican categories) declined from 87 percent in 1950 to 67 percent

in 1970. By the last decade the nonwhite category comprised almost one-fourth of the city's total; Puerto Ricans, one-tenth.

While most analyses of residential segregation have focused on urban nonwhites, Kantrowitz' analysis of the residential segregation of other ethnic groups revealed that, at least in the New York area, the segregation of other ethnic groups persists with rising socioeconomic status. He concluded that:

> . . . economic and racial forces are the determinants of residential segregation. Socioeconomic differentials, as represented by family income, seem to serve a major function only in that they help each race or ethnicity to separate itself from others and permits the rich of that race to keep their distance from the poor of the same race. . .3/

Ethnic and Socioeconomic Diversity

Until 1960, when the Census Bureau, for the first time, asked questions pertaining to national origin or descent, there were insufficient data to estimate the extent of ethnic diversity among the American population. The 1969 survey revealed that 75 million Americans identified themselves with one of 7 major ethnic groups. There were 33 million Americans in the "foreign white stock category"--either foreign born or children of at least one foreign-born parent:

> If we defined 'ethnic' as any individual who differs by religion, language and custom from the white protestant Anglo-Saxon settlers ...the figure would exceed 65 percent of the total population; aside from whites, America has no majority group.9/

Weed's comparison of employment by ethnic categories, based on data from a 1969 Census Bureau Survey, showed that "close to half of all male workers of Irish, Polish and Italian origin are employed in blue-collar occupations, there are more poor whites in the northern metropolitan areas than poor blacks and a disproportionately high number of them are first-second- and third-generation ethnic Americans of European descent. . ."5/ It is the white ethnic who is in "closest proximity to the black and Latin ghettos of the older industrial cities and therefore in direct competition in jobs, education, housing, recreation, transportation and street life."6/

Recent Migration

Few discussions of ethnic diversity in America have taken into account the change in the characteristics of migrants following amendments to the Immigration Act in 1965. These amendments reflect a "major break from the past" and the exclusionary immigration policies based on "racial supremacy ideas."[7] Among other changes, the new provisions abolished the national origins quota system which discriminated against Eastern Hemisphere nations, and established a preference system which fostered the reuniting of families and the admission of more immigrants into professional categories.

After comparing the immigration figures from 1960-1965 and 1969-1973, Keely reported the following changes in the composition of the immigrant stream:

- The volume of immigration increased about 30 percent between the two periods.
- The geographic origins of immigrants shifted. The Western Hemisphere contributed a greater share in the later period (57.3 percent vs. 50.8 percent).
- Within the Eastern Hemisphere the total immigration dropped from 41.9 percent to 27.3 percent and Asia overtook Europe as the chief source of Eastern Hemisphere immigration moving from 7.6 percent to 27.4 percent.
- Of all giving an occupation, the proportion who listed a professional occupation increased from 19.8 to 28.9 percent . . . Of those from Asia and Africa the proportion was over 60 percent. The proportion of professionals from North and South America actually declined.[8]

In an earlier paper, Keely reported that the 1965 changes in immigration policy had led to changes in internal ethnic politics as well as changes in urban populations.[9] The introduction of over 150 bills to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act in the 91st Congress (1969) reflected the "involvement of ethnic pressure groups" (including the Irish); there was "increasing density of Chinatown areas on both coasts; an increase of West Indians from Jamaica, Haiti, and Trinidad (which may lead to an even sharper distinction between the West Indian and American Negroes especially in the larger metropolitan areas); in New York City a not insignificant and growing group of non-Puerto Rican/Spanish-speaking immigrants." The social and economic implications of these changes have only begun to be explored. Keely suggests that: "in the

area of ethnic relations, ideology has and is shifting and there is continuing effort at redefining the ideology of ethnic relations . . . There is a clear clash between pluralism and the values of individualism and universalistic criteria . . . Ethnic institutional structures, political socialization of school children, career patterns and even birth, death, and migration rates are but a few examples of areas where pluralism . . . affects us."[10]

Other Urban Changes

Previous sections of this review have alluded to the implementation of urban political reforms and the increase in Federal intervention in local problems as the primary determinants of the decline in the political machines, which most social scientists view as the major mechanism for the inclusion of new immigrants into the American political system.[11] This decline paralleled the increased migration of blacks and Hispanic groups to urban centers and amendments to the immigration laws which changed the characteristics of immigrant streams. Furthermore, Federal and local housing policies and discrimination have fostered an increase in the residential segregation of certain ethnic groups both in inner-cities and suburbs, leaving those in the bottom socioeconomic category concentrated in the inner-city areas. Transportation policies and the decline of industry (in the inner-city) have exacerbated the problems of the urban poor as well as those of city officials.

Federal aid to urban areas, and the political reforms, are regarded, also, as the major determinants of centralization, bureaucratization, fragmentation, and nonresponsiveness of urban governments. The political participation of older and new migrant groups has been restricted by the decline in political parties, the insulation of public bureaucracies, and the powerful associations (including unions representing the police, sanitation workers, teachers, and other public employees) which can inhibit the occupational mobility of new groups and protect the interests of "producers" at the expense of clients.[12]

These are the conditions, according to most analysts, which led to nonresponsiveness of urban public institutions and the alienation of the urban poor culminating in the ghetto riots of the 1960's, and finally, in the demand for neighborhood control of public services. The response to these demands came primarily from the Federal level with the institution of channels for target group representation to participate in the planning of new programs to aid the urban poor and at the city level,

with decentralization of public schools and the creation of new structures for participation in educational policy. To a large extent the decentralization/community control movement was a consequence of the civil rights movement, the failure of school integration, and the inadequacies of the existing structures for participation provided at the city level.

Federal response to the demand for institutional responsiveness included the requirement that community or client representatives participate in the design and evaluation of the community action programs sponsored by Federal funds. The goals, from the Federal perspective, were two-fold:

(1) to make the services delivered to the poor more responsive to their needs, and

(2) to integrate the bottom segments of the urban population into the national society

B. COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAMS

Analysts disagree on the objectives underlying the provisions for "maximum feasible participation" of the poor in the programs funded by the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) through the Office of Economic Opportunity and local community action agencies. Some interpreted the term to reflect pluralist political philosophy--i.e., that the reason for the unequal distribution of public services in urban areas was based on the inability of the poor to develop economic and political power.[13] According to this view, representatives of the poor were to play a decisive role in policy formulation and policy implementation. Others claimed that the provision for participation merely aimed to enable planners to take the views of the poor under consideration and "ensure that persons previously excluded from the political process in the South and elsewhere would nonetheless participate in the benefits of the community action programs of the new legislation. It was taken as a matter beneath notice that such programs would be dominated by the local political structure."[14]

One reason for the disagreement was the fact that the EOA provisions for participation of the poor were ambiguous and contained no guidelines specifying how the representatives were to be selected or the scope of their participation. There were also differences in the points of view of the interpreters of the policy.[15] Although three federally-funded urban programs included references to citizen participation, it was those incorporated in the EOA that stimulated most controversy.

That legislation specified that:

> . . . community action programs be developed, conducted and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served.16/

Most analysts have identified three possible strategies implied by this regulation: (1) a service strategy, (2) a political strategy, and (3) an economic strategy. The service strategy assumes that participation of the poor will serve two functions: (a) improved services more responsive to the needs of target area residents, and (b) the reduction of alienation. The political strategy, enabling the poor to organize political resources and play a decisive role in the decisionmaking process, implies that the "chief means for the poor to acquire power, authority and influence is to advance their economic and social status."17/ The third strategy, which employs residents in the actual delivery of services, would "help the poor by raising their economic status and self-respect or both."18/

Because of this ambiguity, compounded by the autonomy permitted to local government, there were great variations in the programs implemented under EOA. These factors, and the inadequacy of the existing research techniques, made it extremely difficult for evaluators and policymakers to assess the impact of this and other similar social intervention programs.19/

The evaluation process was severely restricted by the variation in program goals, the means devised by local authorities to achieve these objectives, and the inability to devise experimental controls that would permit before-and-after comparisons. Nevertheless, a number of comparative (quasi-experimental) studies were conducted and some provided data that enabled analysts to identify some of the variables related to variations in citizen participation and program impact. We will concentrate on a few of the published reports pertinent to the functions of participation of interest to democratic theorists--efficacy, power distribution, community integration, and social change--and the factors identified in some studies as limiting citizen participation.

Effectiveness

Measures of effectiveness tend to reflect analysts' interpretations of the Federal guidelines and their definitions of participation. If the program is evaluated in terms

of the political strategy, then the measure of effectiveness is the extent to which the program resulted in the development of leadership and/or both leadership and nonelite participation. If the service strategy is stressed, effectiveness is based on measures of improved services. Economic strategy would involve the extent to which the program provided employment to local-area residents. Several studies were conducted by social scientists interested in determining the impact of citizen participation on policy and policy outputs (e.g., service delivery). Those studies, which reflect the concerns of democratic theorists, are concerned with three factors: the development of leadership and mass participation, the impact of participation on individuals, and the impact of participation on institutional change.

A typology of citizen participation developed by Arnstein, attempts to operationalize the extent of participation consistent with the definition of participation maintained by democratic theorists--the extent to which citizen participation leads to a redistribution of power or influence:

> . . . it is the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from political and economic processes . . . to be deliberately included in the future . . . it is the means by which they can induce significant social reforms which enable them to share in the benefits of an affluent society.20/

Arnstein's contribution was the recognition that participation can take different forms depending on the degree of authority granted to citizens. Based on the analysis of such Federal programs as urban renewal, Model Cities and antipoverty programs, she constructed a "ladder of participation" with eight levels, or degrees, of participation. The range of participation represents a continuum from the two bottom rungs, described as "manipulation" and "therapy," which, according to Arnstein, are levels of "nonparticipation" to the top--"citizen control," where citizens obtain full managerial power. Three intermediate levels--"informing," "consultation," and "placation"--represent levels of "tokenism" since the "have-nots" have no genuine voice in decisions. They may be listened to but have no authority to ensure that policymakers heed their views. Only one intermediate level, "partnership," which permits citizens to negotiate and engage in "trade-offs" with "traditional power holders," meaningfully advances the degree of citizen participation. The other level, "delegated power," gives have-nots a majority voice in the decisionmaking process.

Yates suggested a 7-level typology which makes similar distinctions.21/ These typologies do not include the scope of program activities, according to Cole, whose typology of citizen participation programs is based on two indexes: scope and intensity. "Scope" refers to the number and variety of programs within the jurisdiction of a particular program.22/ Urban renewal, for example, represented the most narrowly focused program, whereas Model Cities represented "the potentially broadest." "Intensity" was defined as the "degree of actual influence over program formulation and execution exercised by citizens."23/ Each of the three types of programs--urban renewal, Model Cities, and EOA programs--permitted different levels of citizen participation. Urban renewal, cited by Arnstein as an example of "manipulation," largely ignored input from target area residents. She found evidence that the Community Action Programs (CAP's) (funded by EOA) functioned at every rung of the ladder, and the purpose of participation in Model Cities programs was to develop a comprehensive and coordinated effort to solve the problems of "blighted neighborhoods."24/

Cole's is the only one of the three studies mentioned here that included systematically collected data in these categories on the relationship between program type and citizen attitudes.

According to Cole's typology, urban renewal scored lowest on citizen participation, Model Cities was at the midpoint, and the Community Action Agencies (CAA's) at the top. His sample included 26 programs in these categories in four states and six metropolitan areas limited to the Midwest. Data on the characteristics of the cities were obtained from a 1970 study by the Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations and his own in-depth survey (Oct. 1972-Feb. 1973) on the "characteristics, attitudes, motives and opinions of citizens participating in a variety of programs."25/ Interviews were conducted with CAA representatives, and questionnaires were administered to participants. In all, 396 subjects responded. (The sample included cities which had adopted participation programs, with or without Federal aid.)

Results revealed that almost half of the cities included in the sample (47.1 percent) initiated no citizen participation program at all and none of the programs that were initated in the remaining cities ranked high on the measures of scope and intensity (total neighborhood control). The findings showed that the most important environmental factors associated with citizen involvement were city size, race, and metropolitan type (suburban or inner city).

Most participants in the 26 programs "reported an increase in their trust and confidence attitudes attributable to the participation programs."[26] It was assumed that the "impact of participation on citizen trust will be greater in those programs rated high on the index of participation: intensity and program scope," but this was not borne out by the data. The programs rated by participants as the most effective in improving "both the citizen's and the neighborhood's image of and confidence in public authorities" were those which received more moderate scores on intensity and scope. This was explained by other findings indicating more internal conflict, and less fulfillment of Program goals, in programs with higher scope and intensity. Programs ranked near the mid-point tended to involve more interaction with local officials. This contributed to making them less threatening to the community and more likely to achieve program goals. Such programs were regarded (by the participants) as providing more material rewards for the participants and thereby increasing their level of satisfaction. Although the top-ranking programs tended to attract more militant residents who had higher expectation levels, similar scores on satisfaction and alienation were found among participants in programs falling at both ends of the continuum. Relying on this finding, Cole concludes that program outcomes cannot be interpreted solely in terms of the characteristics of individuals. Furthermore, he believes the findings "suggest that important changes in political orientation may occur well into adult years of an individual's life and that alterations in policy output (especially when considering programs involving citizen-governmental interactions and involvement) may significantly affect that process."[27]

There would probably be some disagreement among social scientists about these findings and conclusions. First of all, Cole's methods can be questioned. The interviews and questionnaires involved only the self-reported attitudes of program participants and did not include objective measures of their actual behavior. Secondly, Yates and others have described Model Cities as, in fact, functioning to strengthen the power of city officials and not intended to increase citizen participation. It would appear, then, that Cole has limited his analysis to the impact of participation in terms of official goals.

Power Distribution

It was assumed that programs that stressed the political strategy, enabling the development of local leadership and nonelite participation, would lead to a more equitable distribution of material resources. Evaluations of the political strategy assessed the extent to which citizen

participation led to institutional change.

A review of evaluations of CAP conducted by OEO concluded that "CAP was a modest success when judged on the basis of its ability to generate institutional change."[28] One set of evaluations looked at institutional change in four areas: social service agencies, public schools, business (employers), and neighborhood political organizations. The cities included in the study were divided into three types based on the "general strategy pursued by the community action agency" (service, political, and employment). An examination of the results, Brecher reports, "supports the hypothesis that the goal pursued by a city's CAA (that is, the nature of the intervention) is an important determinant of CAP effectiveness."[29] CAA's which stress the political strategy (or "organizational goals") scored highest on three measures of program effectiveness: (1) increase in level of organization and number of demands by residents, (2) increase in percentage of the population who are members of community organizations, and (3) increase in petitioning of public agencies by organizations. Those agencies giving greater emphasis to the political strategy had greater success in securing political and institutional change. [30]

Supplementary interviews with local political groups provided data on the impact of CAA's on local political structures. The CAA's "partially filled" the vacuum in poor communities.[31] Data indicated, also, that a city's political structure affected its CAA. Variables investigated included:

- the nature of the existing political organizations serving the poor,
- the nature of public opinion among constituents of the existing political organizations,
- the general nature of the CAA in the city,
- the number of militant acts (demonstrations) initiated by the CAA,
- the level of institutional change.

The findings showed that:

> CAA's produce the greatest change in areas where participation of the poor is already most developed. The most political CAA's were found in cities with larger and more active political organizations to represent the poor and where public opinion was already mobilized. These political agencies were the

ones most effective in securing institutional changes. In contrast, traditional social service CAA's are found in cities with inactive, nonminority organizations representing the poor with an unaroused public opinion. They engaged in no militant acts and achieved few institutional changes. The employment-oriented CAA's seem to represent a middle ground. 32/

Additional data on the relationship between levels of participation and community characteristics were reported in the Brandeis study of CAP's in 68 cities.33/ Four levels of participation and participatory activity (limited, active, advisory, and internal and external adversary) were related to four categories of city:

- small city,
- large city with small black population,
- large city with large black population; mayor-council government, and
- large city with large black population; council-manager government.

Results showed that:

- patterns are systematically associated with the characteristics of the city in which the CAA is located,
- actual content of participation in a particular CAA is more directly affected by local conditions than by OEO requirements, and
- "the most important city characteristic associated with the level of participation activity is the population size of the city. Large cities in general have a more active pattern of participation within the CAA board and through the activities of neighborhood associations than small cities."34/

In about one-third of the CAA's, there was:

> no significant impact on decisions within the CAA or other community service organizations; in another third, the CAA's target area participation did influence some decisions within the CAA, primarily through an advisory relationship between target-area association and spokesmen and the CAA, but there was little impact on other organizations; in the remaining one-third of the CAA's there was a regular and continuing

> influence on decisions within the CAA . . . and changes in the policies and programs of other community service organization resulting from target area pressure. 35/

Participation was limited, according to Brecher, by both the Federal program guidelines and a CAA board's definition of its role. Funds were earmarked for specific purposes and boards tended to have a narrow definition of target-area participation. The potential strength of associations and neighborhood representatives on CAA boards was fragmented by the necessity to select neighborhood organizations. This restriction tends to focus the participant's attention on narrow, particularistic issues.36/ Yates also found that neighborhood groups were restricted by Federal guidelines, limited resources, and focus on the neighborhood-related issues.37/

Organizing the Poor

Recent analyses of the impact of CAP's have dwelt on the difficulties encountered in organizing the poor. Both Wilson and O'Brien attribute the difficulty to the inability to resolve the "public goods" dilemma identified by Olson. This dilemma has to do with the distinction between "divisible" and "indivisible" rewards (discussed in section III). Where programs stressed the employment strategy, there were tangible, divisible benefits providing an incentive for the participation of the poor. According to Wilson and O'Brien, all those based on the political strategy encountered the same problem that all voluntary organizations face in recruiting and maintaining membership. The rewards offered to potential participants under the political strategy required that they have the time to participate, and the ability to perceive the presumed relationship between their participation and future social and economic advancement.38/ Given the circumstances faced by most poor residents in urban neighborhoods, nonparticipation in CAP's, says O'Brien, is rational. Not only do they lack the the time and skills for participation, but such activities will not make that much difference. The rewards were mostly indivisible and would have gone to the community whether the individual participated or not.

Wilson agrees that to attract the "lower-class" person (defined as a person "with a low income, an unstable family, and an episodic employment pattern) an organization must offer "incentives that are immediately and directly available and of high value to the recipients" or the promise of a "personality transformation" that will enable them to become middle class. Wilson goes on

to suggest that "the organization will be started by entrepreneurs who are not themselves lower class."[39] The strategy followed by the Massachusetts Welfare Rights Organization can serve as an example. The welfare mother was promised a "direct material benefit within a very short time after coming to her first meeting."[40] However, once the State eliminated the specific welfare benefits, it was difficult to develop comparable incentives and "by 1971 the organization was in decline."[41]

In his analysis of the longitudinal data on the Mobilization for Youth program[42] derived from records and field investigation, Helfgot found that:

> . . . indigeneous participation was defined differently over time . . . at no time, however . . . were the poor 'seen as decisionmakers or potential recruits to the staff.' [43]

When community residents complained that the organizational staff did not represent them, the staff defined "indigeneous" as "racial or ethnic status and not class position or residency." Demands for indigeneous representation led to the hiring of minority group professionals, many of whom were "Cuban immigrants who have usurped jobs in the community."[44]

Helfgot concluded that:

> Government-sponsored changed efforts may be permitted to exist only as long as they remain ineffectual. Reform organizations tend to become dominated by professionals, organizational goals are displaced by professional interests and the poor are represented 'symbolically.'[45]

Representation

Other studies besides Helfgot's have referred to the social-class backgrounds of the representatives who were elected or appointed to CAP's. While some observers were critical of the programs that were "controlled by some of the more upwardly mobile and assertive members of ethnic minorities,"[46] Wilson questioned the validity of the criticism:

> Whatever the other merits or faults of CAP, this second criticism (it has been dominated by the not-so-poor) seems hardly to be warranted--after all, any organization will inevitably be officered by those with the taste and talent for leadership. One purpose of having a new organizational intervention in poor areas is to provide an opportunity for the

superficially lower-class person to distinguish himself from the truly lower-class one . . . 47/

Peterson found that the most effective representation of the general interests of the poor occurred when representatives were of the middle-class and were selected by inner-city organizations. This finding reinforces Pitkin's theoretical emphasis on the selection process.48/ Two dimensions of representation were used by Peterson in his comparison of representatives in three cities: mode of selection, and the representatives' issue orientation (universalistic or particularistic). Substantive representation (the representatives' actual behavior) was measured by the representatives' influence and orientation. "Orientation" was defined operationally by (1) the extent neighborhood councils controlled poverty resources, and (2) the degree to which the funds allocated were distributed to independent neighborhood groups. 49/

In Philadelphia, representatives were selected by a neighborhood council directly elected by low-income area residents. They were oriented towards "securing particularistic benefits for themselves rather than towards promoting broad, universalistic changes in government policy."50/ Consequently they did little to expand participation of other residents in their neighborhoods and the influence of these representatives declined.

Representatives in Chicago were indirectly selected by the mayor and had little influence over the operation of the CAP. They were involved primarily in providing services to the poor and had no authority to strengthen the political resources of the neighborhoods.

Community organizations in New York City were invited to send delegates who elected representatives to local neighborhood councils with less formal representation than in Philadelphia.51/ In the three areas investigated in New York City, representatives used resources to increase the participation of local residents in such institutions as the welfare department and the school system. However, this led to conflict--which was not visible in the two other cities.

Peterson attributes the ability of representatives in New York City to pursue broad (universalistic) interests to the resources provided by an organized community.52/ He found that lower-income representatives were more interested in securing particularistic benefits (mainly jobs for themselves and their friends) whereas middle-income representatives were interested in achieving both influence and universalistic changes in governmental services to the poor.53/

Community Integration

Both the literature on participatory democracy and on federally funded citizen participation stress the integrative function of such participation.

But the literature on community conflict indicated that increased participation leads to conflict--or lack of integration. Similar results were found in the community action studies. However, the pressures are not mutually exclusive. Conflict in one period may be followed by integration in a later period and vice versa.

Some of the democratic theorists had predicted that increased participation would reflect the activation of the apathetic, previously alienated, segments of the community. Others suggested that alienation might result from inadequate opportunities for participation.

Many government officials were reported to perceive community action programs as a means to reduce the tensions (alienation) of urban residents by creating new channels for participation.[54]

As indicated in Cole's findings related to citizen efficacy and satisfaction, the programs with the highest and lowest scope and intensity were regarded as least successful.

A similar result was found between program type and the trust score.

> . . . those programs assigned more moderate scores are rated by the participants as the most effective in improving both the citizens' and the neighborhoods' image of and confidence in public authorities.[55]

Comparison with national norms revealed that regardless of program type, those who participated had higher trust scores. This applied to whites as well as blacks, but "the total effect of participation actually is greater on black feelings."[56]

These findings led Cole to conclude that:

> . . . in terms of increased citizen trust and confidence, the most successful programs will be those avoiding extremes of the intensity and scope index.[57]

Cole discusses three possible explanations for the lesser degree of satisfaction and trust found among those who participated at the higher ends of the program index: (a) the rising levels of expectation model and the

inability to achieve dramatic and immediate improvements; (b) greater levels of community influence lead to greater levels of conflict (as in Peterson's study and the community conflict studies); and (c) Lipsky's reward (symbolic and material) hypothesis.[58] The first two theories, Cole argues, place the blame "almost totally upon the citizen participants, ignoring possible influences of other actors."[59]

While the third theory accounts for higher distrust scores, it "begs the question of why these groups are less successful in achieving material rewards."[60] One explanation, derived from Sundquist and Davis' study of CAA's and Model Cities programs, involves influence strategies.[61] Two models were suggested: one resembling a combat approach which stressed challenging the status quo, heightening conflict and lowering problemsolving (represented by the CAA's); the other resembling a coordinated approach, which stressed planning between citizens and public officials, with greater control exrcised the City Hall throughout (represented by Model Cities). The coordinating approach did not emphasize innovation.

The programs in Cole's study at the upper ends of the continuum resembled the CAA model and those in the midpoint resembled Model Cities. Similarly, Sundquist and Davis reported lower satisfaction and morale and greater conflict in the first type. Two reasons were given for the lower success: conflict with other community organizations, and "adverse community impressions of the organization." Model Cities was "more favorably received by community participants" and public officials.[62]

Though the coordinating model rated lower on participation and innovation, Cole maintains that it is likely to achieve more results than the other program types. It is less threatening to the community and also provides for interaction between participants and city officials.

Similar views were expressed by Pressman:

> To be useful at all, planning must be related to the patterns of political power in a community: effective planning can be done only by an organization that has some capacity to enforce its will upon others . . . planning divorced from implementation and political centers is, at best, irrelevant. At worst, it can create problems for government by stimulating demands that may be impossible to fulfill.[63]

These views are consistent with the evidence reported earlier on school integration. Rogers, for example,

referred to the stalemate created by the lack of leadership within the school board and among politcal officials, as well as the lack of cohesiveness among black citizen groups causing their inability to form a coalition with moderate white groups.64/ In the two innovative cities cited by Gittell and Hollander, change resulted from the development of strong leadership capable of coalescing divergent groups, and in Detroit from the cohesiveness of the black organizations. However, there is a fundamental difference between those groups and neighborhood groups sponsored by government funds. Gittell and Hollander referred to independent voluntary associations.65/ This possibility is supported by Yates' finding that the most effective participation is associated with independent associations:

> . . . many of the most aggressive initiatives in neighborhood organizations grew out of private organizations and ad hoc citizens groups which operated without any government sponsorship . . . It appears that it was these voluntary associations that made the late 1960's seem a time of intense neighborhood organization and of strident demands for 'power to neighborhoods' . . . 66/

It should also be pointed out that the generalizability of Cole's findings is limited--as he admits. The sample was confined to the Midwest and did not include any cities which had experienced high levels of "violence" (demonstrations) between 1965-1968. Our discussion of ethnicity and segregation suggested that white resistance to black demands was most likely to occur in areas where low-income blacks were competing with whites. The potential for conflict may be greater in communities where such groups share public facilities and services.

O'Brien suggests that the assumptions underlying the Federal action programs were based on an outmoded concept of the local community as a homogeneous and autonomous entity, rather than a concept of community as an "integrative mechanism vis-à-vis the larger society."67/ Community building (or development) in modernizing societies, for example, was intended to develop means to link autonomous local groups into the national society. O'Brien refers to Warren's conceptualization of the "great change" in American society--the fragmentation of local communities resulting from the shift in decisionmaking from the local to the Federal level.68/ Action to resolve local problems:

> . . . can be taken in urban communities by only a small proportion of the people, acting through various

> relatively fragmented organizations. This affords at least a modicum of deliberate, coordinated problemsolving activity, but it does not resolve the problem of how a substantial proportion of the population can meaningfully be brought into the process. At the neighborhood level, however, community development efforts can engage a larger proportion of individuals over a larger sweep of neighborhood level issues . . . 69/

The goal of community development organizers is to engage local residents in self-help activities by encouraging them to identify "salient problems" and to develop problemsolving skills. These organizers concentrate on the "process of community involvement in self-help tasks rather than on the accomplishment of specific objectives."70/ It is assumed that "capacities for leadership and problemsolving are found in all communities."71/ Consequently, once local people learn these techniques and develop confidence in their abilities, they can pursue cooperative institutional change efforts without the assistance of the technical advisors.

However, there is little evidence on the effectiveness of cooperative projects to promote institutional change.72/ O'Brien asserts that literature on community development has neglected the problem of incentives, interests, and the "public goods dilemma." This approach assumes the consensual model of the local community associated with a "gemeinschaft" milieu (small, homogeneous) inappropriate to the population of the urban slum (large, heterogeneous).

Community Action Programs (CAP's) instituted in the 1960's (including community building and protest strategies) were based on the community development model and the unrealistic image of the urban community. Similarly, program implementers failed to consider the public goods dilemma (the need to provide selective individual benefits in order to sustain participation) or the reactions of other groups and individuals where the structures created for the poor and the "competing patronage bases posed a direct threat to the viability of the Democratic party coalition."73/

In addition to neglecting the potential conflict of interests at the local level, community development proponents gave "little attention to the problem of political coordination between the interests of individuals in the local projects and the national government."74/

Social Change

Contemporary theorists of participatory democracy stress the potential for citizen participation to achieve social change.[75] The type of participation developed through Model Cities programs--centralized and elite dominated--these theorists claim, converges with the type of citizen participation envisioned by pluralist political theory. In other words, it calls for little or no participation on the part of nonelites. They argue that this pluralist vision is biased in favor of the status quo and has been shown to be closed to the participation and representation of the interests of those at the bottom. Furthermore, it is suggested that professional domination of public bureaucracies shields them from elected officials. Consequently, the ability to achieve change through citizen participation in councils controlled by political officials and public bureaucracrats is somewhat limited. This can be seen in the case of Model Cities. When the citizen organizations are controlled by these same established interests, the probability of achieving change is even lower. Even when citizen action programs were not controlled, the ability to influence broad social and economic issues was restricted by Federal guidelines as well as the fragmentation of local interest.[76]

Analysts disagree, however, on the impact of the War on Poverty. Lowi indicts the CAP's as essentially conservative. He believes they weakened the civil rights movement and co-opted the poor. The problem, says Lowi, is not poverty, but the nonrandom distribution of poverty--or injustice.[77] He raises one of the central problems of interest group theory: how new interests are included in the decisionmaking process. A new group of leaders was initially recognized by the federally-funded action programs. But once these leaders gained control over the available opportunities, they were no more likely to incorporate new groups than were established interests.[78] Consequently, according to Lowi:

> . . . the War on Poverty will never integrate the city, racially or culturally. Narrow perspectives are created and reinforced by the neighborhood concept. Decentralization is an absurdity at the beginning of a program whose major goal is (or ought to be) re-education toward new social values. Decentralization is an abdication--worse, it provides additional powers of resistance . . . [79]

However, a later appraisal is more positive:

> . . . events since the publication of Race and Authority in Urban Politics make all the more clear that the

> program's impact was too significant to warrant the simple label of "failure." Of course, the effect on the nation's socioeconomic structure was marginal at best . . . but the alteration in the political status of black Americans since CAP's inception has been substantial. Not only have blacks been included within the pluralist bargaining structures of many of the nation's largest cities, but they have been largely integrated into the structures of the national political system as well.[80]

C. SCHOOL DECENTRALIZATION

Background

So much has been written about the community control/decentralization controversy that began in New York City in 1966 that it has become standard operating procedure for reviewers to state that there should be no need to go over the material again--and we agree.[81] Other than pointing out the similarities and differences between community control/decentralization and CAP's, it will be assumed that the reader is acquainted with the major issues involved in the former.

In several respects, the rationale underlying community control/decentralization follows the same logic as applied to the community action programs--specifically that institutional provisions creating new channels for the participation of the poor would: (1) redistribute power and influence in the decisionmaking process, (2) improve the quality of services provided to the poor (institutional responsiveness), (3) lead to greater citizen satisfaction with governmental institutions, and thereby (4) reduce tensions and alienation.

School decentralization advocates believed that it would: increase the role of the community in school governance; make school professionals more accountable to the community; promote innovations more responsive to the needs of minority students and, furthermore, upgrade student achievement and lead to greater satisfaction and trust in the schools.

These views are at least partially confirmed by the findings of a series of evaluative studies undertaken by Gittell and the Institute of Community Studies on New York City's three "demonstration school" districts (I.S. 201, Ocean Hill-Brownsville, and Two Bridges) in the late 1960's and early 1970's.[82]

The data gathered in these studies challenge the conventional wisdom on the impact of local control on educational achievement, and social science assumptions on the participation of low-income citizens.

Critics of community control have argued that the experiment was accompanied by conflict and that presumably this led to a decline in educational achievement. The authors argue that conflict was inevitable (given that the "demonstration districts" were a response to previous social protest), healthy, and that since this was also a political/social rather than merely an administrative/pedagogical experiment, evaluations should take into consideration its political impact. 83/ However:

> Even in the narrowest, yet most essential area of educational output--reading achievement--the districts showed some notable results. Their test scores were less than the general decline throughout New York City as reflected in 1970 test scores.84/

Moreover, these districts tried more new programs than had existed in the New York City ghetto schools prior to the creation of these districts. This may have been due to the significant changes in hiring practices undertaken by the new local school boards. Most innovations were initiated by unit supervisors appointed by these local boards. Similarly, the boards hired more community oriented teachers and principals who were sympathetic to the needs of poor children. This may have resulted in heightened feelings of efficacy on the part of the pupils. Children in the demonstration districts (a clear majority) did not blame themselves for their failure. The authors suggest that this "is quite different from the typical atmosphere in which children learn to blame themselves for failure." Furthermore, over 75 percent of the children felt they could do something about "what is going to happen tomorrow."85/ The study compared children from schools outside the demonstration district with children from the same income-group families but who were attending I.S. 201. The latter showed a greater sense of efficacy.

A related question is whether this heightened sense of efficacy was the result of what was happening in the schools or in the community itself. The authors argue, quite correctly, that the two are inseparable. Consequently, the real lessons of Ocean Hill-Brownsville have to do with the impact of the experiments of local control on the community.

Data on this impact (for Ocean Hill-Brownsville) was collected by participant observation of local boards and an interview survey of 214 parents in that school district. Hereafter, the term "participants" will refer to board members while "constituents" will refer to parents.

Social science research has revealed that high rates of participation are often associated with high socioeconomic status (SES). This has led some to assume that this reveals something about the sociopsychological characteristics of low SES populations. However, Gittell's data show that, where there were objective opportunities for participation, low-income persons participated at or above the levels of suburban middle-class populations. Most participants were low-income parents.86/ Many had been involved in CAP's; some had gone on to action in other community development organizations. This suggests some kind of spillover effect and is further evidence of the impact of Federal Government sponsored opportunities for participation. Among constituents: 36 percent belonged to the Parent Association; 86 percent had reported visiting the school in their district; 10 percent had talked personally with the unit administrator; 13 percent had talked with a member of the local school board; and 30 percent belonged to some other local, community organization.87/ This last compared favorably with national averages in the rates of participation and membership.88/

On the other hand, Gittell's findings do confirm the assumption, shared by both "classical democratic" and "mass society" theorists, that participation leads to increases in political knowledge and efficacy. Participants did make gains in political skills and sophistication. Some 53 percent of the constituents were able to make extensive and knowledgeable predictions as to their local boards' policies for the next year; 30 percent evidenced familiarity with some of the new programs initiated in the demonstration schools.89/ Moreover, increased participation and increased knowledge also led to increased **feelings** of efficacy for the constituents but not for participants. Some 80 percent of the constituents believed that the community had more--or the same amount--of influence in running the schools compared with a few years before.90/ Participants did not share this feeling.91/ Their intimate experiences revealed the relative powerlessness of the community vis-a-vis the central administration. However, the behavioral consequence was more, and more militant, participation, rather than less.92/

Social scientists have also argued that participation leads to integration, and to attachment to the community

and to the Nation. Here the data on Ocean Hill-Brownsville are particularly revealing. Increased participation did lead to positive attachment to the schools as community institutions, but it also, especially on the part of participants, lead to increased alienation from the larger, citywide school system.[93]/

For example: 72 percent of the constituents rated their local schools as better since the beginning of the experiment; 52 percent were opposed to the abolition of the demonstration district.[94]/ Moreover:

> In an overview of the job assessment given school officials in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville experiment, the parents assigned positive ratings of 75 percent to principals, 57 percent to the local governing board, 58 percent to the unit administrator and 50 percent to the Board of Education. In general, the evaluation given to local leaders and teachers was higher than for citywide education leaders.[95]/

Again, these findings can be useful compared with a contemporary Harris Poll (1972) on Americans' popular attitudes of trust and legitimacy in their institutions and leaders. That poll found that: 21 percent expressed confidence in the House of Representatives; 21 percent in the U.S. Senate; 28 percent in the Supreme Court, and 27 percent in the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government.[96]/

The results of this study of the New York experiment in local control and the opening of objective opportunities for participation have the following implications. First, given the opportunity, a "culture of poverty" population will participate at rates and volumes comparable to middle-class suburban populations. Second, to use the language of classicial social theory, increased participation leads to a decrease in anomie, but an increase in alienation. This should not be surprising. Given that participation leads to increased political knowledge and sophistication, participants quickly discover both the potential and the limits of their power. (Hence, the mix of increased efficacy and alienation.) Third, and again not surprisingly, participation leads to positive attachment only to those institutions in which participants feel some measure of control and influence.

However, with the exception above, many of the assumptions used by school decentralization advocates were derived from stereotypes about suburban schools where, it is popularly held, widespread parent involvement in educational policy has promoted "quality" education.

Before decentralization was implemented in any city, Lyke undertook a comparative study of school board representation in two small cities to explore the effectiveness of two alternatives--reforming a centralized board or the creation of smaller, more homogeneous decentralized school boards--to resolve the legitimacy crisis which confronted urban school systems in the late 1960's.[97] He identified several factors that made it difficult for larger districts to provide substantive representation, stressing: (1) the insulation of school politics from partisan politics which tended to promote relatively homogeneous school boards even in heterogeneous communities, and (2) inadequate communication channels between the board members and their diverse constitutents.

The effectiveness of dentralization, Lyke reasoned, would depend strongly on three factors:

(1) the extent of the local board's influence on budget, personnel and curriculum policy,

(2) the extent of community heterogeneity of the new districts, and

(3) the clarity or ambiguity of administrative line or direction, and control.

Issues related to the second factor will be discussed here. Where school boards were responsible for a heterogeneous constituency, their ability for substantive representation would be weakened. On the other hand, greater homogeneity might decrease participation by decreasing the "visible symbols of conflict in the community" and thereby eliminating the incentive to participate. This view is based on the assumption that "people participate when they have something to protest rather than merely to exercise power."[98]

Interest groups are more likely to form in larger districts:

> . . . partly because larger districts have greater absolute numbers of people with a particular interest and partly because resources for organization, such as newspaper coverage, are better. Local politics, particularly in the field of education, depends heavily on the presence of ongoing interest groups and decentralization may (depending on how district lines are drawn and how stable communities are) inhibit their formation . . . [99]

The "crucial" question, said Lyke, is not whether participation is increased by decentralization but whether:

> . . . community participation is sufficiently diverse to both support and challenge the position of educators and board members. Much of the participation in suburbs supports educators and thus fails to have the impact that it should in a democratic system of government. In short, increased community participation may only be a subtle way of forming a new establishment group, one that appears legitimate because the active people in the community support it. Democracy however, demands that attention be paid to the people as well, and any administrative system that makes it difficult for them to express their opinions must be regarded with scepticism.100/

For these and other reasons, Lyke concluded that decentralization by itself would not necessarily lead to increased participation or substantive representation. These conclusions are consistent with the findings of studies reviewed earlier, which suggested that the success of reform efforts was related to the organizational structure of the community, and the ability to minorities to develop cohesive organizations and gain support from other community organizations.

Additional support for some of these notions is provided in Gittell's evaluation of decentralization in New York City where the extent of innovation appears to be related to the orientation of the school board members and population diversity.101/ Before turning to the findings, however, it should be noted that Gittell stated that the decentralization law passed by the State Legislature did not permit a "true test of political decentralization."102/ The provisions of the law left the central board's control over key areas--budget and personnel--virtually intact. In relation to personnel recruitment, the most important power delegated to the community boards was the appointment of the superintendent. Other changes incorporated in the law were:

- The establishment of 31 community school districts, each with its own local school board elected by local residents. (In 1973 this number was increased to 32.)

- Boards were enabled to develop policies for elementary and junior high schools in community school districts within the guidelines established by the Central Board and State Education Law.

- The Central Board of Education (initially consisting of a 5-person board selected by borough presidents, and later expanded to 7 members) would continue to be responsible for the high schools.

- A new position--chancellor--replaced that of superintendent as the chief school administrator. The chancellor was given the authority to supersede community school districts that violated Central Board policies.

- District budgets were determined by the Central Board. After deducting teacher salaries and other mandated expenditures, there was little left for community school board initiatives.

- Schools with large proportions of students reading below grade level were permitted to hire "off-list teachers." This term refers to the eligibility list compiled by the Board of Examiners.

The selection of principals by the community school boards was made possible not by the decentralization law but a court decision (the Mansfield decision) which permitted community boards to hire principals who had not undergone Board of Examiners procedures.

On the assumption that standard research methods (e.g., experimental design) were inappropriate for the study of "social change and institutional forms in transition," Gittell's analysis is based on participant-observation and interviews as well as aggregate data.[103]

The Community School Board Elections

Results of the first community school board elections were, to say the least, disappointing. Only 15 percent of the eligible voters in New York City turned out for the 1970 elections. The turnout ranged from a low of 4.9 percent to a high of 22.0 percent.[104] In part this was attributed to boycotts in some districts advocated by community control leaders who were angered by the elimination of the demonstration districts. Most community school boards were dominated by white middle-class established groups, including members of religious organizations, political parties, and the teachers' union:

> . . . the typical community school board member is a white male of the Jewish or Catholic faith, a middle-class professional, with at least two children attending nonpublic school and living in his district

for approximately nine years.[105]

In a school system whose student enrollment was two-thirds minority, of the 279 board members elected in 1970, almost three-fourths (72 percent) were white.

Several factors accounted for the underrepresentation of minorities on the community school boards. The manner in which the district lines were drawn created white majorities even where the school enrollment was predominantly black and Puerto Rican. The intent of the law was to promote school integration but it had the latent effect of "gerrymandering of the districts so that it became impossible for blacks and Puerto Ricans to develop voting majorities."[106] Besides the boycotts, the election procedures (proportional representation) were too complex for many laypersons to understand, and minority parents who were not members of community organizations did not have sufficient time to put together and promote a slate representative of public school parents; both contributed to lower voter turnout.

Educational Change

Community school boards were classified as "change-agent," "active," or "status quo." Change-agent boards had high parent involvement in personnel selection and recruited from the "off list" of teachers and principals. In addition they hired a new district superintendent who--on taking office--initiated educational innovations, held more open board meetings, and provided more information to the community on school affairs.

Although active boards initiated some of the above changes, they tended to perceive their role "and that of parents and local residents as supplementary to standards and procedures set by school professionals."[107] The status quo boards made no attempt to alter existing practices and restricted community participation.

Only two of the boards fell into the change-agent category; six were active; and the rest status quo. Change-agent and active boards were in districts with predominantly black and Puerto Rican populations. Status quo boards were divided between those in predominantly minority and those in predominantly white districts.

Two types of boards were identified in the predominantly black districts and analyzed separately: "unrepresentative" boards and "conflict-ridden" boards. In the former, the difference between the board and the community accounted for the board's resistance to community participation; in the latter, resistance was related to intergroup tension within the community which generated conflicts

between board members. In this case, board meetings were disrupted by protests and, in some, it was alleged that board members were harassed by community members.

Although there was high voter turnout in the white districts with status quo boards, the community did not participate in decisionmaking and there was "little curriculum change. . .and no hiring of 'off list' personnel."[108] There was little incentive to initiate innovations in these districts where a majority of students were doing well.

In the districts with the change-agent boards, conflict was between the community board and the Central Board.

Gittell concluded that:

> . . . there have been no major changes in the distribution of power in school decisionmaking. Educational policy in New York still depends on school professionals in their unions and associations under central contracts and agreements. The central headquarters staff and the Board of Education retain the major share of power.[109]

Positive results, however, were found. "Citizen participation in school affairs has increased . . . attendance at board meetings has improved, and parent interest has heightened."[110] In several districts, parents were actively involved in the selection of principals, and there was increased discussion of "educational options and new methods," but:

> . . . the major impact of parents has been felt in programs with Federal-and State-funding where city budget and contract constraints do not exist. [111]

As with the appointment of principals, the participation of parents in the State and Federally funded programs, came as the result of litigation rather than decentralization.

Research on the Politics of School Decentralization

Aside from Gittell's evaluation, most of the published research on school decentralization has focused on the factors contributing to the development of demands for decentralization and variations in response in different cities. Perhaps the most ambitious undertaking was LaNoue and Smith's three-year comparative case study of five cities in which decentralization was believed to be the highest issue: St. Louis, Los Angeles,

Washington, Detroit, and New York. Their major objective was "to provide an empirical base for a theoretical and public policy analysis of the decentralization movement."[112]

The focus was on stages of the decentralization process: "placement on the agenda, reception by the educational authorities, response of pressure groups, appeal to outside legislature, and alteration of existing school governance." The quest for generalizations was complicated by the "variety of urban governmental structures, the diversity of political actors, and the distinctiveness of local custom and ethos."[113]

Public response provides one example of these variations. In New York City, State intervention followed massive citywide controversy. In Detroit, local controversy emerged after State intervention. Inability to resolve the issue at the State level in Los Angeles is attributed to a financial crisis and the difficulty of sustaining a strong decentralization coalition. In St. Louis, where it was foundation-initiated, decentralization never reached the State level. In Washington, support came primarily from white parents and Federal officials. The failure of institutional changes in New York to produce the anticipated "massive grassroots" citizen involvement reveals the misconceptions underlying community control ideology. Suburban school systems, the model on which the ideology is partly based, are not controlled by parents and, typically, voting turnout is lowest in poor neighborhoods.[114] The authors anticipate that efforts to create accountability at the community level will continue, but note the shift in attention to fiscal issues and the expanded role of the States.

Not surprisingly, the most significant variable found, that related to the decentralization issue, was city size. Of more interest is the finding that the percentage of nonwhites in a school system or city seems not to be as important as the number of nonwhites.[115]

The significance of differences in local condition was brought out in case studies of decentralization conducted by other researchers. For example, the strength of the political machines in Chicago was identified by Cibulka as a major reason community control never reached high salience in that city.[116]

Foley found that the failure of decentralization in Philadelphia was due to a lack of sufficient power to overcome the opposition of groups who depended upon and actively defended the historically centralized and professionally dominated systems.[117] Decentralization in that city was

supported by the superintendent and deputy superintendent. But it was opposed not only by a conservative citywide parent organization that did not believe parents were competent to make professional decisions, but also by other civic groups with an interest in education. These groups were allied with reform government and saw decentralization as a threat to their interests. Because the superintendent lacked the support of the reform allies, neither local nor State officials actively participated in the decentralization struggle.

Foley found community groups to be divided; black groups active in community affairs were divided for and against decentralization, and "racial conflict between black and white organizations polarized community reactions."118/ There was no tie-in between community groups and anti-poverty agencies who "concerned themselves primarily with economic issues and did not provide indigeneous leadership or support for school reform."119/ The issue was to be resolved by a special commission. However, the selection of participants and members was controlled by the citywide parent group opposed to decentralization. Consequently, the superintendent and the decentralization plan were defeated.

In Rochester, New York, events related to community control were linked to a school desegregation controversy. The outcome of that case was analyzed by Boyd and Seldin. They conclude that:

> Reform efforts which focus on school administrators as the key obstacles to reform, are simplistic and, in a significant sense, misguided.120/

While school authorities were not as insulated from public opinion as some reformers contended, their response to community control demands was essentially symbolic, reflecting the conservative bias in educational decision-making. The final response to desegregation reflected the dominance of white middle-class interests. Reform efforts must consider both sources of resistance to policies which aim to serve minority interests.

Pressure for school desegregation in Rochester, prior to 1969, came from the State rather than the community. But when the school system moved towards implementing a desegregation plan, opposition developed. Consequently the school board vetoed the plan. It was the board's rejection of a second, 1969 desegregation plan supported by a coalition of minority and white groups that led to demands for community control. After a series of protests on the part of community control advocates,

the board adopted a resolution to establish community school councils. Since the proposed councils did not grant substantial powers to the community, the subsequent series of negotiations did not result in any major concessions to the community control advocates.

While these negotiations were proceeding, there occurred changes in the school board creating a prodesegregation majority and adoption of a reorganization plan which involved busing. This plan aroused the opposition of white middle-class groups, the successful effort by Republicans to change the school board (from a 5-member partisan body to a 7-member nonpartisan group) and subsequent election of an antidesegregation majority. Election results indicated that both the minority community and white liberals were divided on the two issues. The new board subsequently reversed the desegregation resolution. Although the community control leaders pressed successfully for an expansion of the functions of the community school councils, there was little effort to implement the new provisions, indicating that this reform had "lost most of its credibility with the inner-city community."121/

These events illustrate the limitations of both protest and conventional political bargaining strategies to promote minority interests. As in other cities with a relatively small and geographically-dispersed black population, it proved difficult to organize and sustain an effective coalition on behalf of minority interests.

Another comparative analysis, by Boyd and O'Shea, of the differing response to community control demands in New York, Detroit, and Los Angeles sought to explain the variable responses in terms of three models. These models are: rational decisionmaking, political bargaining, and organization response. 122/ The first was ruled out on the grounds that the schools did not possess "a proved method for resolving the problems of minority underachievement."123/ While neither of the remaining models is "inherently irrational," the choice reflects the participants' definitions of the situation which, following Mannheim's formulation, tends to depend on their social positions.124/ Those who opt for the political solution tend to attribute minority underachievement to an imbalance of power and seek to restructure the governing process. School officials define the problems in terms of insufficient resources and authority and seek more administrative autonomy at the local level.125/ This analysis of variations in initial response to decentralization demands and the policy consequences requires consideration of the assumptions underlying the political and organizational models.

Similar events preceded the emergence of demands for community control in the three cities examined in this study: rapid increase in minority populations, recognition of low achievement levels, and a demand for school desegregation. Minimal response to this demand gave rise to the demand for community control by minority leaders who were supported by leaders of either white liberal or white conservative groups. In the two cities which adopted political decentralization--New York and Detroit--the issue was resolved by State legislatures. However, "even in the legislature, hopes for community control were limited by the formidable power of organized teachers and other interests which viewed community control critically."126/

One consequence is that the difficulties related to organizing support, and the inability of pro-community control forces to achieve substantial changes, raise serious questions about the efficacy of the political bargaining process as the means to promote minority interests.

In Los Angeles, although a community control proposal had been passed by the State Legislature, the solution reflected the organizational process model. The Los Angeles school board's adoption of an administrative decentralization plan that would establish new structures for citizen participation, at both the citywide and local school levels, was used by the governor in his veto of political decentralization. The new structures, in terms of organizational theory, are viewed as "boundary-spanning" mechanisms designed to enable the organization to maintain control over an uncertain environment. The organization accomplishes this by creating new roles and instituting rules and regulations to coordinate and control. But these procedures lead to a paradox: "control will be decentralized only insofar as it can be controlled."127/

Boyd and O'Shea refer to several factors that challenge the applicability of organizational theory to large school systems as well as the potential of administrative decentralization to promote environmental responsiveness and accountability. Data from several earlier studies indicated that school systems are relatively "insensitive" to their environments and that there is little role differentiation at the local level. Control mechanisms at this level tend to be weak, due to the "desire for professional autonomy on the part of teachers and the structural isolation of teachers in classrooms which makes supervision difficult." School officials, therefore, will tend to "favor types of decentralization which do not significantly weaken their already th n lines of

control and authority."128/

Despite these obstacles, the authors predict "continued debate with regard to school decentralization, or other structural changes in the administration and governance of public education."129/ But the decline in public interest in decentralization led Peterson to discuss the limitations of the organizational and political bargaining models for analyzing changes in public policy over time. He argues that the rational decision-making model provides the best approach for explaining the emergence and decline of the decentralization issue, although it does not predict the "degree or form of decentralization" or the outcome.130/

Peterson, assuming (because the decentralization studies he examined did not consider data on official motives) that social cohesion was the primary goal for school and other public officials, suggests that the adoption of decentralization--political or administrative--can be regarded as rational. This model views government as a "unitary" goal-oriented body confronted by problems. According to this formulation, social and economic changes led to civil disorders which threatened social cohesion, a threat which was "a major concern of civic leaders in urban areas."131/

Problems in urban school systems, reflecting the racial conflicts in the larger society, could not be ignored by either civic leaders or school authorities. Decentralization, following this interpretation, was an acceptable alternative because it promised to reduce conflict by containing dissent at the local school level. Furthermore, it would provide local administrators with authority to respond to local demands and needs and to enable the hiring of minority teachers and administrators. Both political decentralization and administrative decentralization perform the same function: providing a "linkage mechanism" to contain the "increasingly disruptive segment of the population."132/

The decline of decentralization is probably due, in Peterson's opinion, to the emergence of economic issues, a reduction in "race-related civil violence" and the decline in Federal support.133/

On the other hand, Peterson argues that the differential response to decentralization demands can be best explained in terms of the political bargaining or pluralistic model, which requires consideration of the strength of decentralization proponents and opponents as well as of school system officials. In the two politically decentra-

lized school systems, New York and Detroit, decentralization advocates were supported by an alliance of citywide civic groups and State legislators. "In Los Angeles the alliance had not sufficient white support to prevent conservative Governor Ronald Reagan from vetoing a decentralization bill."[134] Failure of decentralization efforts in Rochester and Philadelphia was attributed to the division between integration and decentralization interests. These and other findings were consistent with Peterson's earlier conclusion that the activation of civic elites in urban school politics "provided a more effective political base for reform than the formal changes promoted by the OEO."[135]

One study of the impact of administrative decentralization in Los Angeles supports the social control hypothesis--although the unit of analysis is the school building principal rather than higher authorities or elites. Jenkins suggested that the new participatory arrangements (community-school advisory councils) would tend to deflect local demands and complaints from the school board and central administrators to local school principals who in turn would develop strategies to manipulate council members in order to avoid conflict.[136]

Several hypotheses, related to Goffman's concept of "impression management," were tested in an analysis of principals' methods in 35 advisory councils.[137] "Impression management" refers to the way the principal presents himself or herself to the council members, in order to control their perception of his or her behavior. It was anticipated that principals would use two strategies to acheive this control: (1) discourage involvement by presenting himself or herself as an expert and the only one qualified to make educational decisions, and (2) manipulation. Several indicators of the possible forms these strategies could take were included in interview schedules and questionnaires administered to all the participants. In addition, a researcher observed a council meeting to obtain first-hand data on principals' behaviors.

The results suggested that all principals saw themselves as the legitimate authority in the school and that they used manipulative techniques and were reported to use them by other participants. There were variations in the extent to which these techniques were used. Jenkins' study was not designed to explore this variance; however, there were indications to suggest that the most important variable may be the level of council support for the principal. Principals in white middle-class schools, where parents tended to accept the principal's authority, used fewer manipulative techniques than those

in racially desegregated ones where council members challenged the school and the principal.

Other studies suggest a similar relationship between administrative attitudes and community context. Mann compared variations in administrative representational orientations in 10 New York areas.[138] The sample consisted of principals, superintendents, and headquarters staff in different types of communities (large city, industrial suburb, residential small city, etc.) including two decentralized districts in New York City. Representational role orientations included the "trustee" (decides in terms of what he or she thinks best for the community), the "delegate" (reflects constituents's wishes), and the "politico" (follows either the delegate or trustee style depending on the situation.[139]

Although the trustee role predominated (61 percent of the sample), this tendency declined with elected boards, with oversight of the board, and with the existence of active and independent community-based educational interest groups. Mann's community organization typology included three categories:

(1) "unorganized"--no functioning educational interest group,

(2) "traditional organized"--only the PTA, and

(3) "highly organized"-- two or more continueing education related interest groups independent of the schools.

Mann's findings tend to support Lyke's contention that the level of community organization tends to be related to population diversity.[140]

A qualitative longitudinal study of parent-initiated reform efforts in a heterogeneous New York suburb reinforces Mann's and Lyke's findings on the significance of independent community-based organizations.[141] When the study began (1968), the educational program was controlled by school professionals. Parents who wanted educational innovations were in turn controlled by a conservative PTA and local building principals. Following two school budget defeats and parent complaints about the nonresponsive system, the administration created a new channel for parent input to establish "educational goals and plan innovations." All six of the districts' building principals resisted parent influence, forcing those who were interested in promoting specific reforms to organize independent groups. While the parents could not get established community

groups to endorse the innovations, membership in these various groups provided recruits and indirect social support for ad hoc groups. One explanation for the board's response to the parents' interests was the threat of a budget defeat. The successful groups were all led by parents who had extensive interpersonal networks (strong and weak ties) throughout the community. Without strong support from the school parents, the board had learned from experience, it was unlikely to get the budget passed.

Summary

Federal efforts to increase the participation of the poor were a response to urban unrest in the mid-1960's. Available evidence on the impact of the participatory programs indicates that the results varied in different cities.

Part of the variations in program implementation was attributed to the ambiguity of the program guidelines, and community characteristics. In some cities, the ability of the participants to promote institutional change was limited by constraints imposed by program implementers. Analysts' interpretations of the results tend to be inconsistent, possibly reflecting their own values, different research methods, program variations, and time limitations which prevented them from conducting longitudinal studies.

Some concluded that the new participatory structures were essentially mechanisms of social control. They directed minority hostility from central officials to the local neighborhood and promoted intergroup conflicts at this level. Where the CAP's raised unrealistic expectations for social change, they were described as demoralizing the poor and increasing feelings of alienation and frustration.142/

While Cole reported that programs rated by citizens as most effective were those that promoted limited participation and influence stressing cooperation between the representatives of the poor and established groups, Brecher found that programs rated as most effective by evaluators were those which stressed a political strategy and the mobilization of the poor.143/ But Brecher's analysis also suggests that the strategy worked best where black leadership and neighborhood organizations were already established or emerging, and that these patterns were related to city size as well as the size of the black population.

Federal resources apparently contributed to the reinforcement and further development of preexisting patterns. Demands for school decentralization appear to have been strongest in cities where the CAP's had performed this role. But the adoption of political decentralization, since it required policy change at the level of the State Legislature, involved a coalition of cohesive black groups and white established groups in the political bargaining process. Reformers hopes were thwarted by the opposition of teacher groups and other interests who were able to limit the types of issues in which the community could become involved. Control of the areas most relevant to educational innovation--budget and teaching personnel--remained concentrated at the central board and the union. The events illustrate the limitations of pluralism for the representation of minority interests.

Peterson (1975) speculated that the goal of decentralization (from the perspective of policymakers) was social cohesion rather than social change, to be achieved by containing conflict at the local level and facilitating the hiring of more minority personnel.144/ This view is consistent with Gittell's interpretation of the decentralization law enacted in New York.145/ However, the limitations of the powers granted to the community school boards activated some districts to pursue further change efforts. The central board was, in general, insulated from community groups. However, where change efforts were frustrated, activists turned to the courts. Some issues were sponsored by city-level groups. The employment of more minority personnel resulted from a court action undertaken by the NAACP, rather than from decentralization.

More recently, the institution of bilingual programs for Puerto Rican students on a systemwide basis, and the hiring of more Puerto Rican teachers in the New York City system, followed the resolution of a law suit sponsored by Aspira, another city-level group. Similar lawsuits have been instituted on behalf of language-minority students in other cities. Groups representing black students continue to use the courts to force resistant school boards to implement school desegregation policies. These court actions reflect Federal civil rights legislation and, in some instances, material and legal resources provided by the Federal Government.

These events suggest that evaluation of the impact of both the CAP's and school decentralization should consider unanticipated consequences as well as the goals of policymakers and the initial expectations and subsequent experiences of minority activists. The relative

diminution of grassroots interest in participation at the local community level may be an indication that minority leaders, following their unsuccessful efforts to promote change through the local structures, have turned again to centralized structures--primarily the court.[146]

The neighborhood organizations mobilized with Federal resources were constrained not only by the difficulty of activating and sustaining the participation of community residents, but also by the Federal guidelines and the inability of Federal officials to change local power structures. Where federally-funded action programs were able to organize on a neighborhood basis, this led to the creation of narrow--rather than broad--constituencies and reform policies.

Where school decentralization advocates were able to mobilize sufficient influence to effect change in school governance, efforts to promote institutional reforms were constrained by the decentralization guidelines as well as the resistance of established educators and white community groups. Resources to pursue significant reforms in personnel policies and curriculum came from sources beyond the local community: the Federal Government and citywide interest groups. Whether these efforts will succeed is a subject for future investigation.

There appears to be general agreement that locally based interest groups lack sufficient resources to formulate and articulate broad policy changes. Furthermore, most analysts agree that policymaking has shifted from the local community to citywide, State and Federal decision centers and that whatever power remains at the city level is concentrated in occupational groups. Although there seems to be some support for the view that independent voluntary associations are more effective mechanisms for social change than those sponsored by the Federal Government, their influence is limited in the face of organized professional groups and trade unions. If this view is accurate, we can predict that the innovations resisted by educators--even where citizens manage to effect policy changes--stand a slim chance of being implemented in terms consistent with the reformers' goals.

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19. See: Peter H. Rossi and Walter Williams, eds., Evaluating Social Programs (New York: Seminar Press, 1972), and Robert S. Weiss and Martin Rein, "The Evaluation of Broad Aim Programs; Experimental Design, Its Difficulties and an Alternative," Administrative Science Quarterly, March 1970.

20. Sherry R. Arnstein, "Eight Rungs on the Ladder of Citizen Participation," in Citizen Participation: Effecting Community Change, ed. E.S. Cahn and B.A. Passett (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 71.

21. Douglas Yates, Neighborhood Democracy: The Politics and Impact of Decentralization (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co., 1973).

22. Richard L. Cole, Citizen Participation and the Urban Policy Process (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co., 1974) p. 15.

23. Ibid.

24. Arnstein, "Eight Rungs on the Ladder of Citizen Participation" (1971).

25 Cole, Citizen Participation (1974), p. 23.

26. Ibid., p. 108.

27. Ibid., p. 126.

28. Brecher, The Impact of Federal Anti-Poverty Policies (1973), p. 99.

29. Ibid., p. 100.

30. Ibid., p. 101.

31. Ibid., p. 102.

32. Ibid., p. 103.

33. Brandeis Study, "Community Representation in 20 Cities," in Cahn and Passett, Citizen Participation (1971).

34. Ibid., p. 209.

35. Ibid., pp. 209-210.

36. Ibid., p. 211.

37. Yates, Neighborhood Democracy (1973).

38. See: James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (New York: Basic Books, 1973); David J. O'Brien, Neigborhood Organizations and Interest Group Processes (Princeton University Press, 1975); and Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press, 1971). In addition, Helfgot reported that in the early phase of the Mobilization for Youth Program in Manhattan: "The new notion of the poor as participants in social action was set in motion by establishing voluntary organizations of indigenous residents who eventually organized for directed social action. Membership was voluntary and members were not paid. When it became doubtful that participation would yield economic benefits those associations disbanded." See: Joseph Helfgot, "Professional Reform Organizations and the Symbolic Representation of the Poor," American Sociological Review, August 1974, p. 479.

39. Wilson, Political Organizations (1973), p. 69.

40. Ibid., p. 65.

41. Ibid., p. 41.

42. Helfgot, "Professional Reform Organziations" (1974). The Mobilization for Youth Program received funds from a variety of sources, including OEO.

43. Ibid., p. 479.

44. Ibid., p. 484.

45. Ibid., p. 490.

46. Ralph M. Kramer, Participation of the Poor: Comparative Community Case Studies in the War on Poverty (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969). Quoted in Wilson (1973), p. 68.

47. Wilson (1973), p. 68.

48. Paul E. Peterson, "Forms of Representation: Participation of the Poor in the Community Action Program," American Political Science Review, June 1970. See also: Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

49. Peterson, "Forms of Representation" (1970), p. 496.

50. Ibid., p. 498.

51. Formal representation refers to the method employed to recruit representatives: elected or appointed.

52. Peterson (1970), p. 504.

53. Ibid., pp. 505-506.

54. See: Yates (1973); Cole (1974).

55. Cole (1974), p. 108.

56. Ibid., p. 111.

57. Ibid., p. 114.

58. Lipsky stated that "if activity (political organization and protest) once engaged in, is rewarded primarily by the dispensation of symbolic gestures without perceptible changes in material conditions, then rational behavior might lead to expression of apathy and lack of interest in politics or a rejection of conventional political channels as a meaningful arena of activity."

See: Michael Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource," American Political Science Review, December 968. Quoted in Cole (1974), p. 117.

59. Cole (1974), p. 117.

60. Ibid., p. 118.

61. James L. Sundquist and David W. Davis, Making Federalism Work: A Study of Program Coordination at the Community Level (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1969), pp. 46 and 117.

62. However, there is a value judgement implicit in this research which assumes that conflict is bad.

63. Jeffrey Pressman, "Foreign Aid and Urban Aid," in Neighborhood Control in the 1970's, ed. George Frederickson (New York: Chandler Publishing Co., 1973), p. 157.

64. David Rogers, 110 Livingston Street (New York: Random House, 1968).

65. Marilyn Gittell and T. Edward Hollander, Six Urban School Districts (New York: Praeger, 1968).

66. Yates (1973), p. 22.

67. O'Brien, Neighborhood Organizations (1975), p. 66.

68. Rolan L. Warren, The Community in America (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1963).

69. Ibid., quoted in O'Brien (1975), p. 79.

70. O'Brien (1975), p. 88.

71. Ibid., p. 86.

72. Ibid., p. 88.

73. Ibid., pp. 175-183.

74. Ibid., p. 81.

75. See: Arnstein (1971); Bachrach and Baratz (1970); David and Peterson, Urban Politics (1976); and Yates (1973).

76. For example see: Brecher (1973) and Yates (1973).

77. Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969).

78. Ibid., p. 245.

79. Ibid., p. 246.

80. J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, Race and Authority in Urban Politics (University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. xix-xx.

81. For example see: Michael Kirst and Edith Mosher, "The Politics of Education," Review of Educational Research, December 1969.

82. Marilyn Gittell et al., Local Control in Education (New York: Praeger, 1972).

83. Ibid., pp. 1 and 131.

84. Ibid., p. 129.

85. Ibid., p. 120.

86. Ibid., pp. 131-32.

87. Ibid., p. 64.

88. Nationwide figures for 1967 show 17 percent of the population belonging to "school service, PTA-type of groups." See: Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 42.

89. Gittell, Local Control in Education (1972), p. 64.

90. Ibid., p. 51.

91. Ibid., p. 43.

92. Ibid., p. 132.

93. Ibid., pp. 43, 132.

94. Ibid., p. 51.

95. Ibid., p. 65.

96. See the summary of the poll results in The New York Times, December 3, 1973, 34:3.

97. Robert F. Lyke, "Representation and Urban School Boards," in Community Control of Schools, ed. Henry M. Levin (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1969).

98. Ibid., p. 164.

99. Ibid., p. 165.

100. Ibid.

101. Marilyn Gittell, School Boards and School Policy (New York: Praeger, 1973).

102. Ibid., p. 159.

103. Ibid., p. x.

104. Ibid., p. 98.

105. Ibid., p. 91.

106. Ibid., p. 125.

107. Ibid., p. 94.

108. Ibid, pp. 141-42.

109. Ibid., p. 157.

110. Ibid., p. 158.

111. Ibid.

112. George R. LaNoue and Bruce L. R. Smith, The Politics of School Decentralization (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co., 1973), p. 225.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid., p. 237.

115. Ibid., p. 33.

116. James A Cibulka, "School Decentralization in Chicago," Education and Urban Society, August 1975.

117. Fred J. Foley, "The Failure of Reforms: Community Control and the Philadelphia Public Schools," Urban Education, January 1976.

118. Ibid., p. 398.

119. Ibid., p. 396.

120. William Boyd and Florence Seldin, "The Politics of School Reform in Rochester, New York," Education and Urban Society, August 1975, p. 461.

121. Ibid., p. 458.

122. William L. Boyd and David O'Shea, "Theoretical Perspectives on School District Decentralization," Education and Urban Society, August 1975.

123. Ibid., p. 359.

124. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1936).

125. Boyd and O'Shea, "Theoretical Perspectives on School District Decentralization" (1975), pp. 358-63.

126. Ibid., p. 370.

127. Ibid., p. 371.

128. Ibid., p. 372.

129. Ibid., p. 337.

130. Paul E. Peterson, "Afterword: The Politics of School Decentralization," Education and Urban Society, August 1975, p. 477.

131. Ibid., p. 473.

132. Ibid., p. 476. A similar interpretation is offered by Ira Katznelson who describes school decentralization and other contemporary participatory innovations as mechanisms of social control. See: Katznelson, "Class Capacity and Social Cohesion in American Cities," The New Urban Politics, ed. Louis H. Massotti and Robert Lineberry (Cambridge, Mass.: The Ballinger Publishing Co., 1976), p. 28.

133. Peterson, "Afterword" (1975), p. 477.

134. Ibid., p. 471.

135. Peterson, "Forms of Representation: Participation of the Poor in the Community Action Program" (1970) p. 226.

136. Jeanne K. Jenkins,"Responses of Public School Principals to School Community Advisory Coucils," a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Chicago, 1974.

137. See: Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden City, New York: Doubleday-Anchor, 1959).

138. Dale Mann, "Administrative Representation in New York State Elementary and Secondary Schools," a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1971.

139. Ibid., p. 3.

140. See: Lyke "Representation and Local School Boards" (1969).

141. Lois S. Steinberg, "The Role of Extra-Local Interest Groups in School Policy and Implementation," a paper presented at the American Educational Research Association annual meeting in Washington, D.C., 1975. ERIC Doc. #105 592.

142. See: Katznelson, "Class Capacity and Social Cohesion in American Cities" (1976) and Lowi, End of Liberalism (1969).

143. See: Cole, Citizen Participation (1974) and Brecher, Impact of Federal Anti-Poverty Policies (1973).

144. Peterson, "Afterword" (1975).

145. Gittell, School Boards and School Policy (1973).

146. A reduction in minority participation may also reflect the curtailment of the community action programs.

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